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Walter Pater’s Individualism:
Philosophical Aesthetics and ‘The Elusive Inscrutable Mistakable Self’

Abstract


It is the individual and not art that is at the heart of Walter Pater’s philosophical aesthetics.  Even as Pater realizes the ‘illusive inscrutable mistakable’ nature of the individual under the conditions of modernity, his aesthetics revolve around it.   

He boldly attempts to reconsider the kind of individualism that will be possible in the wake of modernity, searching within the chaos and ephemera of a Godless universe to seek Man’s raison d’etre within the imagination.  Certainly, his idiosyncratic thought is not a system, nor even a consistent vision, so much as a faltering meditation on what kind of individualism is possible under the conditions of modernity.  It is a discourse situated at a schism in humankind’s consciousness of itself: on one hand, looking to the philosophies Pater studied carefully -- those of Hume, Kant, Schiller and Goethe, amongst others -- and on the other hand, understanding that the emerging future will require its own conception of reality.  

With these issues in mind, my study has two main aims.  First, it explores the troubled vicissitudes of Pater’s conception of the individual.  Second, it argues that Pater has a significant position, not only in the history of literary style, but in the history of ideas, by tracing how his thought interacts with and reconceives the philosophical traditions of British empiricism, German Romanticism and Idealism.  Its chapters are organized around six central concerns: the relationship between self and world, the nebulous conceptions of ‘spirit’ and ‘soul,’ sensuality, the body as subject and object, passing time and the eternal moment, and ethics.  These issues are considered with reference to the full range of Pater’s essays and imaginary portraits, including his unpublished manuscripts, ‘The History of Philosophy and ‘The Aesthetic Life.’  Their significance is understood within the context of Pater’s intellectual milieu, his own life and their resonances through literary modernism. 
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Individualism and the ‘Aesthetic Philosopher’:
An Introduction













Art is the most intense form of Individualism...​[1]​


Beyond and above all the various interests upon which the philosopher's mind was ever afloat, there was one subject always in prominence -- himself.​[2]​



The faltering triumph of Walter Pater’s aesthetic is his conception of the individual.  Amid the storms that assailed subjectivity in mid-Victorian culture, Pater’s aesthetic is indeed a portrait of humanity ‘in its uncertain condition’ (R 39); an admission that we may be but ‘a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream’ (R 151), spiritually desolate and ever possessed by conflicting desires.  Yet still it sparkles with the quiet ambition that the modern individual’s lost sense of self-identity may be reconceived through aesthetic experience.  And so Pater’s aesthetic conception of the individual under the conditions of modernity is the focus of this study.  

In every one of his works Pater is in some sense looking for ‘the elusive inscrutable mistakable self’ (HP 44):
            And if we know so little[,] it might be urged of the supposed substance of one’s own 
            mind how much less can we really penetrate into the minds of others[,] of whose whole 
            inward existence in a strictly logical estimate of facts nothing really comes to us but a 
            stream of material phenomena[,] as of ourselves to ourselves[,] but the stream of the 
            phenomena of our own elusive inscrutable mistakable self.  (HP 44)​[3]​
Whilst the individual is not and cannot be for him an unproblematic entity, neither can he allow it to dissolve into nothingness.  Pater returns again and again to the individual, without answers, but with an intense curiosity to explore its vicissitudes: subjectivity, personal identity, spirituality, desire and epistemology.  He is captivated by the ironic situation in which the modern individual finds their self: in a world where all we can be certain of is the truth of our impressions, yet we are left unable to understand the nature of the self who is having these impressions.​[4]​  Pater is an empiricist with Romantic-Idealist ambitions: he is intrigued by ‘the supposed substance of one’s own mind’; our ‘whole inward existence’; that ‘elusive inscrutable mistakable self,’ and craves to know what secrets lie there, whilst understanding that this lies beyond the scope of human knowledge.  

It is an ironic enquiry for Pater, whose own self is constructed on a paradox.  For whilst the endeavour wrought out in his essays and imaginary portraiture is to explore the conditions of individualism and the constituent parts of the individual, Pater the individual is himself shrouded in mystery.  Henry James, who did not know him well but understood him acutely, remarks that ‘[h]e is the mask without the face, and there isn’t in his total superficies a tiny point of vantage for the newspaper to flap his wings on’ (293; sic).  As every biography of Pater laments, he is himself that ‘illusive inscrutable mistakable self.’  The biographer’s art is all but lost on him because we will never understand his heart through his ostensible words or deeds; he did not want us to and he has delicately achieved his aim.  He was not given to confidences, being ‘cautious, reserved and shy in his relations even with his friends’ amongst whom his ‘extremely affectionate disposition took the place of expansiveness’ (Gosse 265).  Neither did he keep a diary and his letters are brief and unrevealing.  As he apologetically admits to his correspondents: ‘I write so few letters!’; ‘Letters are such poor means of communication’; ‘I am but a poor letter-writer’ (L 52; 80; 128).  As though he sought to emulate ‘[Prosper] Merimée’s superb self-effacement, his impersonality’ (MS 24), he ensured that few if any saw behind his masks.  He was J. Alfred Prufrock in many ways; his intense inner-life hemmed within by a shyness and meticulousness nagging always ‘Do I dare?’

William Rothenstein’s sketch emblematizes the issue.​[5]​  Pater sat for Rothenstein, who was creating a series of Oxford Characters, in late 1893 or early 1894.  On seeing the finished picture he wrote to Rothenstein, ‘I thought your drawing of me a clever likeness, but doubt very much whether my sister, whom I have told about it will like it; in which case I would rather not have it published’ (L 150).  This was followed by a letter to the publisher, John Lane, professing that his sisters ‘think it so unlike me that publication of it must be given up’ (L 152) and a visit to Lane in which he ‘used great stress as to what he will do if it is published’ (L 150n).  In actual fact it was Pater’s sisters who gave permission for the sketch to be published after his death in 1895.  The Rothenstein episode reminds us of Pater’s anxiety about his self-presentation.  Whether he really rejected the sketch because it did not resemble him or whether it resembled him too much, we will never know.  Whenever we look at Pater though, we are uncertain as to whether we are seeing his true likeness.  Pater the individual is enigmatic, so much so that the only way to glimpse him is in a sideways glance through his literary art.  Pater is quoting Merimée when he writes, ‘“It has always been my rule to put nothing of myself into my works” (to be disinterested in his literary creations, so to speak), “yet I have put too much of myself into them”’ (MS 23-4).  He might have been speaking of himself.  As Pater explores the concept of the individual through his own ‘literary creations’, he is also exploring himself. 

Therefore, in some sense, Mrs. Oliphant is quite correct when she writes that, in The Renaissance, 
           [i]t is in furtherance of the grand pursuit of self-culture that he writes, treating all the great 
            art and artists of the past, and all the centuries of men, as chiefly important and attractive 
            in their relations to that Me who is in the centre of the dilettante’s world.  (87) 
Yet this supreme Me is an ironic centre, effected and affected with a seriousness that eludes Mrs. Oliphant’s sardonic tone.  Pater grapples within a philosophical paradigm of epistemology which had become both insistent and fraught to defend the individual as the centre of being against forces that threatened to dissolve it into nothingness.  He offers to reconcile us with our finitude and to show us that we are more than mere prisoners of our nature.  Reflecting on modernity in The Renaissance he asserts that ‘not less than ever, the intellect demands completeness, centrality’ (146).  He is understating his point here, for he believed − or at least wanted to believe − fervently in the centrality, even ‘lordship’, of the creative subject (R 132).  ‘Pater’s vision of the human condition,’ as Murray Pittock has commented, ‘is one which stresses the autonomy of the human spirit: that which we create ourselves, and are the measure of our own value’ (15-16).  All told, Pater agonizes over this vision.  Autonomy is hard-won against the ‘mythical personage’ of God, society and its ethics, material conditions in their eternal flux, and the self-destructive impulses that may possess one.  His writings are a wondering quest to explore how it is possible to achieve autonomy under the conditions of modernity through aesthetic experience.  

In this way, Pater is utterly defined by his position at the schism between Romantic sensibility and the beginnings of modernity.  He is torn: unable to give up his belief in individualism, yet profoundly touched by the insistent realities of Darwinism, the fragmented experience of time, the death of God and subjectivity in the modern world.  Looking back to Wordsworth and Schiller and forward to Proust and Woolf, Pater is at that most tricky and interesting crux, as one who must attempt to understand the nature of the transition taking place and define its implications for art and one’s self.  The way in which he questions the Promethean man in his Conclusion to Studies in the History of the Renaissance has led critics to suggest that Pater does not believe in individuality. ​[6]​  With respect, this is clearly incorrect.  Pater's ‘commitment to engage with and assimilate “modern thought” and then to turn it against itself under the auspices of aestheticism’ (Carolyn Williams 27) is at its most fervent when he considers the individual.  If, at times, this individual becomes absorbed into the flux, it is part of Pater’s exploration of how individuality is assailed by modernity; part of his endeavour to understand these conditions in order to forge an alternative and distinctly modern conception of individualism.  This study concerns the dynamics between the individual, modernity and art in Pater’s aesthetic.  It argues that Pater pursues a Romantic individualism in contradistinction both from Victorian individualism, which is defined by the individual’s economic and political freedom from State intervention,​[7]​ and from the multifarious merging forces that threatened to dissolve the individual altogether.  Emerging out of German Romanticism, the Paterian individual is defined according to his ‘uniqueness, originality, self-realization’ (Lukes 17).  Pater pursues these qualities in his imaginary portraiture against and in spite of the forces of self-dissolution that he tacitly acknowledges.  As modernity and its ideas assail the individual it is aesthetic experience and creativity that give the individual a sense of autonomy.

The reason why this golden thread is so often neglected or even misunderstood amidst the colours of Pater’s prose has to do with the very way in which we approach him.  It is Pater the stylist and, more recently, Pater the purveyor of male-male desire, which have been the subject of the critic’s gaze.  Pater the thinker is an altogether rarer concern.  In one of my favourite digs, which could stand for many others, Angela Leighton quips that ‘Pater is good at memorable nonsense’ (2005, 67).  Similarly, Denis Donoghue has declared ‘that Pater was indifferent to ideas’ (306), whilst Gabriel Roberts argues most recently that philosophical approaches to Pater have led to ‘the persistent misconstrual of what Pater actually meant’ (409).  They argue almost as fervently as Richard Wollheim has argued that, in fact, we must begin with Pater’s philosophy if we hope to understand him at all (24).  Academics such as Billie Andrew Inman, Laurel Brake, Carolyn Williams and Leslie Higgins have done much to bring to life the philosophical dimensions of Pater’s writings; and the above comment notwithstanding, Angela Leighton herself has contributed greatly to elucidating Pater’s philosophical ideas.  Even so, too many critics only skirt the edges of Paterian thought, whilst engaged in quite other discussions or restrict their scope to just a fragment of his writing: the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  If one wishes to understand the dynamics between the individual, modernity and art that underpin Pater’s works, one must make him central, broadening the scope to his lesser-known and unpublished works and granting that he is one of the most significant aesthetic theorists of the nineteenth century.


i. Walter Pater: ‘aesthetic philosopher’

        In a minute there is time
       For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse...​[8]​

The question raised by Angela Leighton’s comment on the quality of Pater’s thought must first be addressed.  Certainly, the nature of his thought is idiosyncratic: shifting, apparently contradictory and, in places, tinged in purple.  It is not what philosophical thought is meant to be.  But this is, in part, the point. 

There is an endearing and altogether characteristic incongruity between Pater’s assertion that ‘we will hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch’ (R 152) and the way that he devoted his career to this endless, irresolvable task.  His endeavour, always, was to explore what kind of philosophical discourse might be possible under the conditions of modernity.  In the famous and anonymous review of ‘Poems by William Morris’, he writes
           It is a strange transition from the earthly paradise to the sad-coloured world of abstract   
            philosophy.  But let us accept the challenge; let us see what modern philosophy, when it is 
            sincere, really does say about human life and the truth we can attain in it, and the relation 
            of this to the desire of beauty.  (WM 309)  
In the career that began with this review Pater’s writings represent his acceptance of this challenge.  His writings are his attempts to fuse the desire for beauty with sincere exploration of the human condition.  He is an idiosyncratic thinker, there is no denying that.  He did not believe in objectivity, eternal truths or philosophical systems, nor did he even believe that rational discourse can ascertain right.  This does not mean that his thought is nonsensical or a merely stylistic performance.  Intellectual rigour is crucial to Pater’s literary art.  Thus he applauds the achievements of Violet Paget’s Euphorion,​[9]​ writing to her that, ‘I always welcome this evidence of intellectual structure in a poetic or imaginative piece of criticism, as I think it a rare thing, and it is also an effect I have endeavoured after, and so come to know its difficulties’ (L 80).  Humphrey Ward recalls that Pater ‘was severe on confusions of thought, and still more on any kind of rhetoric.  An emphatic word was sure to be underscored and the absolutely right phrase suggested’ (Benson 25).  This aspiration to the exact expression of rigorously worked out thought is in accordance with his vision of art as a perfect fusion of form and content (R 88).  One expects that Pater has these aims in mind when he writes of Flavian’s views in Marius the Epicurean: ‘The happy phrase or sentence was really modelled upon a clearly finished structure of scrupulous thought …. [and] this rare blending of grace with an intellectual rigour or astringency, was the secret of a singular expressiveness in it’ (M, I, 154; 157).  This preoccupation with the fusion of beauty and intellectual thought characterizes his own literary art.  Pater does not sacrifice the intellect to beautiful form because he understands that they are
indistinguishable.  His rigorous development of style has been discussed extensively; of his rigorous exploration of ideas there is much left to say.

One of the problems in recognizing this is that Pater does not belong to any school of philosophical thought that would allow the critic to accurately fix him in a formulated phrase.  This has been attempted with the ‘Aesthetic Movement’.  However, to subsume Pater into this disparate group prioritizes the hedonistic Walter Pater others wished him to be.  Perhaps he once entertained the thought of becoming this man in the early 1870s.  In truth though he never did.  He was not part of any school or movement, really.  He was a fiercely individualistic writer who turned away from the pressing influences of his contemporaries to preserve his personal vision.  As his friend, Edmund Gosse, recalls, 
            Pater did not study his contemporaries; a year or two ago he told me that he had scarcely 
            read a chapter of Mr. Stevenson and not a line of Mr. Kipling.  ‘I feel from what I hear
            about them,’ he said, ‘that they are strong; they might lead me out of my path.  I want to 
            go on writing in my own way, good or bad.  I should be afraid to read Mr. Kipling, lest he 
            should come between me and my page next time I sat down to write.’  (265) 
This modest sense of self-preservation suggests why, whilst at the centre of intellectual life in Oxford in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Pater distanced himself from his contemporaries.  He shied from the influence of other writers, just as he shied from intimate friendships, as though ever fearful that ‘[o]ur collective life, pressing equally on every part of every one of us, reduces nearly all of us to the level of a colourless uninteresting existence’ (D 157).  To outsiders he looks to be a key fragment in the ‘kind of looking-glass world' of Oxford, 'through which all of the intellectual, cultural, scientific, and political issues of the day were reflected’ (Higgins 2006, 33).  Certainly, he knew Benjamin Jowett, Mark Pattison, Charles Swinburne, T.H. Green, Henry James, Gerard Manley Hopkins, Oscar Wilde and Arthur Symons personally.  However, Pater remained distant from them.  He demurred from close engagement with the thinkers of his day, the better to form his own vision: born of immersion in current issues refracted through the prism of the history of ideas and art. This is one of the reasons why he stands as a dynamic, oblique force within his culture.

Pater’s self-directed education in Enlightenment and Classical philosophies is fundamental here, as it takes him back to the source of critical thought on art and the individual.  His was a self-imposed regime that combined the conventional with the unconventional, including a wide range of British and German philosophy and histories of philosophy.  This was a selective history reflecting the early interests that Pater developed throughout his career, and it centred on ancient Greek philosophies, British empiricism and the Romantic-Idealist tradition in Germany.  One can see in hindsight why these epochs appealed to Pater: the Greeks offered him a practical philosophy of living, the empiricists fore-grounded sensation as the epistemological focus and the Romantics and Idealists were the first both to take art seriously as a philosophical concern and to place the individual at the centre of the universe. 

In the 1860s it was Pater’s interest in German philosophy that was least conventional.  At that time ‘anyone suspected of being influenced by German scholarship was assumed to be unorthodox’ by many at Oxford, as it suggested association with the criticism of religion by Feuerbach and Strauss (Annan 64).  Quite likely, this was part of the attraction to him and his interest was intensified by several visits to Heidelberg, where he had an aunt.  As Pater came of age, suspicion was superseded by a renewed interest in German culture and thought, and his philosophical expertise was duly acknowledged by his contemporaries.  Thomas Wright remarks that Pater’s knowledge of German philosophy helped him to gain a fellowship at Brasenose (I. 211); while years later, Lionel Johnson confirms that still ‘he gave much time to the aesthetic theorists of Germany – Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, Hegel, such speculations agreed with that cogitating spirit in him’ (364).  His inaugural paper to the Old Mortality Society in 1864 was on ‘self-culture’ in the work of Gottlieb Fichte, and it was to philosophy that he ostensibly returned in his last book, Plato and Platonism.  

Whilst it is true that German culture was increasingly significant in contemporary academia, such that by ‘the end of the nineteenth century, the leading academic philosophers, both in America and Great Britain, were largely Hegelians’ (Russell 2005, 661), this does not wholly apply to Pater.  He was not an Hegelian – an assumption far too often made and the basis for Anthony Ward’s book The Idea in Nature.  Pater's engagement with Hegel is of a fairly shallow variety: in 'Winckelmann' he borrows from Hegel's Aesthetics, which he read in German in 1863 (Inman 1981a, 49).  Pater's debt to him is limited to just this and it is no longer relevant when we turn to the Paterian individual.  Hegel’s philosophy is at odds with Pater’s world-view in crucial ways: its politics, its conception of right, its broader vision of art, which is ultimately subjected to philosophy and religion in the realm of Absolute Spirit, its belief that thesis and antithesis necessarily resolve into synthesis, and even the teleology in which this idea is formed, are all profoundly un-Paterian.  Moreover, Pater’s long visits to Germany and his capabilities with the language​[10]​ meant that he was well versed not only in Hegel, but in a wide range of German theorists.  In addition to the philosophers mentioned above, Novalis, Schlegel, Schleiermacher and Schiller appear in Pater’s library records and their thought permeates his writings.  He interweaves many of these different philosophies into his aesthetic, albeit often without direct references, and creates in the tissue of his texts an internal dialogue with them.  Hence it never quite works when we try to think about Pater in relation to any single thinker, or even any single school of thought, such as the German Idealists, or the French aesthetes, or the philosophers of ancient Greece, or the contemporary Oxford scene.  He abides by no system or single philosophy but forges his own idiosyncratic, though sometimes faltering, philosophical aesthetic through a nexus of influences, taking threads from here and there.  

He writes with a strong sense that philosophy in the modern world is defined by the multifarious and fluctuating bric-a-brac character of its age.  Like his own characterization of Plato, we find that Pater 
           figures less as the author of a new theory, than as already an eclectic critic of older ones, 
            himself somewhat perplexed by theory and counter-theory […] They are everywhere in it, 
            not as the stray curved corner of some older edifice to be found here or there amid the 
            new, but rather like minute relics of earlier organic life in the very stone he builds with.   
                                                                                                                                               (PP 2)  
His writings are textured with the philosophies that interested him – Kant, Hume, Hegel, Schiller, Darwin and Berkeley, to name but a few discussed in the following chapters – as he defines a careful dialogue between them and modernity through his own consciousness.  As he thus endeavours, his considerations create a new perspective; not a system or orthodoxy, but an unconventional kind of philosophical thought which attempts to come to terms with the fluctuating character of individualism in a world where God, if not yet dead, is in terminal decline.  So Pater did not write philosophy in any conventional sense and he was in no way a conventional philosopher.  But neither was Friedrich Nietzsche.  Like Nietzsche, Pater is intensely conscious of the incongruity between the philosophical form and modernity.  He understands the limitations of conventional philosophical method in this world of ceaseless flux.  As he attempts to resolve for himself those irresolvable philosophical problems, he is also implicitly asking: what sort of philosophy is possible under the conditions of modernity?  

Any enquiry into Pater’s thought is certainly hindered by the fact that his constructive epistemology is ‘passive, confused, shifting […] with distinctions blurred and influences crossed’ (Harrold 110).  This is the ironic truth behind his recurrent image of man’s ‘clear crystal nature’ or ‘transparent crystal’ (D 158; MS 46).  In the ‘clear crystal’ ideal the workings of the individual’s mind are plain before the philosophical enquirer, but in praxis a Romantic mystique lingers in Pater’s account of it.  He struggles between his desire to know and his Romantic sense that these things are essentially unknowable and beautiful because of this infinite mystery.  He is not exactly confused in his beliefs, though they would alter in the course of time, any more than he is he uninterested in ideas.  Rather, he is a writer trying to come to terms with his conception of the world and his place within it; and the unpretentious way in which he does this makes him, in some ways, Every Man.  

This is part of what makes his aesthetic difficult.  Its apparent contradictions may suggest a lack of rigour, which is often due to his personal modesty and his understanding that he has no authority to legislate for the world.  Pater ‘never thought of using ideas as Arnold used them, to win an argument and make people change their lives.  Pater did not argue’ (Donoghue 306).  Truly, Pater did not argue.  Gosse compares him to Renan, whose tendency ‘led him to refrain from opposition and argument, and to bow his head in the conversational house of Rimmon’ (266).  It is difficult to imagine Pater arguing with anyone, not because of indifference but because of his reserved and gentle nature – the tendency of Renan – which is reflected in his narrative tone.  Humphrey Ward’s recollection (above) implies that Pater distrusted the rhetorical hinges of argumentation for their hollow force and flourish.  He chooses instead in his writings to suggest, illustrate and allude to his ideas to the reader. 

In his attempts to pinpoint his own fluid endeavour, Pater often returns to the question of what ‘philosophy’ could otherwise be.​[11]​  He reweaves philosophy and aesthetic discourses into a new mode of philosophizing in essay form to befit the modern world, aspiring always beyond philosophy to art, in his attempt to reconcile discourse with the uncertain, subjective, conditional nature of modernity.  Thus, he becomes an ‘aesthetic philosopher’ (R 94).  It is in this way that the essay becomes his preferred form and the form on which our discussion concentrates.  Pater ‘associates the essay with modernity, agnosticism, uncertainty, and therefore with a kind of knowledge which does not easily reach conclusions or answers’ (Leighton 2007, 28).  Truly, the essay is, as Pater reflects, ‘that characteristic literary type of our time, a time so rich and various in special apprehensions of truth, so tentative and dubious in its sense of their ensemble, and issues’ (PP 120).  The essay thus creates a sense of ‘final insecurity’ (PP 127):  
           This is an apology, but it is also a boast.  The essay finally leads, not to a point proved but 
            an 'insecurity' achieved.  It is the critical genre which can, on the one hand, admit 
            uncertainty, subjectivity, conditionalness, while also, on the other, putting its own shaped 
            form into play as part of its matter.  (Leighton 2007, 28-29)  
When we scratch the surface of Pater’s purple prose, we may see then that he is attempting to redefine philosophy from within.  This is an endeavour that harks back to the Romantics, but most of all it begins the process by which philosophy’s ‘phlegmatic, “clogged” homogeneity is soon to be broken apart and reformed in the mobile discourse of aestheticism’ (Williams 39).  What Pater knows for certain is that the time is past for the grand, static philosophical systems which had dominated modern philosophy.  He is frustrated with speculative forms of philosophy that take ‘fugitive, relative’ thought and ‘tr[y] to fix it in absolute formulas’ (A 72).  In this world of unceasing flux we must think and look for truths, but without ever ‘acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte or of Hegel, or of our own’ (R 152). 

It is having thus subsumed philosophy into the artistic realm of the essay that Pater himself chooses literary art, rather than traditional philosophical discourse, as the medium through which to express his own ideas.  Imaginative literature maps the vicissitudes of the modern condition:
           For the essence of all artistic beauty is expression, which cannot be where there’s really 
            nothing to be expressed; the line, the colour, the word, following obediently, and with 
            minute scruple, the conscious motions of a convinced intelligible soul.  (PP 82) 
Elsewhere he writes of ‘the incapacity of philosophy to be expressed in terms of art’ and philosophy’s incapacity to be expressed in terms of art (MS 43; A 65 ff).  And yet, still, in ‘Giordano Bruno,’ ‘philosophy becomes a poem, a sacred poem’ in the hands of the title figure (GB 237); and this is just what Pater aspires to.  His is a mode of philosophizing like that of Raphael: ‘Well! in Raphael, painted ideas, painted and visible philosophy, are for once as beautiful as Plato thought they must be, if one truly apprehended them’ (MS 43).​[12]​

The fundamentally philosophical character of Pater’s interests places his own disciplinary identity in question.  In truth, his position in the field of English literature has always been a little tense.  During the drawn-out debates which preceded the institutionalization of English Literature as a subject of academic study in its own right at Oxford in 1893, Pater wrote to the Pall Mall Gazette, 
           I should […] be no advocate for any plan of introducing English literature in the course of 
           university studies which seemed likely to throw into the background that study of classical 
           literature which has proved so effective for the maintenance of what is excellent in our   
           own.  (L 69)  
His natural aversion to reform surely contributed to this circumspection.  It may also have deeper roots in a reaction against Matthew Arnold’s identification of institutionalized English literature with ‘right reason’ and ‘authority’ and with the means to correct the ‘injurious’ want of these in contemporary society (Arnold 1949, x).  Enlisting the arts as part of a crusade for moral improvement was not Pater’s way.  In a heated discussion on reform in the Brasenose common room, he ventured, ‘At present the undergraduate is a child of nature; he grows up like a wild rose in a country lane; you want to turn him into a turnip, rob him of all grace, and plant him out in rows’ (qtd Gosse 270).​[13]​  One wonders what he would make of higher education today.  Still, leaving those issues aside, in Pater’s letter to the Pall Mall Gazette his ostensible concern is not Arnold or the bland mass-production of undergraduates but that English literature is properly understood as part of ‘an organic unity’ (L 69) that includes study of the Classics, philosophy and European literature.  In short, he feared disciplinarity because he believed it to be detrimentally narrow.   

It is ironic then that subsequent and modern commentary on Pater's work has come almost exclusively from the very English faculties whose existence he wished to prevent.  While these critics continue to offer great insights into Pater’s works, perhaps it is now time to question whether they have not also over-prescribed the ways in which we think about him.  In an important advance, recent studies by Regenia Gagnier, Laurel Brake and Linda Dowling suggest the potential scope of an interdisciplinary approach to Pater, considering hitherto neglected political, economic and scientific dimensions to his writings.​[14]​  In a similar spirit, the present study too intends to take Pater on his own interdisciplinary terms with its focus on the interaction between philosophy and literature.          


ii. Scope and organization

We may make a couple of assertions to crystallize these issues into objectives.  This study sets out to define the conditions of individualism in Pater’s writings.  It gives particular attention to the way in which these conditions are realized through his engagement and innovation in the history of ideas, demonstrating that he was far more involved with the intellectual currents of his age than has been hitherto recognized.  At the same time, it seeks to address how the Paterian individual reflects the personal tribulations of its author: so that its contradictions are his contradictions, its hesitations are his hesitations.  A full exploration of the Paterian individual, we suggest, is necessarily in symbiosis with a study of Walter Pater himself and the intellectual problems of his culture, which refract through his idiosyncratic mind.  Each casts its light onto the other: the general and particular, theory and practice, abstract and concrete.

With these objectives in mind, the following chapters seek to track the Paterian individual from the inside out: from the a priori spirit to ethical being in (or rather absence from) the world.  Chapter I, ‘Between Empiricism and Idealism: “Receptive” Capacity and “Initiatory Power”’, characterizes the dynamic between the individual and world as a fusion of receptivity to the phenomena of the world and creativity from the faculty of the imagination.  The internal and external aspects of the individual at issue are considered in chapters II and III, respectively.  Chapter II, entitled ‘Divinity, Identity and the Infinite in “the Spirit or the Soul of Man,”’ explores how far Pater succeeds in eradicating metaphysics to become an empirical materialist, always privileging the concrete over the abstract (Higgins 1991, 86).  Certainly, Pater had no clear conception of a spiritual dimension, and he abhorred the sensibility – identified by him with medieval Christianity  – that eschews the seen world for unseen metaphysical notions.  However, his relationship with religion and metaphysics is complex and he never succeeds in being the atheist he sometimes purports to be.  Chapter III is entitled ‘Sense and Sensuality: Aesthetic Escape from “a Band of Madmen.”’  It considers the ambivalent conception of sensation that emerges from The Renaissance and the singular role of art in refining and tempering the fervour of intense sensuality.  In chapter IV, ‘Pater’s Copernican Revolution: Chaos and the Body’, we turn to consider the body in its dual aspect as an object and subject: as object, the body symbolizes eternal beauty and unsated desire and, as a subject, it is experienced as a thwarted illusion of infallibility, as the body ages and decays.  The living flesh and blood body, immanently evoked in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, is the subject of chapter V, entitled ‘ "At the Still Point of the Turning World": Evolutionary Time and the Aesthetic Moment’.  This chapter explores how Pater comes to terms with the individual under the conditions of evolutionary history through his concept of the aesthetic moment.  Finally, in chapter VI, ‘Pater’s “New ‘Ethick’” and the Limitations of Schilleresque Self-Culture’, we consider how Pater negotiates individualism, society and ethics, illustrated by his reappropriation of Friedrich Schiller’s ‘aesthetic education’.

In one sense, these chapters are conceived as a series of studies in the contradictoriness or disunity of Pater.  His is a world view defined by theses and antitheses which do not necessarily resolve themselves into syntheses.  He is in constant battle with the ‘dramatic contrasts’ (R 148) that define the individual, including sensual pleasure and pernicious craving for sensuality, the body beautiful and its inevitable decay, continuous time and the discrete moment.  And yet, at the same time, these chapters are also a series of enquiries into the unifying principles that endeavour to transcend such contrasts.  For as noted above, Pater suggests that philosophy seeks to propose ‘a reasonable unity and order’ regarding experience, and at some level this is what he is always looking for.  He looks for it in desire, in the spirit or soul, in continuity of consciousness, ethical action, aesthetic creativity and subjective experience.  Just like his self, ‘it’ proves elusive.  

There are a number of things that this study is not.  It is not a study of the homoerotic undertones of Pater’s aesthetic.  One cannot consider Pater’s aesthetics or individualism without an appreciation of queer theory, it is true, and critics including Richard Dellamora, James Eli Adams and Linda Dowling have written extensively and insightfully on Pater and male-male desire.  Even so, Pater’s contribution to ideas has been at risk of becoming distorted by the all-encompassing reign of queer studies.  There is a danger in all minority discourses that, having won the battle to become part of the establishment, they may themselves become hegemonic.  It is time to question the implicit Foucauldian premise that sexuality is at the centre of the individual and that it is, therefore, central to all aspects of the Paterian individual.  It is not.  This assumption has closed or inhibited other areas of enquiry that are absolutely fundamental to understanding Pater’s conception of the individual.  It is simply unacceptable that a critic unconvinced or uninterested by queer readings of Pater, such as William Shuter, may be branded as ‘a reactionary critic, excessively hostile to the homosexual enquiry’ or that failure to fall into line may lead to an accusation that one is tainted by ‘that virulent strain of homophobia’ (Davis 262).  This kind of identity politics has no place in judicious criticism.  The tide has receded since Shuter’s protest against ‘the outing of Walter Pater’ (1994, 480 ff) and my intention in this enquiry is to take a more balanced approach: not dismissing queer perspectives on Pater by any means, but not taking these as the life-blood of his writings.  Having begun to address the broader intellectual issues involved in Pater’s conception of the individual, one may return better prepared to consider homoerotic desire in his writings. 

Neither is this a biographical reading of Pater’s writings, although biography is one of the frames it brings.  In recent years, biographical criticism has gone out of vogue and even psychoanalytic criticism seems, today, unfashionable against the current trend for Victorian material cultures.  Pater presents to these currents a curious case.  As Gerald Monsman has argued, Pater's writings are 'a mirror in which Pater causes his own image, inscribed within the textual apparatus, to turn back upon the image of his hero and his hero's age -- which then, once again, turns back upon the author's life' (1980, 7).  With this in mind, the current study intends to interweave biography and an awareness of Pater's emotional history into literary criticism.  As the great dramas of Pater’s life were played out only in the theatre of his imagination and it is this unrecorded emotional life that vividly informed his writings, we will at times try to create a bridge between this and Pater’s writings with his own form, the imaginary portrait.  Neither, finally, is this a study of Pater’s style.  Pater’s role as a stylist of course comes into any discussion of Pater’s writings.  However, to redress the balance of criticism that has tended very much and to focus on style, this is not considered in any substantive way. 

When it comes to defining an approach to Pater , his ever-shifting thoughts pose problems for the literary critic.  As we have noted, like the fluctuating self of which he writes in his Conclusion, Pater’s thoughts are often ‘re-forming themselves on the stream’; the radical young W.H. Pater who wrote ‘Poems by William Morris’ in 1868 is not ‘that dear old pussycat Walter Pater’ who wrote Plato and Platonism in 1893 (Toynbee 21).  The nature of Pater’s shift has been critically divisive.  Richmond Crinkley and Michael Levy conceive a distinct schism in Pater’s work in the early 1880s (137; 1985, 9ff) and much criticism passively assumes this idea, tending to concentrate on the early works by which Pater’s name was made.  The views of William Shuter are more sophisticated, proposing that Paterian thought is ‘an incessant reshuffling’ of ideas and passages as Pater revises and refines and redefines his ideas again and again (1997, 123 ff).  It is in this spirit that we approach Pater's writings.  His unceasing dialogue with himself cuts across any notion of a distinction between 'early' and 'late' Pater and it broadens the critical focus to the peripheries of his oeuvre; to such works as the posthumously published Greek Studies and Miscellaneous Studies and his last published book Plato and Platonism, acclaimed by critics at the time but largely overlooked since.  In a field where the vast majority of critical pieces on Pater are short journal articles or book chapters, the understandable impulse is to focus on the one book of Pater’s that is widely read and the impact of which was definitive: The Renaissance.  Yet, like one of Pater’s consummate aesthetic moments, The Renaissance is an intense sensation which quickly passes. If the current study keeps coming back to The Renaissance it is because until his last day Pater was in a constant dialogue with the ideas expressed there.  However, the works that follow it are no less vital, in that they elucidate and rewrite its polemical and often inexpansive comments.  Hence this study will consider a broad range of Pater’s writings, from his early essays in the Westminster Review to the essay on ‘Pascal’ which he was writing on the day he died. 

In the spirit of inclusion this study also considers ‘The History of Philosophy’ and ‘The Aesthetic Life,’ two of Pater’s unfinished and still unpublished manuscripts written in the late 1870s.  For various reasons unconnected to their intellectual value these manuscripts, now lodged in the Houghton Library at Harvard University, are often overlooked.​[15]​  Yet they are singularly useful in understanding Pater’s thought, as uncensored reflections that allow us to catch him off-guard.  Frank and incisive in places, they slice through the layers of allusion and qualification which often seem to render the published, polished Pater ‘the mask without the face.’  In terms of subject matter these pieces are Pater's most ostensibly speculative works.  ‘The History of Philosophy’ conjectures that there has been a wrong turn in the history of ideas, while ‘The Aesthetic Life’ sets out to re-found ethics on aesthetics.  Admittedly Pater’s manuscripts vary very much in quality, and one needs to be selective: ‘Well! does not all right conduct of artistic matters always involve selection?’ Pater asks in ‘The Aesthetic Life’ (14).  Unfinished and abandoned by him, these ambitious essays illustrate a creative and intellectual failure as he was ultimately unable to adequately resolve the issues he raises, which cut to the heart of his aesthetic and philosophical project.  At various points his ideas peter out to almost illegible, scribbled out prose, or he proceeds with the omission of large quotations; the page is left with gaping blank spaces and no hint of how he intended to fill it.​[16]​  Yet the way someone fails may tell us at least as much their success. 

All of this is of more than antiquarian scholarly interest.  Over a century after his death, Pater remains a vital bridge between Romantic thought, late Victorian culture and modernity.  He has a complex but key relationship to his contemporary culture; above all in seeking to explore the conditions of individualism in the modern world, and suggesting new structures of thought to befit the conditions of modernity.  The Paterian individual is situated at the precise moment of his conception, in the immediate post-Darwinian, pre-decadent world, in the transition between high-Victorianism and early modernism.  Amidst the University reforms and the liberal debates that followed Mill’s On Liberty and Arnold’s assertion of culture in the wake of God’s demise, in the shadow of Darwinism and as the aesthetic of ‘art for art’s sake’ began to shape the contemporary arts in England, Pater stands back to consider the problematic dynamics between the individual, modernity and art, and Romantic that he is he seeks to find a solution in art. 



I. Between Empiricism and Idealism: 
‘Receptive’ Capacity and ‘Initiatory Power’






…we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art – for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified…​[17]​




Of the ‘dramatic contrasts’ (R 148) which characterize Pater’s view of life, that between the ‘receptive’ capacity and the ‘initiatory’ power of the individual is one of the richest.  The dual qualities of receptivity and initiatory thought are fundamental to his understanding of how we experience the world and art, and how we ourselves are formed.  Through his exploration of these ideas, Pater addresses the question at the heart of modern philosophy: ‘the grand problem of the relation of Mind to Universe’ (C.R. Morris 11).  

It is in Pater’s unpublished manuscript, ‘The History of Philosophy,’ that he first indicates this dualism, as he describes the individuals of ancient Greece in 'full enjoyment of their receptive and active powers’ (HP 1).  This idea is expanded later in ‘Giordano Bruno’:  
           It would be a mistake, he holds, to attribute to the human soul capacities merely 
            passive or receptive.  She, too, possesses, not less than the soul of the world, initiatory  
            power, responding with the free gift of a light and heat that seem her own.  (GB 237)
These extracts are only gestures; but significant gestures because they suggest that representative consciousness has two distinct facets: the ‘receptive’ mind that receives impressions from the world and the 'initiatory' or creative ‘light and heat’ that comes from within the individual.  Such a fusion of receptive capacity with initiatory power positions the individual at the creative centre of the universe, in place of God.  It is with this that Pater brings together ‘the knowledge of the visible world’ with ‘the other sort of knowledge wh[ich] must be attained, if at all, by purely intellectual intuition, by faith, or by conscience’ (HP 12).  The qualities emerge from Pater’s dialogue with the empiricisms of David Hume, John Locke and George Berkeley, and the transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant.  It is out of his frustration with empirical philosophy that he takes Kant’s transcendental idealism as a model to reconcile the receptive capacity with the initiatory power.  

Although Pater’s conception of the receptive capacity and initiatory power emerges from his engagements in the recent history of ideas, it simultaneously positions him at the vanguard of shifting philosophical culture in the 1870s.  For British philosophers and for the educated classes in the late 1860s and early ‘70s empiricism patterned the world; the metaphysical discussions that raged during the enlightenment were resolved, for the time being at least, into an empirical consensus (Russell 2005, 654).  However, transcendental idealism was gaining prominence in Oxford following T.H. Green’s famous 305-page ‘Introduction’ to Hume’s Treatise in 1873,​[18]​ and this would only increase in the following decade with the emergence of British Idealists such as F.R. Bradley.  It is in his own modest way that Pater enters into this zeitgeist.  To an extent, empiricism remains his centre of gravity and it does fulfil his excited desire for self-renewal and new sensation.  Still, he is fearful lest ‘the empirical philosophy of our day, carrying us so far into space and time seemingly infinite has, in inverse proportion, narrowed the spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ (AL 2).  Perhaps it is because of his ultimate dissatisfaction with the spiritual limitations imposed by empiricism that he negotiates empiricism with the metaphysical influences of the German Enlightenment, suggesting that experience is a fusion of passive receptivity to sense data and the active, creative power of the subjective imagination.  Unlike Green and the British Idealists, Pater does not address this problem in any consistent or sustained way.  Like much of his thought, it must be pieced together from fragments, and he may seem at once a Berkeleyan solipsist (Symons 2003, 98; Meisal 114) and a sceptic-cum-postmodernist (Leighton 2002, 18).  All told, he is neither.  Whilst the uncertainty, obscurity and characteristic contradictoriness that riddle his essays may suggest him as such, he beats a middle course crucially defined by the fusion of receptive capacity and initiatory power. 

This chapter argues that these qualities position the Paterian individual at the interface between ‘knowledge of the visible world’ and ‘the other sort of knowledge’.  In particular it suggests that ‘the other sort of knowledge’ emerges out of Pater’s dissatisfaction with empirical reality in order to cast the individual as the centre of being.  The following sections are organized to explore how this vision emerges.  Section i concerns how Pater’s conception of the receptive capacity emerges from his struggles with Humean empiricism, focusing in particular on how it is related to diaphaneitè: on one hand suggesting a heightened awareness of sensation, whilst on the other hand threatening the individual with dissolution in the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  In his 1878 short story, ‘The Child in the House,’ Pater retreats from Hume’s radical scepticism to a Lockean version of empiricism that focuses on the continuous consciousness.  This is the subject of section ii.  Chronologically of course John Locke preceded Hume and Hume’s scepticism is founded on taking Locke’s principles to their logical conclusion.  Given Pater’s gradual intellectual shift from radical youth to conservative middle age, it may not be surprising though that he inverts this chronology.  Section iii discusses the nature of Pater’s initiatory power, arguing that it is a fusion and appropriation of elements, chiefly, from George Berkeley’s idealism and Immanuel Kant’s transcendental principles to form a vision of perception as a creative act.  This is Pater's constructive thesis, or at least as close as he gets to a constructive thesis and it comes to assuage the threat of empiricism to the individual. 


i. David Hume’s empiricism and the ‘receptive’ capacity

The ambivalent force of David Hume’s empiricism underpins Pater’s conception of the receptive capacity.  It has two main aspects.  First, its assertion of a shifting, ephemeral reality, received through the transparent mind, certainly fulfils Pater’s vision that philosophy comes to us ‘suggesting questions which help one to detect the passion, and strangeness, and dramatic contrasts in life’ (R 148).  Secondly, though, Hume’s idea that identity is formed entirely of raw sense data received through this transparent mind challenges the notion of coherent self-identity.  For, in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, Pater draws heavily on Humean scepticism with his suggestion that ‘the inward world of thought and feeling’ is impermanent, ever-changing (R 151).  Considering these dimensions side-by-side, we can see that Humean empiricism has an ambivalent presence in Pater’s aesthetic: on one hand, encouraging acute attention to the minutiae of the seen world as it constantly changes and, on the other hand, undermining the fabric of personal identity with its assertion that there is no distinguishable subject.  Such concerns come to define Pater’s concept of the receptive capacity, and he explores its implications for the individual in the early essays on ‘Coleridge,’ ‘Diaphaneitè’ and ‘Wordsworth’ and the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  

Pater’s conception of the receptive capacity is born of the empirical assertion that the individual is as a ‘white paper, void of all characters’ onto which are written the multifarious, ephemeral sensations of the world (Locke II.i §2, 109).  The clear analogy between the ‘white paper’ self of the empiricists and the ‘passive or receptive’ capacity of the Paterian individual emerges from a sceptical riposte to rationalist philosophies.  Empiricism’s proclamation that the mind is ‘void of all characters’ erases the a priori knowledge endowed to the individual by rationalism.  This negative thesis is important to Pater.  In his ‘History of Philosophy’ he remarks on how Hume shows ‘the supposed inherent judgements of the understanding’ to be false, leading men towards ‘the corrective authority of the experience of the senses’ (HP 7).  Indeed, Hume typifies for Pater ‘the characteristic modern scepticism […] by his peculiar theory of causation’ (HP 7)​[19]​ and this sceptical rejection of innate knowledge is implicit in Pater’s conception of the ‘passive or receptive’ capacity.  Approaching this capacity from its sceptical side presents it as a pointed assertion that knowledge is gained by receptivity to the external world.  There is something almost quaint about the way that Pater goes to empirical scepticism with fresh enthusiasm in the 1870s, almost two hundred years after it forever readjusted the philosophical frame in which Western philosophy viewed the individual.  It is not only that ‘such speculations agreed with that cogitating spirit in him’ (Lionel Johnson 364).  As though Pater is himself that blank sheet of paper, coming new to philosophy, he goes back to the Hume – as to Locke, Berkeley, Kant and the Ancients – in order to ascertain afresh the terms of modern thought.  Kant writes that Hume’s scepticism awakened him from his ‘dogmatic slumber’ (2004, 2); perhaps the same might be said of Hume’s effect on Pater.  In ‘The History of Philosophy’ he writes,
           in this adventurous quest [for understanding], this way of discipline, in which the mind 
           gains at least a kind of masterful knowledge of its own bearings and capacities, the first 
           step is always an act of scepticism.  For philosophy begins only when, under one of many   
           possible guides […] we enter into a sort of secondary consciousness, in which the 
           common sense of the every-day becomes the subject of dispassionate criticism.  (HP 5)
Humean scepticism clears away all assumptions about innate knowledge and it may be conceived as Pater’s first sceptical step toward understanding, although the form of understanding he pursues will take him ever further from empiricism.  

Notwithstanding Pater’s fascination with how empiricism undermines rationalist philosophy, it is ‘the extension of the positive knowledge of experience’ produced by empirical methodology (HP 13) on which he focuses.  The single most important idea that this ‘positive knowledge’ of empiricism inspires in Pater is diaphaneitè.  The receptive capacity defines the diaphanous type in ‘Diaphaneitè’ by suggesting a relationship between the individual and the world in which external sense data is primary.  Traced to its ancient Greek roots, ‘diaphaneitè’ means ‘[you shall] become transparent!’ or ‘shine through!’​[20]​  Assuming the form of a second person plural imperative verb, diaphaneitè is a command to the reader and it may be read as Pater’s aesthetic manifesto (Brake and Small 258n).  It would be difficult to over-estimate the significance of this transparent quality, so figuratively rich and so multifarious is it in its insights into the Paterian ideal.  This quality becomes a trope, reappearing as ‘the clear crystal nature’ (D 153) and explicitly as ‘truthfulness of temper, [and] that receptivity’ (D 156).  Ironically, as a metaphor it is almost opaque at first, teasing its reader with its depths whilst flaunting its significance with repetition so that we must return to look deeper through its layers.  

Diaphaneitè is also linked to glass: for the diaphanous man is the glass man through whom the phenomena of the world pass and who is so absorbed into the world that the boundaries between self and the world all but disappear.  Like Locke’s metaphor of the blank paper, the glass is without character of any kind until the fleeting characters of the world are seen in it.  Only Pater goes further than Locke by suggesting the impermanence of the sense-data that flit through the mind; whilst the writing on Locke’s blank paper leaves indelible marks, the phenomena that pass through Pater’s crystal or glass are gone forever in the moment they move past its frame and they leave no trace.  In this way, Pater is closer to Hume, who writes of how ‘perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations’ (1964 I.I.iv.vi, 239-40).  Yet, the glass metaphor simultaneously indicates how Pater will move away from empiricism.  Perhaps he had in mind the technique by which glass was shaped by a man blowing through a pipe, a technique by which glass is, in Isobel Armstrong’s words, ‘shaped by the human spirit’ (05/03/2007).  One could imagine these words written in Pater’s spidery ink and its sentiment follows from his belief that the human spirit is formed by self-cultivation: ‘the character we have before us […] com[es] as it were in the order of grace, not by nature, by some happy gift, or by accident of birth or constitution, showing that it is indeed within the limits of one’s destiny’ (D 155).​[21]​
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            the spirit that sees external circumstances as they are, its own power and tendencies as 
            they are, and realises the given conditions of its life, not disquieted by the desire for 
            change […] The character we mean to indicate achieves this perfect life by a happy gift of 
            nature, without any struggle at all.  (D 155)
This presentation of diaphaneitè as an imperative alters the significance of the receptive capacity from that suggested by empiricism.  Paterian diaphaneitè makes receptivity more than just a fact of how experience is possible.  Receptivity has become a conscious endeavour.  

As defined in ‘Diaphaneitè,’ receptivity is not an intellectual act.  It is a way of being that ‘professors often strive in vain to form [which] is engendered less by wisdom than by innocence’ (D 156).  It is the innocence of a child who submits to sensation without inhibitions.  In this regard, childhood becomes a metaphor in that most (in)famous of passages in The Renaissance: ‘Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among “the children of this world,” in art and song’ (R 153).  The context of ‘Diaphaneitè’ combines with suggestions of playfulness in the last part of this sentence into another apparent case in which children are a metaphor for innocence.  We can understand this better given the Biblical context from which Pater’s unreferenced quotation is taken.  In Luke 16.1-10 Jesus negatively contrasts ‘the children of this world’ with ‘the children of Light’ (88), as those who act without Christian morality for earthly benefit.  In Pater’s reappropriation of this image it loses these negative connotations.  He is speaking to ‘the children of this world’: those who recognize the truth which Jesus condemned, that life ends with death and earthly pleasures are what we live for.  The dichotomy between innocence and experience is ultimately false.  Childhood contains within it both innocence and experience, which intermingle and cast light onto each other.  The diaphanous type not only sees but realizes these conditions of life.  There is an understanding implicit in his gaze and in this understanding he is at peace.  The diaphanous quality is an unaffected view of people and situations, which accepts them without pessimism or futile struggle.  It is for this reason that the quality of diaphaneitè takes on such significance.  

The receptive capacity or diaphaneitè has particular significance to Pater's vision of creativity.  It is outlined most clearly in the companion essays on ‘Wordsworth’ and ‘Coleridge’ in which he suggests that Wordsworth embodies how this receptive capacity enlivens creativity whilst, in contrast, Coleridge suggests how an unreceptive imagination may stagnate into the abstract.  Wordsworth understands ‘that in all creative work the larger part [is] given passively, to the recipient mind’ (A 41); he has ‘[a]n intuitive consciousness of the expression of natural things, which weighs, listens, penetrates’ (A 43).  This is fundamental to his creative genius and in this way Wordsworth comes to represent Pater's diaphanous individual: as an artist who passively allows experiences to flow through him and to saturate his imagination.  Such a sensibility is essential to aesthetic creativity because it closely connects art with the sensuous world, giving it an attention to detail and sincerity.  Moreover, it brings relativity – those ‘fugitive conditions’ (A 103) – into art.  Through the glass or clear crystal of the diaphanous mind, the ever-shifting, ephemeral, relative world shows itself unimpeded by pretensions to eternity.  Wordsworth’s ‘relative spirit’ implicitly 
            by its constant dwelling on the more fugitive conditions of circumstances of things, 
            break[s] through a thousand rough and brutal classifications, and giving elasticity to 
            inflexible principles, begets an intellectual finesse of which the ethical result is a delicate 
            and tender justice in the criticism of human life.  (A 103) 
These ‘fugitive conditions’ give Wordsworth's poetry a vivacious connection to the true conditions of life in its infinite variety.  Pater’s belief that we must embrace the world of experience means for him that we must accept and affirm ‘the relative spirit’ (A 66).  For this is the reality of a world in which ‘nothing is, or can be rightly known, except relatively and under conditions’ (A 66); a world, ‘not of objects in the solidity with which language invests them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them’ (R 151).  Therefore the delicate eye exemplified by Wordsworth is necessary to capture the fine gradations between phenomena.  

It is in negative counterpoise that Coleridge takes ‘truth [which] is a thing fugitive, relative, full of fine gradations’ and ‘he tries to fix it in absolute formulas’ (A 72).  Coleridge’s artistic failure is that he could ‘never abandon himself to the dream, the vision, as Wordsworth did’ (A 86).  Hence, Pater argues that Coleridge’s tendency to fix the world in a formulated phrase undermines the receptive capacity necessary to artistic genius.  In his view, Coleridge chokes the life from his poetry in his attempt to fix the world in philosophical formulae because it is denied the life-giving air of the relative world.  In consequence, Coleridge ‘turn[s] ascertained truth into a dead letter, to make us all the phlegmatic servants of routine’ (A 103).​[23]​  To some extent Pater’s criticism of Coleridge reflects the original object of empiricism’s negative thesis: the static systems and assumptions of scholasticism.  But by focusing his critique through art, Pater inextricably links relativity, art and diaphaneitè.

In a sense, Pater takes the edge off empirical reality by focusing on receptivity as a conscious principle of aesthetic creation.  Hume’s diaphanous, white paper self is not a matter of choice or sensibility; it is what makes experience possible and, for this reason, relativity is in the very fabric of our being.  By making diaphaneitè into a conscious endeavour Pater to some extent takes the edge off these fundamental epistemological issues to pursue an aesthetic of modernity and in this respect he is, doubtless, strongly influenced by Charles Baudelaire’s ‘The Painter of Modern Life.’  Certainly, Baudelaire’s essay illuminates the connection between the ‘receptive’ capacity and ‘the relative spirit’:
            Thus, the lover of universal life enters into the crowd as though it were an immense 
            reservoir of electrical energy.  Or we might liken him to a mirror as vast as the crowd 
            itself; or to a kaleidoscope gifted with consciousness, responding to each one of its 
            movements and reproducing the multiplicity of its life and the flickering grace of all 
            elements of life.  (2006, 10)
Baudelaire’s flaneur reminds us of Pater’s diaphanous type, and the kaleidoscope and multiplicity he describes anticipate Pater’s ‘relative spirit.’  The shifting ephemeral world energizes Baudelaire’s flaneur whilst he mirrors it and engages with it, just as it does for Pater’s Wordsworth. 

Unlike Baudelaire, though, Pater is unable to turn his back on the fundamental questions of epistemology posed by Hume.  Whilst Baudelaire looks to a modernity in which such issues no longer matter, Pater looks still in both directions: to the past as well as to the future.  He is unable to move on entirely from the epistemic issue of how experience is possible and he returns to Hume’s conception of sense-data in The Renaissance.  It may be with Hume’s passing, re-passing, gliding and mingling perceptions in mind that Pater opens his Conclusion to The Renaissance: ‘To regard all things and principles of things as inconsistent modes of fashions has more and more become the tendency of modern thought’ (R 150).  Certainly, it is relativity in the Humean rather than the Baudelairean sense that so completely defines ‘the tendency of modern thought’ in the Conclusion.  Here, Hume’s empiricism offers Pater the theoretical corollary to the modern world he saw about him.  For, ‘modern philosophy,’ or empirical philosophy, understands that ‘it is not the truth of eternal outlines ascertained once and for all, but a world of fine gradations and subtly linked conditions, shifting intricately as we ourselves change’ (A 67-8).  In the Conclusion, he embodies the ever-shifting ‘world of fine gradations’ with his rapidly changing foci and images, the prose itself becoming the ‘perpetual motion’ of the physical world (R 150): 
           Our physical life is a perpetual motion of them – the passage of blood, the waste and 
            repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain under every 
            ray of light and sound – processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary 
            forces.  Like the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends 
            beyond us: it rust iron and ripens corn.  (R 150)
The kaleidoscope of relativity is insistent here.  It utterly defines us and our being in the world, so that we lose the rather quaint sense that it is an aesthetic principle to take up or discard at will.  There is a shadow of the self-destructive potential of absolute relativity but this is not so important as the tone is of wilful enthusiasm for the ephemeral world in its infinite variety.  The idea of accepting ‘the established order of things’ becomes steeped in irony, for we realise that to submit to this ‘order’ is actually to submit to perpetual flux.  There is no order, only the disorder of fluctuating reality, in which one has no sooner apprehended something than it has changed forever.  The images come to a climax with the ephemeral nature of the individual himself: ‘birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant combinations’ (R 150).  

The issue is of how Pater is to cope with this.  Or even whether he can live with the relative spirit when it comes to define ‘the inward world of thought and feeling’ (R 151).  As Pater's narrative shifts from external fluctuation to this inward world we see that he inherits from Hume one central question: if I cannot depend on continuous consciousness to give coherence to my empirical impressions then ‘what am I?’  The Humean individual is a bundle of mere impressions, which have not the implicit quality of reflective thought.  If we have knowledge only of what we observe, then we can have no knowledge of the self because, as Hume explains: ‘I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.  When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long I am insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist’ (1964 I.I.iv.vi, 239).  Hume contends that when we accept Locke’s a posteriori self, then ‘there is in truth no such demonstrable unity as a “person”, merely pointilliste impressions of continuity; dots on a page which we might be disposed to join up.’  Since this is the case, ‘[p]ersonal identity [is] thus necessarily contingent and wreathed in doubt’ (Porter 330).  Hume describes man as         
            nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with 
            inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.  Our eyes cannot turn in 
            their sockets without varying our perceptions.  Our thought is still more variable than our  
            sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any 
            single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment.  
            The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their 
            appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and 
            situations.  (1964 I.I.iv.vi, 239-240)
As a ‘bundle or collection of different perceptions’, a succession of discrete and ephemeral data, the empirical self is a very precarious ‘thing’ indeed.  The threat is not only to cumulative self-becoming but to the very existence of ‘self'.  Thorough-going empiricism, he believes, cannot assume causality − that concept which binds the whole of the known world together – to be an eternal, indubitable link between our impressions.  Of course, if all knowledge is gained by observation of the world, we must allow that necessary causality is an inductive principle which has no place.  Hume argues that the mere repetition of impressions does not mean that there are necessary causal connections between those impressions.  The connection of discrete ideas as the causal principle is imposed by us but it may at any time be defied by reality.  The phenomena of the world have no necessary relation to each other and manifest no essence or substance that unifies them.  They are loosened to mingle in infinite variety.  In consequence, the possibility of any stable individual is left wreathed in doubt. 

The question –‘what am I?’ – and Hume’s answer are the basis of Pater’s comments as he focuses on the individual amidst this fluctuating, ephemeral world.  The exhilarated pace of Pater’s comments on the external world in his Conclusion to The Renaissance continues unabated and brings with it a sense of excitement and anticipation: ‘This at least of flame-like our life has, that it is but the fusion, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways’ (R 150).  The flame, one of Pater’s recurrent tropes, here symbolizes Hume’s idea that self is but a temporary concurrence of forces; it recalls Heraclitus’ view that the individual is like fire; changing constantly but identifiable as the same substance until it burns away (Heraclitus 2003, 15).  Pater often brings his influences together in this way, through a common allusion.  It gives a historical texture to his image, which also draws on the symbolic link between fire and creativity that described the ideal conditions in which artists and philosophers ‘catch light and heat from each other’s thoughts’ (R xxxiii).  Brevity is essential to its vivacious, intense beauty.  So perhaps Pater is suggesting a necessary relation between the sense of one’s own transience and the creative imagination.   

Yet the flame in Pater’s Conclusion also threatens to consume and destroy the individual: ‘Or if we begin with the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more rapid, the flame more eager and devouring’ (R 151).  The combination of images – fire and water – define thought and feeling as an overwhelming deluge of ephemeral sensations.  Pater’s narrative frantically anticipates William James’ famous metaphor as consciousness is figured as ‘the race in the mid-stream’ and a ‘whirlpool […] still more rapid’ or a ‘drift’ (R 151).  And alluding to Hume's critique of causality he imagines the individual without the continuity given by causal links: ‘the cohesive force [of selfhood] seems suspended like some trick of magic' (R 151).  The accumulation of experience can no longer be taken for granted as the building blocks for self-identity:
           … colour, odour, texture − in the mind of the observer.  And if we continue to dwell in 
            thought on this world, not of objects in the solidity with which language invests them, but 
            of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with 
            our consciousness of them…  (R 151)
The fragmentation of Pater’s narrative illustrates Hume’s point that without a priori substances there is nothing to give coherence to the random sense data we encounter in the world.  Pater lacks Hume’s rational narrative voice and confronted by the ‘bundle of perceptions’ his narrative stutters, unable to move beyond mere apprehension of the deluge of phenomena to Hume’s constructive thesis.  The pace and culmination of images that was exhilarating as it evoked the physical world is subverted here, so that this accumulation of impressions overwhelms the rational faculty, threatening to fulfil the tentative warning that ‘experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects’ (151).  As the list of impressions gathers pace the narrative almost seems to have lost control, buried beneath a deluge of discrete impression after discrete impression, from which one can no longer construct a coherent sense of self.  This deluge of phenomena is figured as a physical threat: ‘experience seems to bury us’; it is ‘eager and devouring’; ‘pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality’; ‘each mind keeping a solitary prisoner’ (R 151).  These images are compounded by the flood of images of the individual reduced in significance: for experience under these conditions is ‘dissipated,’ ‘dwarfed,’ ‘extinguished,’ ‘it contracts’ and ‘it dwindles down’ under the conception of sceptical empiricism (R 151).  Negative descriptions − ‘unstable’, ‘inconsistent’, soon ‘extinguished’ − define a world perceived by what it lacks (R 151).  So whilst Pater's echoes of the Humean ‘bundle of perceptions’ suggest that ‘[his] own accounts of the self explicitly reject notions of autonomy or essential value’ at the outset, his own reservations about this are also implicit (Leighton 2002, 18).  Whilst he questions the self along with Hume, he does not echo Hume’s sceptical answers.  

In ‘Diaphaneitè’ and the Conclusion to The Renaissance, essays written in the 1860s, Pater’s engagement with David Hume illuminates the contours and limitations of his sympathy with empiricism.​[24]​  In this case, the ‘receptive’ power has two facets.  It is invigorating and renewing, giving the individual the vital energy to create art.  However, it is also terrifying, with its destruction of all certainty, even the certainty of one’s own mind.  Pater cannot live for long with this 'narrowed' horizon (AL 2).  He must look beyond Humean scepticism for some means to create unity within the individual.


ii. John Locke’s empiricism and ‘The Child in the House’

On a small square of paper, of the kind on which Pater tended to make his notes, there survives a short note to himself: ‘Child in the House: voilà, the germinating, original, source, specimen, of all my imaginative work’ (qtd. Evans xxix).  He may be referring to the way that this short story develops his concept of the imaginary portrait.  But Pater may also be referring to the way that ‘The Child in the House’ explores a tension between Locke’s empiricism and Pater's own vision of imagination that is crucial to his ‘imaginative work’.

‘The Child in the House’ centres on Florian Deleal, whose childhood memories are reawakened after a chance meeting.  The story-fragment that follows is his remembrance of self-awakening in his childhood home.  Looking just beneath the story here, we see that Pater’s philosophical focus has shifted from the sense data of the world and apprehension, which were primary in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, to the empirical construction of self-identity.  As we have noted, Locke’s founding principle is that there are no innate ideas and knowledge is acquired by receptivity to, or observation of, the world alone: 
           Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without 
            any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? […] To this I answer in one word, from   
            experience: in that, all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.  
                                                                                                                                     (II.i §2, 109)
And with another metaphor, Locke describes the cause of obscurity in simple ideas:
           if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive 
           the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a 
           temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted…                    (II.xxix §3, 327)
Pater overtly draws on Locke’s famous imagery, explaining at the outset that the experiences of early childhood ‘figure themselves on the white paper, the smooth wax of our ingenious souls’ (IP 6).  Locke’s conception has obvious attractions for Pater: born as a blank, we are without Original Sin and free to create and recreate ourselves as we wish.  Positioned at the beginning of the narrative these images present themselves as an assent to Locke’s conception of self-identity and all that it involves.  Not only do they suggest, then, that the individual is born as an empty vessel to be filled by experiences, they also create an expectation that Locke’s conception of self-formation will be illustrated by Florian.  

So it seems at first.  Pater’s creation of the young child, Florian, enables him to explore Locke’s conception of how identity is formed.  After all, childhood is ‘the time,’ Locke tells us, when we are ‘most susceptible to lasting Impressions’ (II.xxxiii §8, 356) and through the accumulation of these impressions, the individual personality is formed:  
           Children […] are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation 
            of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new and apt to 
            be delighted with the variety of changing objects.  (II.i §8, 112) 
Florian epitomises this vision of how curiosity and acute observation form the personality of a child with Pater’s narrative focusing on the minutiae of Florian’s sensual experiences and their significance to the formation of his identity.  He describes for instance
           that little white room with the window across which the heavy blossoms could beat so 
            peevishly in the wind, with just that particular catch or throb, such a sense of teasing in it, 
            on gusty mornings: and the early habitation thus gradually becomes a sort of material 
            shrine or sanctuary of sentiment; a system of visible symbolism interweaves itself through 
            all our thoughts and passions; and, irresistibly, little shapes, voices, accidents – the angle 
            at which the sun in the morning fell on the pillow – become parts of the great chain 
            wherewith we are bound.  (IP 6)
Delicate attention to these sensual impressions suggests the significance of even such fleeting moments of experience in the formation of one’s personality.  The images of interweaving experiences suggest an organic creation emerging out of ephemeral impressions.  Pater often uses this first-person collective ‘we’ as a device to draw the reader into his fictive realm.  In this way, he universalizes Florian’s story so that it becomes the story of how each one of us acquired self-identity through experience.  This idea is reiterated by imagery of the ‘process of brain-building by which we are, each one of us, what we are’ and, again, by the image of organic growth in ‘the gradual expansion of the soul’ (IP 4).  These spatial metaphors very much evoke Locke’s conception that identity is formed from an organic process that begins as we have experiences.  Like Locke, Pater draws a veil over distinctions between the physical brain and the ethereal soul.  Just where exactly the essence of one’s self is to be found is uncertain, and the uncertainty locates a pressure point in Pater’s conception of the individual.  Can Pater leave behind the idea of unique innate personal identity centred in the mind or soul or heart?

In ‘The Child in the House’ Pater explores the alternative proposed by Locke that continuous consciousness is the fluctuating essence of personal identity.  As Locke explains, the ‘white paper’ self acquires experiences which the mind strings together in the continuous consciousness: 
           For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that that makes everyone to 
           be what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in 
           this alone consists personal identity […] and as far as this consciousness can be extended 
           backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the 
           same self […] with this present one that now reflects on it...  (II.xxvii §9, 302)
So personal identity is confirmed by continuous reflective thought.  Pater’s narrative assumes this idea, echoing the linearity of Locke’s spatial metaphor as he figures Florian’s ‘mental journey’ (IP 4).  Its linearity is again suggested by that description of ‘the great chain wherewith we are bound’ (IP 6).  We may see each link as a moment of experience and reflection in a life and coupled together these comprise the individual.  Moreover, the motif is reiterated by the narrative frame of journeying.  The story opens with the image of Florian as an adult walking along a road and closes with Florian the child embarking along his ‘favourite country road’ (IP 17).  Crossing philosophies, Pater’s images of linear development have resonances with Hegel’s theory that history is a teleology towards perfection.  Undertones of the Hegelian idea lend a sense of unity and purpose to Locke’s continuous consciousness and these are two of the qualities dearest to Pater.  This is ‘the spirit on its way to perfection’ (A 65).  

And yet ‘The Child in the House’ questions the nature of memory and identity on which continuous consciousness is based.  When the adult Florian’s memories are evoked by his encounter with a man from his childhood home, it is described thus:
            a dream of that place came to Florian, a dream which did for him the office of the finer 
             sort  of memory, bringing its object to mind with great clearness, yet, as sometimes    
             happens in dreams, raised a little above itself and above ordinary retrospect.  
									(IP 3; my italics)
 Here, in affirmative mood, Pater reassures us that the construction of self-identity withstands the flaws of conscious memory.  Only, the way in which he does so is ambiguous.  The comparative adjective suggests that Florian’s memories are different – somehow more exquisite -- than ordinary memories.  It is as though, infused with imagination, like the dreams to which they are likened twice in this passage, they become more than the banal recollection of sense-data.  The mere suggestion strays some way from Locke.  It is perhaps closer to Freud’s subconscious or Proust’s ‘involuntary memory,’ because it evokes an apparently forgotten past brought vividly back to the conscious mind.  What makes it distinct and unique is its fusion of memory and imagination.  The imagination of the individual replaces objective truth as the measure of all things.  It is a finer consciousness of the past than reality.  If Pater is suggesting that Florian’s memories are coloured by his imagination, the extent of this is indeterminate and it jeopardizes the Lockean notion that we can access the true memories of our past that create our selves. 

The structure of Pater’s narrative problematizes the continuous consciousness essential to self-identity in Locke’s philosophy.  For, whilst Lockean symbols buttress the continuity between Florian the adult and his childhood self, Florian’s flashback arrests the narrative trajectory at the outset, fragmenting Florian the adult and Florian the child.  At the abrupt end of the story the reader’s expectations are doubly thwarted because we are neither returned to the framing scene of Florian as an adult nor given any firm indication of the development that has brought him from childhood to adulthood.  Again, progress is subverted with Florian the child in apparent moral regress, showing signs of jealousy and selfishness ‘in an agony of home-sickness’ (IP 17).  The story ends as Florian the child ‘was driven quickly away, far into the rural distance, so fondly speculated on, of that favourite country-road’ (IP 17).  His life between this moment and the moment when we meet the adult Florian remains a void.  These episodes give the impression that he is an eternal wanderer, subverting the symbol of the road because there is no evidence of progression, only stasis.  Florian’s country road is unidentified, unlocated, indeterminate; it seems to come from nowhere and to go nowhere.  This departure from Locke creates a tension between the tropes of continuity and the story’s structure.  It introduces the continuous consciousness in order to problematize it.  

Pater gave quite some thought to his unusual plotting.  In the brief cover note to his manuscript he clarifies: ‘it is not, as you may perhaps fancy, the first part of a work of fiction, but meant to be complete in itself’ (L 30).  With his decision not to frame the memory at the end of the story by returning to Florian’s adult self, Pater betrays our expectations of denouement.  When we are ambivalently left with Florian the child at the end of the story, his life is left as two loose strands with the child embarking into an unknown future not linked back to the adult self who began the narrative.  Pater advised his editor that his story is ‘a portrait, and [I] mean readers, as they might do on seeing a portrait, to begin speculating – what became of him?’ (L 30).  Quite so.  This speculation centres on continuity of consciousness.  The abrupt end leaves questions of how continuous consciousness operates to fuse Florian the child and Florian the adult into the same self and of how Florian’s identity is formed in a broader social context. ​[25]​  Focusing on the former, we note that Florian’s ‘mental journey’ is arrested by Pater’s disjointed narrative and ‘the process of brain-building’ is undermined by the fragmentation which halts Florian’s progress while he leaves his first home.  This reflects the culture-defining spirit of arrested progression emerging in the late 1870s as Victorian Progress met with fin-de-siecle sensibility.  Such structural ambiguities leave continuous consciousness in a state of ambiguity that bids us return to ‘the finer sort of memory’. For if these ambiguities place continuous consciousness in question, it is imagination that offers some answer.  Imagination is all that is left of Florian.  Perhaps the child in the house only ever exists as a fragment, like a dream, in Florian’s imagination.  

Though imagination is quickened by empirical philosophy, creativity is also Pater’s point of departure from empirical philosophy.  He is left wanting both by Hume’s stream of sensations and the continuous consciousness on which Locke founds personal identity.  When Pater is closest to Hume and Locke the self becomes precarious.  It may be engulfed by sense-data or reduced to nothingness by the fragmentation of it continuous  consciousness.  Empirical scepticism, he notes, is the first step towards understanding, but the understanding that will emerge in his own writings is not an empirical understanding of the imaginative individual.  Hume argues that we reinstate a sense of order amidst the fluctuating phenomena of our reality when we form ‘Customs’ or habits (1964 II.iii, 133-135).  When Pater’s calm and reassuring narrative emerges from the flux in the following paragraph of the Conclusion, though, it suggests slight disdain for this resolution, wondering whether ‘[in] a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits’ (R 152).  This tone is echoed in ‘Coleridge’ when he derides the ‘phlegmatic servants of routine’ (A 103).  And again in ‘Giordano Bruno’, when he reflects: 
           – indolent habit!  What would this mean in the intellectual life, but just that sort of dead 
            judgements which are most opposed to the essential Spirit, because the mind, the eye, 
            were no longer really at work in them?  (GB 243)           
Pater’s view that habit and customs stifle individuality and creativity suggests his desire for the excitement and potential of change, unfettered by these bonds.  In emphatic mood he writes, for example: ‘Winckelmann was saved from mediocrity, which, breaking through no bounds, moves ever in a bloodless routine, and misses its one chance in the life of the spirit and the intellect’ (R 120).  After all, the way that habit regulates thought into patterns breeds mediocrity and leads to creative intellectual stagnation.  One can but wonder how Pater reconciled this view with his own unerring routines.  Day after day, year after year and decade after decade he carefully ordered his life in Oxford by writing in the morning, reading in the afternoon and socializing and writing letters in the evening.  So Pater was, we might say, a man of habit himself.  As in other cases it seems that his theory expresses an ideal that he could not himself fulfil, perhaps through natural caution or the modesty that judged such daring to be beyond his powers as a mere ‘workman’ (L 59).  In practical terms at least he assumed Hume’s solution; in his other life – the more vivid imaginative life − he cannot.  The un-Romantic view of Hume and Locke that creative genius is not born to us but generated subsequently and perfected with practice is not a thesis that Pater is willing to follow.  However, the rejection of habit and empirical genius leaves him without a way to reconcile flux with creativity. 

Empiricism offers insight as to how we experience the visible world, but it cannot give Pater an adequate account of our being because it passes over the unseen: ‘the empirical philosophy of our day, carrying us so far into space and time seemingly infinite, has, in inverse proportion, narrowed the spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ (AL 2).  Like T.H. Green, Pater suggests that empirical observation is not exhaustive.  In another passage he writes that empiricism has indeed involved an ever-narrowing limitation of its aim, to what ‘is relative, temporal, apparent only, as it speaks with more and more detail and fullness of the circumstances of our visible life, less and less of anything ranging beyond it’ (HP 13).  This view illustrates disillusionment with science that divides him from the empiricists he engages with.  Hume, for example, ‘wrote in an age when men entertained the greatest possible hopes of science; when they did not hesitate to believe that all the problems of the universe would soon be solved by the unaided power of disciplined reason’ (C.R. Morris 112).  This is not true for Pater.  These statements articulate that which is deeply implicit in Pater’s published prose: the sense that empiricism endangers the spiritual dimension of our being.  The pivotal point is that empiricism increasingly narrows itself ‘to what is relative, temporal, apparent only…’ at the expense of experiences that transcend this.  Pater’s explicit identification of the relative and temporal with observable phenomena implies its contrary, the eternal that ranges beyond it.  We will leave aside the irony that Pater suggests that the scope of philosophy should extend into the spiritual dimension.  He is unable to articulate this in any more specific terms.  By strong implication, in asserting that this empirical philosophy ranges not beyond this visible life, Pater is suggesting that stability, certainty, and even the eternal are there to be found elsewhere in the realm of spirit. ​[26]​  


iii. Creativity and the ‘initiatory power’

Thomas Wright suggests a further facet to the crystal metaphor that defines the diaphanous man, as he describes Pater’s aim ‘to be entirely different from other people’:
            as a result he stands quite apart from his contemporaries.  He is isolated, and to use a 
            favourite word of his own, columnar.  The placid, white, marmoreal, monastic, subtle, 
            equable, nebulous soul stands self-revealed.  He is the nearest he could get to the Crystal 
            Man.  (I, 218)   
Although Pater’s ‘Crystal Man’ is one who allows the ever-changing world to shine through his diaphanous surface, he is simultaneously one who crystallises the fluid world into a substance that is solid, precious and unique. 

Whilst it is clear when we consider the diaphanous man that ‘outside conditions permeate the self, shining through it,’ we cannot necessarily infer that ‘the difference between self and not self is lost’ (Leighton 2002, 18).  This idea of a proto-postmodern Pater is not true to his vision because, whilst he sees the possibility of the dissolution of the individual, this is devastating for him to contemplate and it would undermine his whole conception of genius.  It is creativity that comes as a panacea to empirical scepticism.  Creativity or the ‘initiatory power’ emerges out of ‘the finer sort of memory’ to define the individual.  It is this power that distinguishes the ‘self’ from the ‘not self’ and on it Pater’s aesthetic is founded.  With this, Pater turns from empiricism to Berkeley’s Idealism and, ultimately, to Kant’s transcendental idealism, using Kant’s premise that the empirical sense data is created into experience by the shaping spirit of the creative imagination.  

This initiatory power stands supremely above the deluge of empirical phenomena.  As will be recalled, ‘the human soul […] possesses, not less than the soul of the world, initiatory power […] the free gift of light and heat that seem her own’ (GB 237).  Pater resolves the problems left by empiricism with the conjoining of the receptive capacity to the ‘active powers.’  The active power suggests a rather anti-empirical notion with the possessive ‘her own’ perhaps indicating that this quality has an a priori origin.  Moreover, the active power conjures itself as a creative quality.  The metaphor of ‘light and heat’ recalls Pater’s image for creative inspiration as he describes an ideal in which artists and philosophers ‘breathe a common air, and catch light and heat from each other’s thoughts’ (R xxxiii).  Perhaps this quality is premised on ‘the spiritual, the imaginative horizon,’ which empiricism denies.  It is the ‘other sort of knowledge’ that ‘must be attained, if at all, by purely intellectual intuition, by faith, or by conscience’ (HP 12).  The manuscript from which this statement is taken was written in the same year as ‘The Child in the House,’ 1878, and its mystical vision co-exists with his exploration of empirical philosophy.  In this way Pater recalls Baudelaire’s belief that ‘by “modernity” I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable’ (2006, 12).  It is to the philosophies of George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant that Pater turns to explore the possibilities of the eternal and immutable, identifying these in his idea of the initiatory power. 

Pater’s fascination with George Berkeley’s subjective idealism rests in part on his view that ‘Berkeley’s main point has never really been answered’; his idealism ‘has still no philosophical antidote’ (HP 41; 42).  But it is also, and primarily, because Berkeley’s subjective idealism promises the individual a creative power to imagine the whole world into being.  Berkeley argues that the external world has no reality at all; being but a figment in the mind of the individual: ‘all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; […] their being is to be perceived or known’ (1999, §6, 23).  And so Berkeley rejects the subject-object relationship of the Lockean and Humean self and world for the subject-subject relationship of the self and his imagined world.  In the Conclusion to The Renaissance, Humean flux blurs into subjective idealism, as though Pater is himself disorientated by the various tendencies of modern thought and cannot but oscillate between them.  Evoking this solipsistic world, he asserts that the objects of the world ‘are extinguished with our consciousness of them […] dwarfed into the narrow chamber of the individual mind’ (R 151).  This solipsism appears in sharp contrast -- an apparent non-sequitur -- to the Humean position that it follows.  In an instant, the phenomena that threatened to engulf a coherent self are shrunken down by the solipsistic Berkeleyan self, which holds the power to create and destroy these.  The possibility of autonomy offered by Berkeleyan idealism is undermined by Pater’s imagery, which evokes the mind of the idealist as an isolated and claustrophobic space:  ‘Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner in its own dream of a world’ (R 151).  Here Pater brings an increasing sense of deprivation and loneliness: a fitting counterpoint to liberation and expansiveness of the receptive power, or diaphaneitè. 

This said, Pater is much taken by subjective idealism.  It captivates him because it suggests a quite singular creative autonomy.  In arguing that the essence of the object is in its perception, what Berkeley means is that the object exists in the mind of God who makes it appear in the minds of men (1999, §§7-15, 5-10).  However, Pater empowers the individual by surreptitiously removing God from the scene.  He cedes creative power entirely to the autonomous imagination of the individual to create its ‘own dream of a world.’  It is Pater’s own fancy to muse that the individual has the creative power to bring the world into being and the destructive power to extinguish it at will.  He comes back again to this notion in ‘The History of Philosophy’ and Appreciations, characterising subjective idealism as a personal creative power: ‘the actual world would, as it were, dissolve and detach itself flake by flake, and he himself seemed to be the creator, and when he would the destroyer, of the world in which he lived’  (A 55).  Whilst the rhythm and alliteration of these repetitions positively savour the power of such a conception, the conditional tense will not let us forget that this is a fantasy.  Pater assumes Berkeley’s theory that the essence of an object lies in its being perceived, suggesting that ‘the outward object appears to take colour and expression, a new nature almost, from the prompting of the observant mind’ (A 55).  This is not a misunderstanding.  Berkeley’s Principles are clear and concise, in sharp contrast to Kant or Hegel, whom Pater was reading contemporaneously in the early 1860s (Inman 1981a, 26).  We know of course that Pater often does not attribute his sources; in the same vein, his sources do not necessarily correlate with the ideas that he attributes to them.  Billie Inman has noted that ‘Pater was not engaged by the differences between Berkeley and the philosophers whom Berkeley opposed.  He was struck by the questions that Berkeley raised concerning how and what the perceiver perceives’ (Inman 1981a, 27).  Pater is not only engaged in addressing idealism in its various forms.  To understand him, we must see that whilst he is struck by the questions of idealism, he is simultaneously attempting to define his own constructive account of the relationship between the individual and the world. He uses Berkeley’s theory according to his own belief that ‘the service of philosophy is to rouse, to startle [the human spirit] to a life of constant and eager observation’ (R 152).​[27]​  In this way, he takes off from Berkeley’s actual position into his own radical secular vision of the individual that does not include God.   

Pater teases himself and his reader with the implications of placing the individual into the gap where God had been, to become the creator and destroyer of the world.  This would be the ultimate triumph over the uncertainties that haunt his writings, placing the individual at the centre of the universe.  There is intense desire for this power in ‘The History of Philosophy’ as Pater describes how, according to subjective idealism:
           objects which have seemed to [the individual] to be in reality its own creations to make 
            and unmake and how wildly in each of us it struggles against any degree of suppression as 
            if the being of the whole world hung upon its continuance.  It would seem to be the one 
            object in the whole sum of things of which we have a really intimate knowledge.  (36-7)
Subjective idealism becomes a wilful, desperate response against ‘suppression.’  Perhaps it is a power that we hold ‘wildly’ out of fear of its fragility.  Even so, it reverses the power balance in the relationship between the individual and world, so that now it is not the continuous consciousness of the individual that is fragile but the world itself.  There is a hint that the world is hung on a continuance of the conceit that we are its creators.  Pater knows that the existence of our ordered world depends not on the metaphysics of idealism but on our belief in idealism, the only thing that saves us from feeling overwhelmed and suppressed.  This is the significance of subjective idealism to him.  

Pater is not a solipsist; of course not.  His belief in the external reality of the world never really wavers through his forays into subjective idealism.  Subjective idealism is a fantasy in which he indulges.  Perhaps it is a fancy of Pater the shy outsider who wished to extinguish the world with which he was too often at odds.  Ultimately, though, Pater’s Berkeleyan solipsism must always be understood in relation to diaphaneitè.  The sensations of the outside world are so insistent that he is unable to deny their existence, ‘calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action’ (R 151).  The receptive and initiatory powers of the individual intermingle and challenge each other.  If, indeed, we are each in ‘our own dream of a world,’ Perry Meisal asks, ‘where is the “without” from which forces are supposedly to pass through?’ (114). Requiring the notion of a clearly separated inside and outside, Pater retains some conception of a world external to the individual even as he finds himself immersed in subjective idealism.  Meisal continues: ‘Pater’s solipsism, in other words, is erected on a spatial metaphor’ and he invokes it ‘in order to deny it’ (114-115).  Certainly, Pater’s ‘solipsism’ is inconsistent.  However, he has not the intentionality that Meisal suggests.  Pater is attempting to reconcile the receptive capacity and creative power, outer experience and inner spirit, and – intentionally or not  – highlighting the difficulties in doing so.  

It is Pater’s endeavour to combine receptive with the initiatory powers that takes him to Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.  Pater has little more time for the metaphysics of Kant’s first Critique than he has for Christianity.  He dismisses Kant’s ‘pretensions to pass beyond the limits of individual experience [which] seemed as dead as those of old French royalty’ (MS 1).  It is Kant’s pretentiousness that bothers the modest Mr. Pater.  The object of his rejection is not the notion of a metaphysical realm, or not primarily.  Rather it is the conceit that the rational mind might pass behind the veil into this realm.  As we will see elsewhere, it is the supreme Reason that Pater cannot believe in.  Like a true Romantic, he gestures toward the imagination, attempting to reconcile this immutable essence at the centre of the individual with his Romantic-Empirical understanding that this cannot be explicated by reasoned analysis.​[28]​  Amidst the eternal flux of empirical sense data and an unreliable, transparent self-identity, the creative imagination promises to sanctify and unify the individual.  Putting aside his dislike for Kant’s metaphysical pretensions and his systematization, Pater nonetheless accepts the central principle of his transcendental philosophy.  According to Kant intelligible experience is only possible when intuited phenomena – the empirical and ‘diaphanous’ elements of experience − are conceptualized by the Categories of the Understanding -- the a priori, creative part.  So the individual’s experience of the world comprises random phenomena of Hume’s empiricism and a priori categories of understanding and imagination.  It is out of this fusion that ‘I’ comes into being.  In his Preface to the second edition, Kant characterizes this philosophy as a Copernican Revolution (1929, 25): just as Copernicus proves that the sun is the scientific centre of the universe, so he ‘proves’ that the individual is the epistemological centre of the universe, giving shape to the random sense data that appear to it from the world.

Kant’s principle allows Pater to have it both ways by showing how empirical receptivity may combine with that ‘free gift of a light and heat that seem her own’ (GB 237).  There is some suggestion of this dynamic in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, as Pater describes: ‘That clear perceptual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours […] a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it’ (R 150).  The ‘outline’ or form of the world we perceive is given to it by us.  We can think of the web as a tapestry: in the act of perception we create a design without which there is but a jumble of threads.  These are necessary to the design but we find it impossible to make sense of them; we can only see what they all mean when the threads are arranged into a design and there must be a design or the threads of experience remain a meaningless confusion of phenomena.  In Kant’s terms, this jumble of threads is the random sense data and the design is the world as we experience it.  The individual creates experience from the threads of data that are out there in the world.  This suggests that Pater’s criticism of Coleridge should not be read as criticism of transcendental idealism as such, but rather of Coleridge’s interpretation thereof.   It is with uncharacteristic scorn that Pater criticises Coleridge’s ‘endeavours to present the then most recent metaphysics of Germany to English readers […] in which he was certainly far from uniformly at his best’ (A 81-2).  Pater links Coleridge’s critical tendency with Kant’s idealism, but as he well knows transcendental idealism does not seek to make knowledge static.  In its fusion of empiricism and rationalism, the world’s phenomena are subject to constant change; it is only the conditions of knowledge that are absolute.  Kant offers Pater a way of imposing a unifying principle on the flux and relativity of empirical phenomena.  For Pater, the active, or creative, power functions on three epistemic levels: first, it acts a priori to shape random sense data into experience, secondly, it merges with the diaphanous quality in artistic creativity and, thirdly, this active principle fuses with the art object to create aesthetic experience. 

It is in the light of this dynamic that Pater reflects on the individual as creator.  He writes,  ‘Gathering himself together from that complex world and standing back as it were to gaze upon it […the individual] may figure to himself as the master of nature and akin to its creator’ (HP 35).  As in the empirical vision of things, the individual is evoked as ‘a bundle of perceptions’ to be gathered and, presumably, associated somehow.  Only the second part of the sentence seamlessly refigures this dynamic, with the individual as the creator of the world.  He is the active force who brings order to the world even as he gathers its phenomena into himself, and it is in this way that he becomes its creator.  Years later, distancing himself from this view even as he gives an account of it, Pater says that ‘[i]n a certain mystical sense, which some in every age of the world have understood, he, too, is creator, himself actually a creator, himself actually a participator in the creative function’ (GB 236).  

Thus far, we have been referring to the metaphysical constructions that make experience possible.  The same principle underlies Pater’s conception of artistic genius.  Kant presents artistic creation as a fusion between sensations from the world and the a priori quality of genius.  Paterian genius involves the diaphanous quality, and we saw this in his assertion that ‘in all creative work the larger part [is] given passively, to the recipient mind’ (A 41).  Considered in these terms, scattered empirical terms like ‘temperament’ and ‘taste’ (A 98; R 156) may suggest an a posteriori explanation of artistic genius, in which its characteristics are acquired through experience, not brought to experience.  Yet, for Pater as for Kant, ‘[g]enius is the innate mental predisposition through which nature gives the rule to art’ (Kant 1987, §46 174).  At the beginning of The Renaissance Pater strikes this keynote by quoting William Blake: ‘“[t]he ages are all equal […] but genius is always above its age”’ (R xxxi).  This brief suggestion is compounded elsewhere when Pater defines creative genius as an ‘intense and individual power’ and a ‘quite unusual sensibility, really innate within [the individual]’ (A 40; 44).  The expression of such personal qualities is ‘the central aesthetic formulation of The Renaissance’ (Lyons 767ff).  As Pater declares, ‘expression [is] the purging away from the individual of what belonged only to him’ (R 43).  For this reason, it is defined against ‘the mere accidents of a particular time and place’ that are the very conditions of genius in empirical philosophy (R 43).  This Romantic idea makes genius exempt from the fluctuations and ephemera so vividly evoked in the Conclusion as an innate and personal quality.  

Pater’s presentation of Dante Gabriel Rossetti offers an example of how sensations and a priori creativity combine in the genius artist.  Pater writes that ‘in the vehement and impassioned heat of his conceptions, the material and the spiritual are fused and blent: if the spiritual attains the definite visibility of a crystal, what is material loses its earthiness and impurity’ (A 212).  On one hand, Rossetti is defined by his diaphanous quality of ‘transparency’ (A 202).  Pater argues that this quality is palpable in his poetry: ‘he had this gift of transparency in language – the control of a style which did but obediently shift and shape itself to the mental motion, as a well trained hand can follow on the tracing paper the outline of the original drawing below it’ (A 206).  Stressing the analogy between this transparency and the sensible world, he continues: there is ‘a seal of reality’ on Rossetti’s expression of the world; ‘a definiteness of sensible imagery’ (A 206; A 207).  On the other hand, Rossetti is strongly defined as being in ‘the very midst of profoundly mystic vision’ (A 207).  This is necessary to Rossetti’s diaphaneitè because it gives shape to his perceptions.  It is the human spirit that gives shape to the glass form.  The innate, ‘profoundly mystic vision’ that is integral to Pater’s conception of genius exults the imagination of the individual beyond the seen world and dignifies him with the divinity of a god. 

For Pater, the dualism of the receptive capacity and the creative power also defines the aesthetic spectator.  As Christopher Lane notes, ‘Pater attempted to incorporate the spectator’s look into a dynamic model of criticism so that the object could be “realised” and not simply “seen”’ (31).  The fusion of receptivity with aesthetic experiences and subjective interpretation of these experiences posits the aesthetic spectator as an active participant in the creation of art.  In the Preface to The Renaissance too: ‘in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly’ (xxix).  The radical suggestion that aesthetic value is not immanent in the work of art (as Arnold would have it) but ‘realised’ in the imagination of the subject serves to consolidate the position of the individual at the centre of the universe, making the subjective individual necessary to the creation of aesthetic experience.  The perceiving individual becomes the over-arching principle of unity of art, and in each exercise of this creative criticism he finds his existence confirmed.  

It is the ‘initiatory power’ of the individual to fuse random sense data into experience and to create art and to realize art as its spectator that saves him from the empirical ‘bundle of self’ entertained in the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  This ‘initiatory power’ or creativity is the very highest achievement of being because it is proof positive of the unity of the subject; it is the objective correlative of the individual imagination, and the work of art is all that remains of us: our only claim to eternity.  Pater’s allusions to Berkeley, Kant and to more general Romantic notions of creativity place further explanation beyond his own prose, in the thoughts of others.  Gesturing beyond the scope of his prose to these thinkers, he reaches beyond empirical experience to the metaphysical notions they express, without quite being able to submit to these ideas himself. 


iv. Conclusions 

The dualism of the ‘receptive’ capacity and the ‘creative power’ places the individual at the centre of its ‘dramatic contrasts’.  Here, as the individual initiates and mediates the fusion of fleeting phenomena and creative spirit, he stands at the very centre of the universe. Pater’s dualism resolves the dichotomy between self and world, between the transcendent a priori self and the a posteriori ‘bundle of perceptions’.  On one hand, the individual is created out of the ever-changing external world, whilst on the other hand he defines himself against this flux by his gift of creativity and subjectivity, which gives him autonomy.  These qualities, woven into the fabric of The Renaissance, save him from the ephemera of merely passive sensations so that he becomes, perhaps, god-like.  

So if Hume’s sceptical stance does not make Pater feel disillusioned with life (Inman 1981b, 20), the reason is not because he finds any comfort in it but because he never really believes it.  He rarely believes the theories of others.  Ideas instead become woven into a tapestry of his own idiosyncratic design.  So Pater never quite allows the relative spirit to define the individual.  It comes close in the Conclusion when breathless excitement teeters all too close to a loss of control and, certainly, he is excited by the dynamism that relativity offers to the individual, with the opportunity to constantly invent one’s self.  However, he cannot give up autonomy and essential values because they are necessary to his aesthetic vision.  Influenced by Pater’s sceptical turns, it would be the modernists for whom ‘the outline of character almost disappears, all characters begin to look much alike, it is difficult to find any positive, authentic core of being that could be called the self’ (Longbaum 170).  We should be careful not to retroactively impress their appropriation of Pater's writings onto the writings themselves, for his sensibility is quite different.  

If sometimes ‘the difference between self and not self is lost’, then, for Pater (Leighton 2002, 18), it is but for a moment.  He would not, does not and cannot give up the idea of the individual because the individual as subject and as creator is at the centre of his aesthetic.  Without a unified semi-stable self the opening question of Pater's Renaissance would be meaningless: ‘What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book, to me? (R ixxx).   Moreover, the artistic genius, who is the focus of every Paterian imaginary portrait would not be ‘above his age’ at all (R xxxi); just another empirical self through whom impressions flow, mired in their time and just as fleeting.  

Pater’s notion that ‘analysis leaves off’ or ever could leave off for exquisite ephemeral sensual impressions is implicitly undermined.  This is a fancy, to which he can never quite give himself up.  His engagement with the history of ideas as this chapter has begun to suggest is indicative of his learning.  He wears it lightly, purple-tinged, but it is nonetheless necessary to him.  His explorations of empiricist, Idealist and Romanticist philosophies illustrate how he grapples with ideas, selecting the aspects that resonate with him and piecing these ideas together into a patchwork that maps the foundation of the relationship between the individual and the world.  It is a foundation that, as we will see, he feels forced to go beyond.  One of the reasons is implicit in the ‘creative power’ which is curiously unresolved.  The fact that Pater feels unable to perform an anatomy of creativity puts him in the awkward Romantic position of suggesting that there is something beyond our comprehension and that this has to do with creativity, without being able to explain anything about what it is.  Whether this ‘certain mystical sense’ is analogous to ‘that other sort of knowledge’ (HP 12) and how creativity is linked to spirit are questions to which we will turn in the next chapter. 



II. Divinity, Identity and the Infinite in
‘the Spirit or the Soul of Man’


































Oh! for a godlike aim through all these silent years.​[29]​

‘The silence of those infinite spaces,’ says Pascal, contemplating a starlight night, ‘the silence of those infinite spaces terrifies me…’​[30]​




Dappled light on wet cobblestones and light drizzle in the air.  Against the glare of a low sun an incongruent pair is silhouetted, wandering west along Brasenose Lane.  One is relatively tall and big-boned, with a slight stoop; the other is short and delicate, and they are engaged in hushed but earnest conversation.  At least, the taller man animatedly talks.  The other, in deferential silence, stays close and listens, venturing to interrupt only occasionally.  Their faint single shadow follows them between the walls of Lincoln and Exeter, and as they turn right onto the Turl, we lose them amongst the end-of-day bustle. 
 
It was early evening on 30th May 1866, and perhaps it was later that night, in his room, as the rain returned, that Gerard Manley Hopkins recorded the episode in his diary: ‘Pater talking two hours against Xtianity’ (1959, 133).  Not that this was particularly unusual.  Nearly a month earlier he had described Pater as ‘“[b]leak-faced Neology in cap and gown”: no cap and gown but very bleak’ (1959, 138).  Benjamin Jowett had recommended Pater to tutor Hopkins -- then a Balliol undergraduate -- three years earlier, in vain hope that this rather vocal dissident would counteract the influence of Cardinal Newman.  In truth, Hopkins and Pater were not so dissimilar and one may expect that each knew it; perhaps it was this that drew them to one another.​[31]​  They were both young men in 1866 – twenty-one and twenty-six, respectively – and each had his own struggles with Christianity. 

At that time, the religious atmosphere of Oxford was tumultuous.  The tensions brought by the Oxford Movement had faded, but new ones arose concerning the relationship between the Church and the University.  The clerical hegemony that had long defined university life was in battle with the liberal Anglicanism contentiously expressed in Essays and Reviews in 1860 and the radical anti-clericalism of Charles Swinburne.  His ‘Hymn to Proserpine’ was published in1866:  
           Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath;
           We have drunken of things Lethean, and fed on the fullness of death.  (24)                                                                                             Pater probably counted Swinburne as a friend​[32]​ and both were members of The Old Mortality Society, with Swinburne a founder-member and Pater elected in 1863.  It is similarly vehement frustration that one hears in The Renaissance as Pater denounces God as ‘a sort of mythical personage without us, with whom we can do warfare’ and proclaims that metaphysical questions of beauty are ‘as unprofitable as metaphysical questions elsewhere’ (148; xxx).  Such outbursts were fundamental to Rev. John Wordsworth’s ‘grieved’ and ‘pained’ response to Pater's first book (61).  For it presents a violent antagonism between the ‘mythical personage’ of God and humanity that ridicules our supposed relationship with ‘Him.’  Pater presents God as nothing more than  a fantasy, self-destructively imagined into being to chain and imprison the individual.  

Pater’s views on metaphysics, though, are less polemical and less easily fixed and formulated than he would have us believe.  Almost in spite of himself, he is steeped in Christian culture and its structures of thought.  Doubters and would-be reformers notwithstanding, it is difficult to overestimate the pervasiveness of Anglicanism in all areas of academic life in Oxford during his lifetime.  Although, to all intents and purposes, the prising apart of Church and University had begun with the University Reforms Act of 1854 and there had been sustained pressure from the government and liberals within the university for further reform, ‘the spirit of the place remained the same’ (V.H.H. Green 152).​[33]​  That is to say, the university was in the grip of the clerics; most dons were ordained, and the overwhelming spirit of the place was Anglican, re-emergent after the waning of the Oxford Movement.  Although Pater himself was a non-clerical don – one of the new breed created by the first Reform Act – this was the air that he breathed.  Moreover, it was the air he had breathed since childhood, when his religious devotion convinced his Aunt Bessie that he would become a priest (Wright I, 91). 

After his painful disillusionment with religion ‘he always privileged the concrete over the abstract’ (Higgins 1991, 86).  Or at least he tried.  But his complex antipathy to God the Father and his apparent concentration on materialism is not analogous with atheism, which is quite different.  He ‘was never in his heart of hearts a confirmed atheist […] he hung to religion, as it were, by a few fibres, just as -- if we may borrow a simile from the countryside – the hawthorn trunks hang to the parent root-stocks after the hedge has been “laid”’ (Wright I. 204).  In his manuscript essay, ‘The Aesthetic Life,’ he experiments with a more impartial view, suggesting ‘[w]e live (it is said daily) amid the wreck of religious theories of the unseen’ (1).  The parentheses and objective, impersonal tense doubly distance him from the anti-clerical views he had espoused in The Renaissance and in private.  In middle-age he returned to the Church, as Oscar Wilde, Aubrey Beardsley and Charles Swinburne would later.  So Pater never could vanquish God, not really.  The silence would be too much to bear.  God lingers in Pater’s conception of spirit, which is nowhere more evident than in his conception of the individual.  And so, this chapter argues that Pater is unable ever to fully give up the Abrahamic conception of an individualized, divine, metaphysical soul.  Even as he denounces the Church, the sense of some spiritual realm is fundamental to his conceptions of creativity and individuality.  We began to see this in the previous chapter with Pater’s undefined notion of innate creativity, and in a sense our enquiry now focuses in on the origin of that creativity.  In Pater’s writing the spirit is insistent; sometimes taunting us with knowledge that we cannot posses and, at others, consoling us with the possibility that the individual is not, after all, disinherited from the infinite.  The Paterian individual is nebulously underpinned by a metaphysical essence that he can neither define nor do without. As we track its main vicissitudes we will consider how Pater’s figurative and often shifting language endows the individual with an innate metaphysical quality. 

At times, echoes of Mattthew Arnold, T.H. Green, John Henry Newman, Emanuel Swedenborg and others may be heard in Pater’s voice as he speaks of the spirit.  However, his thoughts are formed less in dialogue with other thinkers than in quiet meditation with himself.  When, in a unique passage, he turns his full attention to this animating principle of the individual, he falters, describing ‘the idea of the mind itself[,] or of the ego[,] or of personality[,] or will[,]​[34]​ or of the soul[,] or spirit of man[,] as it is variously named’ (HP 35).​[35]​  In this rough, unpublished draft​[36]​ Pater is irreverent about the true nature of this variously named ‘it.’  Blurring these very different conceptions into one, he makes a mockery of the futile endeavour to distinguish between them.  These distinctions, as he notes elsewhere, are ‘hard to ascertain philosophically’ (A 25).  One cannot ignore the sense, sometimes, that he does not care to try.  Terms like spirit and soul can slip into his prose, almost furtively, as if to paper over the cracks with cultural cliché.  Yet this is not a true picture, all told.  It does not mean that he is any less convinced by the existence of a divine ‘it’ that animates each individual and makes each unique.  He keeps returning to ‘the soul or spirit of man,’ ever preoccupied with the metaphysical notions which he disavows in the same breath.  

To discuss the spirit in Pater’s writings is an endeavour to be precise about that which is inherently imprecise, without closing down the possibilities couched within.  It is the reconstructive account of an inherently unresolved notion, investigating the symbiotic relationship between Paterian ‘spirit,’ his religious unbelief and reconciliation to some kind of conventional faith in his twilight years, and the tumultuousness of religion in his age.  As such our three sections are provisional, organized respectively around the spirit, gestures toward pantheism, and the soul; but pointing beyond that which is unequivocally stated by Pater.  


i. Light and the spirit 

Pater’s early essays explore ways to relocate the unique animating spirit of the individual from Heaven to Humanity.  In a world where God is but ‘a mythical personage’ and metaphysical questions are discarded, the status of hitherto metaphysical terms like spirit and soul, though, is necessarily ambiguous.  Therefore, as Pater attempts to come to terms with the kind of secular animating spirit that might define the individual, he attempts to find a secular language with which to free himself from God.  He envisages the individual endowed not with a God-given soul but with a secular spirit that may shine its own light across Arnold’s ‘darkling plain’.  Indeed, light becomes an important though ambivalent metaphor for this secular quality.  It symbolizes, on the one hand, a Hellenic principle of rational thought that puts one in mind of Matthew Arnold’s ‘sweetness and light’, whilst on the other hand it stands for a nebulous quasi-metaphysical quality.  It is this latter conception that comes to gently assert itself in ‘Diaphaneitè’ and The Renaissance, as Pater attempts to define what kind of divine spirit may be possible in the absence of God the Father.      

Pater’s ambition to re-centre value in the secular individual is a broadly Hellenistic endeavour.  He is in sympathy with its centrality of self-reflection and even flirts with the Hellenistic terms in which the rational intelligence of the individual is paramount.  Such Hellenistic gestures evolve out of Matthew Arnold’s discussion of Hellenism in Culture and Anarchy (89-103).  For Pater emboldens Arnold’s faint identification between Hellenism and light,​[37]​ conjuring Hellenistic philosophy as an illumination to the dark corners of the mind where superstition and mysticism might otherwise lurk.  This is suggested particularly in ‘Winckelmann’ where Hellenism is ‘the principle pre-eminently of intellectual light’ (R 122) and ‘Hellenic culture is a sharp edge of light across the gloom’ (R 131).  In an aside, Pater draws attention to the clarity and simplicity that define Hellenism in contrast to the sensual excesses of modernity and the spiritual excesses of the middle-ages: ‘(our modern culture may have more colour, the medieval spirit greater heat and profundity, but Hellenism is pre-eminent for light)’ (R 122).  This repeated image reappropriates the Christian symbol of light​[38]​ to connote instead the Hellenic culture of intellectual culture and reason.  Winckelmann embodies this principle, with his ‘native affinity to the Hellenic spirit’ suggesting that he is ‘still uninfected by any spiritual sickness, finding the end of all spiritual endeavour in the aspects of the human form, the continual stir and motion of a comely human life’ (R 122; 117).  The ‘inward or intellectual light’ of Pater’s Apollo epitomises this principle with ‘his calm and peaceful order of the soul’ (GS 267).  By consolidating the ‘spiritual endeavour’ within the individual, Pater effectively frees the individual from God through the powers of reason.  

However, Pater cannot long pursue his revaluation of the individual on the terms offered by Hellenism.  He is ultimately ambivalent about the scope of reason on which Hellenism is founded.  Matthew Arnold links Hellenism with his own conception of the function of criticism: ‘The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are’ (1949, 91).  This link between Hellenism and the very vision of literary criticism that Pater famously revises in the first paragraph of The Renaissance​[39]​ is significant.  It reminds us that Pater’s aesthetic is founded on principles of subjectivity and imagination that are ultimately at odds with the objective, rational self suggested by Hellenism.  To pursue a strictly Hellenistic vision of the individual would be, for Pater, to relinquish the ineffable, spiritual qualities that are fundamental to individuality.  Moreover, he recognizes that the faculty of reason is fragile.  When Winckelmann dies at the hands of his lover​[40]​ he becomes Apollo crushed by Dionysus, because reason is slave to the destructive passions, always.  Whilst Pater is ambivalent, even fearful, of the implications of this, he recognizes that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in Hellenistic philosophy.  Passion and desire are two of his departure points from Hellenism, and we will return to these in the next chapter; spirituality is another.  

On the subject of spirit, Pater is often at odds with himself.  He is uncertain of how to vanquish God but retain the nebulous spirituality and divinity which God granted to the individual, and this uncertainty is illustrated by the emergent ambivalence of his symbol of light.  For, alongside and at odds with the light of reason, Pater offers light to us as a metaphor for a metaphysical, spiritual quality within the individual.  This is first suggested in ‘Diaphaneitè,’ in which the diaphanous man is defined by ‘a mind of taste lighted up by some spiritual ray within’ (D 155).  The compound image rests on an implicit distinction between the ‘mind of taste’ and the ‘spiritual ray within’ it.  The mention of taste, first, evokes Edmund Burke’s empirical aesthetic, in which the quality of taste is based on understanding and may be developed ‘by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by frequent exercise’ (Burke 25).  Pater, though, transforms this empirical idea with his ‘spiritual ray.’  This ray confuses the metaphorical link between light and Hellenism.  Light, here, becomes symbolic not of the rational mind but of an undefined, possibly metaphysical, certainly creative spirit.  It illuminates the imagination and not the rational mind, anticipating the ‘light and heat’ metaphor for creativity in the Preface to The Renaissance (xxxiii) and suggesting that this creative light is distinct from and enhances the empirical mind of mere taste.  

Moreover, it assumes an analogous relationship between spirit and aesthetic sensibility, which is refined later in the essay as Pater describes the ‘pure white light that one might disentwine from the tumultuary richness in Goethe’s nature’ (D 158).  Pater picks up on the image of light to refine its significance, more specifically, as a symbol for creativity.  If, then, ‘the empirical philosophy of our day, carrying us so far into space and time seemingly infinite, has, in inverse proportion, narrowed the spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ (AL 2), it is Pater who looks to expand the horizon of the spiritual and the imaginative realms.  Conjoined by this half-uncertain analogy in ‘The Aesthetic Life’, the spirit and imagination become a single animating principle in the individual.  

Further clues to the nature of this nebulously defined ‘spirit’ are implicit and must be interpreted by the reader from the depths of the image.  The extract from ‘Diaphaneitè’ suggests that it appears from beyond the realms of comprehension, with the word ‘spiritual’ suggesting an inchoate metaphysical quality.  The adjective – ‘some’ – iterates the unfathomable character of this light: it is not the spiritual ray but some undefined other.  Here Pater is at the limits of any empirically defined epistemology, and his conception of ‘spirit’ is emblematized not so much by ‘clear crystal’ as by ‘that hard gem’ with its myriad of opaque, beautiful surfaces.  He is a quintessential Romantic: aware of a spiritual dimension in our ordinary perceptions but believing this to be beyond the range of rational analysis.  This is a nebulous force in Pater’s visions of art and the individual; but a force, nonetheless.  If he is, as he purports to be, liberating us from that ‘sort of mythical personage without’, he is unable to do it as a good Hellenist through the faculty of reason.  His liberation emerges as a middle-course that seeks to erase God but to retain the personal metaphysical quality of spirit.  The light which had been the external light of Hellenic culture in general or bequeathed to Man by God is now internalized, consolidated within the individual.  To an extent, this is analogous to Winckelmann’s triumph of ‘finding the end of all spiritual endeavour in the aspects of the human form’.  The difference is that whilst Winckelmann did this through the cultivation of reason, the ‘spiritual ray’ suggests an indefinable quality at the heart of the individual that cannot be reduced to reason or even personality or character.  Paterian spirit assumes the qualities of light, becoming unbounded, unquantifiable, indivisible and immaterial.  Indeed, in marked contrast to the Romantics’ placing of spirit in the heart and the empiricists’ and psychologists’ location of ‘spirit’ in the brain, the Paterian spirit emanates from the general within.  It diffuses through every part of the individual.

The internal quality of spirituality and imagination is expanded through Pater’s metaphor of light by granting the individual god-like divinity.  In a passage of The Renaissance, Pater begins to describe an unnamed Greek statue with the image of ‘pure light on its gleaming surfaces’ (R 136).  The evocation of light reflecting off the contours of the statue suggests an external source, as in the light of Hellenic reason or the light of faith brought by Jesus.  After skirting this form, though, Pater’s eye returns to the image of light, which has shifted from surface reflection to a ‘white light’ that emanates out from the ‘unchanging characteristics’ within man: ‘That white light purged from the angry bloodlike stains of action and passion, reveals not only what is accidental in man but the tranquil godship in him as opposed to the restless accidents of life’ (R 137).  The ‘white light’ signals the intensification of this quality as it becomes internalized.  White light was the hottest and strongest light that could be created by Man in the late-nineteenth century.  The dichotomy between the inner-life and the frenzied ‘action and passion’ in the outer-world indicates the character of this quality.  It vividly conjures a distinction between the defining quality within the individual and the violent, ephemeral world of ‘action and passion.’  It is through several such contrasts that Pater evokes this internal quality as pure, tranquil and eternal: borrowing the immutable element implicit from the Abrahamic soul in contrast to the ‘accidental’ and ‘restless accidents of life.’  In this way, the Paterian individual is intricately linked with this ‘supposed secondary, or still more remote meaning, − that diviner signification held in reserve, in recessu divinius aliquid’ (R 23).​[41]​  There is a similarity here to Pater’s conception of creative genius in 'Wordsworth', where he writes that ‘[t]he secret of creative genius would be an exquisitely purged sympathy with nature, with the reasonable soul antecedent there’ (A 79).  The analogy between ‘white light’ and creative genius reminds us of the slippage between spirituality and creativity.  It also stresses the a priori nature of this spiritual-creative quality, building on the gestures of Pater’s metaphor of light to depart from an ostensibly empirical materialism toward a metaphysical vision of an a priori quality at the centre of the individual.  

Pater takes the ‘tranquil godship’ one step further by positing that the individual actually becomes a god.  Quoting the neo-Platonist metaphysician Plotinus, he writes that 'we may see […] ourself in splendour, filled with the light of intellect, or rather light itself, pure, buoyant, aerial, become – in truth, being – a god’ (GB 239).  The ‘light of intellect’ is revised in mid-sentence as though capturing those ‘decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.’  It leaves us with pure light: the adjective for no definable quality, but itself the divine quality which exalts the individual to the status of a god.  Pater’s prose attempts to find a new idiom through which to speak of our reality.  It rejects the Biblical rhetoric that one often hears echoed in the ‘prophetic mode’ of Carlyle, Ruskin, and Arnold (Peterson 376).  ‘I’m afraid we’re not rid of God because we still believe in grammar…’ Nietzsche wrote (1976b, 21).  Pater’s prose attempts to remake the grammar of the Bible, dissipating its declamatory tone and didacticism into those wondering, wandering sentences which seek to capture the uncertain, fallible individual hesitating in the wake of God’s death, unable to make the assertions of old without the assurance of God’s word.  So whilst Nietzsche sought to define the post-God world by assuming Biblical tones and allegories in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Pater distances himself from such self-confidence.  The death of God leaves him insecure and unsure, and his stuttering ever-shifting prose reflects this even as it audaciously suggests the dawn of a new secular spirit.  

In a sense, human divinity is the necessary corollary to Pater’s dismissal of an after-life.  It is an antidote or at least an attempt at an antidote to the insecurities of a godless world.  With this, Pater’s yearning for ‘a god-like aim through all these silent years’ finds its mark within the individual.  This innate quality gives value to our being, here and now, and in this world.  It imbues human life – brief as it is – with divinity, making it intrinsically perfect.  This autonomy renders Jesus or God the Father superfluous because we need not search outside ourselves for truth or the right to determine our way in the world.  Nietzsche would call this ‘a revaluation of all values’ (1982, 656), and though Pater taps too softly for Nietzsche’s philosophical hammer, here too Man becomes an end in himself.  He emerges from the eternal taint of Original Sin because he is perfect for his own sake and this perfection involves virtue.  The light within individualizes Truth and gives the individual power to create and to redeem himself.  
  
Through Pater’s imagery, the divine spirit emerges to become fundamentally distinct from ‘the idea of mind itself [,] or of the ego [,] or of the personality [,] or will’ with which it had been interchangeable in  ‘The History of Philosophy.’  Conjuring spirit through images of light and individualizing divinity, he effectively makes the spirit intangible and ethereal as ego and personality are not.  These qualities make spirit resemble the Abrahamic soul, with the crucial distinction that by consolidating ‘godship’ within the individual alone Pater may dispense with God Almighty.  It is a neat secular twist.  However, the relationship between this spiritual light within and personality is nebulous and by no means resolved.  In ‘The Aesthetic Life,’ for example, he writes that ‘the higher life of mind and or spirit will involve preference’ (AE 15).  This crossing out indicates an unresolved notion of the distinctions between the finite mind and the infinite soul.  Pater has reconsidered the rash ‘and’ which grants them co-existence, and his replacement ‘or’ is a withdrawal of confidence: a declaration of uncertainty as to whether mind and soul are different substances after all. 

The relationship between this abstract spirit and embodied personality and subjectivity is far from clear.  It is a curious irony that, whilst Pater asserts subjectivity as a tenet of individualism, his narratives distance themselves from the personality of the subjective individual.  For all that Pater focuses on the individual his gaze rarely, if ever, goes beyond the abstract, and this is never more clear than when we look at spirit.  As if he cannot penetrate his own ‘thick wall of personality’ (R 151) to empathize with others such that he could imagine the personality of another, Pater does not really get beneath the skin of his characters.  Pater promised that there should be no personalities in Marius (Wright II. 80).  Marius, Pater’s most sustained protagonist, is a vessel of competing and conflicting ideas that mark the space of years till his death.  Perhaps this is why this novel is so divisive.  In the case of Marius and the figures on whom Pater focuses in his imaginary portraits, spiritual light animates creativity and gives life to the individual in unseen ways, obfuscating the relationship between the nebulously metaphysical and the empirical spirit.   

Pater’s conception of spiritual light is a stuttering conception: less an idea than an implication that one may find fledgling amidst Pater’s prose as it reaches beyond itself for a vision of spirit that cannot be encapsulated in words, only evoked in the imagination.  Light becomes an ever-shifting metaphor with its various suggestions of Hellenic reason, spirit, divinity and creativity.  It locates the confused nature of the animating quality at the heart of the individual at the same time as it illustrates Pater’s inability to give up on some sort of innate quality that defines the individual.  What we find in each conception, though, is not after all so different from the Abrahamic soul of Christianity.  Each account evokes an internal quality that exalts the individual beyond the merely material and beyond Hume’s ‘bundle of ideas’ to show us that he is autonomous and perfect on his own account.  As spiritual light emerges as something divine, God emerges not eradicated but reconceived.  ‘God’ is brought into being within each individual as a personal quality and centre of value, thus avoiding ‘the literal negation of self, [the] kind of moral suicide’ (PP 25) by which some mystics conceive the union between the individual and God.  This is a middle course where the individual is granted autonomy from God’s external force, but retains a divine mystery and quality at the centre of his being.  We noted analogies between Pater’s thought and T.H. Green in the previous chapter, and here again Pater’s conception recalls Green’s pantheistic belief that there ‘is the presence in us of God’ (131), suggesting that spiritual alternatives to orthodox Christianity were to an extent a spirit of the age at this time.  
 
Pater blurs the boundaries between spirit and creativity at the centre of the individual.  Creativity seeks to liberate the individual from God, as it later would liberate Stephen Dedalus, but it does so without ever really challenging the divine Abrahamic soul.  However, the implicit elitism whereby this divine Abrahamic soul is refounded in creativity is a little troubling.  As Steven Lukes has argued Romantic individualism ‘especially as applied to the artist’ led in one direction to ‘the purest egoism and social nihilism’ (18).  It is unclear as to whether Pater is suggesting that spirit is peculiar to the imaginative genius or whether ordinary, uncreative people also ‘lighted up by some spiritual ray within’.  If Pater’s fusion of spirit and creativity implies the former, this reduces the rest of us to the herd of ‘collective life’ (D 157).  


ii. Gestures toward pantheism 

Pater’s conception of spirit tends to linger in the background of his writings; it is brought to the fore as personal, individuated spirit opens out into what he variously calls ‘world-spirit’ and ‘spirit of life’ (A 56; GS 95).  This is founded on the idea that the central forces of the world, which Christianity places in the hands of God the Father, pulse through each individual and the world.  It is a pantheistic notion, aestheticized so that the imaginative individual is positioned at its very centre, and it is fundamental to Pater’s search for unity.  Imaginative genius becomes the unifying principle of reality’s disparate elements and, in this act, fulfils its ‘godlike aim.’  Thus Pater writes that ‘in imaginative genius […] the intelligence of nature, all its discursive elements now connected and justified, is clearly reflected’ (A 78).  This vision, addressed directly in ‘Wordsworth,’ ‘The History of Philosophy’ and ‘Giordano Bruno,’ expands the conception of creative genius and secular spirit, reconceiving the relationship between spirit and matter and suggesting that the spirit unifies being.

Pater censures Coleridge for his exaggeration of pantheism into ‘something like the identity of a natural organism, and the associative act which effected it into something akin to the primitive power of nature itself’ (A 79).  Pater’s conception of pantheistic spirit is somewhat different; for him, this spirit is created by the artistic imagination.  Operating through the imaginative genius, it promises to create unity and order in our ‘unstable, flickering, inconsistent’ impressions of the universe (R 151) or ‘unity in variety’ (PP 35).  You will recall one of Pater’s statements about the nature of philosophy:
           To enforce a reasonable unity and order, to impress some larger likeness of reason, as one 
            knows it in one’s self, upon the chaotic infinitude of the impressions that reach us from 
            every side, is what philosophy as such proposes.  (PP 21)
The suggestion of an internal, self-conscious quality, ‘as one knows it in one’s self,’ echoes the ‘tranquil godship’ in the individual.  It goes further though by suggesting that this quality is an active principle that may be brought to impress unity and order on our vision of the universe.  Whilst Pater has lost faith in ‘the larger likeness of reason’ on which philosophical systems rest, he retains a belief in unity and order at least.  It is imagination that takes the place of reason: imagination impresses unity and order onto ‘the chaotic infinitude of impressions’ in Pater’s aesthetic vision.  This is indicated by the strong analogy which he makes between the ‘unity in variety’ seen in the world and that achieved in music.  In ‘Shakespeare’s English Kings’ he writes that lyric poetry has a ‘unity of impression’ that is at the crux of ‘artistic perfection’ (A 203): ‘all the various expressions of the conflict of character and circumstance falling at last into the compass of a single melody, or musical theme’ (A 203).  The significance of music recalls Pythagoras’ theory of musica universalis or ‘the music of the spheres’ (later taken up by Plato and Ptolemy​[42]​).  As in that classical concept, Pater’s ideal of ‘world-spirit’ is a vision of the unity in variety achieved on imaginative terms.​[43]​  
 
This is an aestheticized and individualized version of the ‘older and more spiritual philosophy’ of pantheism (GS 95).  It is through the imaginative eye that spirit and matter become two interpenetrated aspects of being, as Pater argues for an end to the ‘false contrast or antagonism’ of them (A 212).  And although his conception of spirit would change dramatically, this remains constant.  It is an endeavour to understand spirit and matter as two aspects of one substance, recalling the Christian belief that body and soul will be reconciled in Heaven while radically  relocating this in the here and now.  Or it can also be seen as a humanistic return to the time before the Fall, before Original Sin, when body and spirit were in harmony.  Aligning himself with this ‘philosophy more of instinct than of understanding,’ he writes of
           some spirit of life, akin to that which makes its energies felt within ourselves […] Such a     
            philosophy is a systematised form of that sort of poetry (we may study it, for instance, 
            either in Shelley or in Wordsworth), which also has its fancies of a spirit of the earth, or of
            the sky, − a personal intelligence abiding in them, the existence of which is assumed in 
            every suggestion such poetry makes to us of a sympathy between the ways and aspects of 
            outward nature and the moods of men.  (GS 95-96)
Pater suggests in this 1875 essay​[44]​ that matter and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are two aspects of a single fundamental substance.  This is a mystical notion of some presence experienced not empirically but by intuition alone.  It is a chameleon: both general as the ‘spirit of the earth’ and ‘personal’.  

Pater explores its scope through his contemporaneous essay on William Wordsworth.  He admires Wordsworth’s pantheism because it seeks not for abstract theorization but animates his poetry.  Philosophy is perfectly fused with art.  In Wordsworth’s writings, indeed, ‘philosophy is a systematised form of that sort of poetry’, and in his poetry he suggests a way of reconciling metaphysical spirit with ‘the authority of the senses’ (R 19).  Though Pater is not without reservations about this reverie, ‘in which some had desired to lose themselves’, he is taken with the relationship between spirit and matter on which it is founded.  He picks up particularly on ‘the thought of a spirit of life in outward things, a single, all-pervading mind in them, of which man and even the poet’s imaginative energy, are but moments’ (A 56).  Spirit and mind become analogous forms of unifying power, underpinning the material universe with their common substance. 

For one often credited with identifying the disunity of modernity, Pater is rather preoccupied with unity.  Pantheistic spirit offers Pater the possibility of creating a quasi-Wordsworthian unity: ‘an energetic unity or identity [which] makes itself visible amid abounding variety’ (A 79).  As he explores the relationship between unity and pantheism, in ‘Wordsworth’, the eponymous poet recedes as Pater fastens onto the idea of a unifying spirit:
            [T]he network of man and nature was seen to be pervaded by a common, universal life: a 
            new, bold thought lifted him above the furrow, above the green turf of the Westmoreland 
            churchyard, to a world altogether different in its vagueness and vastness, and the narrow 
            glen was full of the brooding power of the one universal spirit.   (A 56)
The concerns here are more Paterian than Wordsworthian.  Certainly, Pater’s evocation of pantheism is energized by a strong identification between himself and Wordsworth, and his depiction of the poet’s ‘inward,’ quiet,’ apparently ‘monotonous’ life self-consciously reflects his own (A 44).​[45]​  Yet at the point where author and subject melt into each other Pater begins to go his own way.  As with each new clause the narrative ascends to ‘the one universal spirit,’ it also moves beyond Wordsworth’s vision and into Pater’s imagination.  The ‘one universal spirit’ promises to assuage the random and discrete phenomena that characterize the world depicted in the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  Both its singularity and its universality give a sense of unity in diversity.  Moreover, this is achieved on terms that range beyond the empirical world and are known only by thought.  Perhaps this form of thought, then, belongs to ‘the spiritual, imaginative horizon’ that had been narrowed by empiricism.  Certainly, unity belongs to some spiritual realm, which ranges beyond the random phenomena of the world according to sceptical empiricism.

The humanistic dimension of pantheistic unity is particularly striking in this passage, with the ‘common, universal life’ perhaps characterizing spirit as a universal empathy or sympathy between individuals.  Pater picks this up in his essay on Bruno to indicate, further, that sympathy between individuals offers redemption from a godless world:  
           The ghastly spectacle of the endless material universe, infinite dust, in truth, starry as it 
           may look to our terrestrial eyes – that prospect from which Pascal’s faithful soul recoiled 
           so painfully – induced in Bruno only the delightful consciousness of an ever-widening 
           kinship and sympathy, since every one of these infinite worlds must have its sympathetic 
           inhabitants.  (GB 240-1)
As a sympathetic connection between individuals, pantheism becomes Pater’s panacea to Pascal’s ‘infinite spaces’.  The ‘ever-widening kinship and sympathy’ presents itself as a humanistic consolation to the silence of a godless universe.  It suggests that pantheism, as a metaphor for the energy of sympathy that passes individuals, relocates forgiveness and understanding from a God Almighty who might be reached by prayer alone, to other individuals. 
 
In a sense, the truth of pantheism is neither here nor there.  Its metaphysical overtones need no proof because their truth is but the sense of the individual.  Pater’s assertion of subjectivity renders this virtually irrelevant.  The question is of how expedient it is to envisage the world in this way.  In this regard, Pater is acutely aware of how the sense of interpenetrated spirit and matter re-centres the artistic eye from God to the individual: 
            His pantheistic belief that the Spirit of God was in all things, was not inconsistent with, 
            might even encourage, a keen and restless eye for the dramatic details of life and character 
            for humanity in all its visible attractiveness, since there, too, in truth, divinity lurks. 
                                                                                                                           (GB 237-8)  
In the first part of the statement pantheism presents itself as an encouragement to artistic vision, the truth value of which is irrelevant.  However, the narrative’s view has shifted by the end of the sentence, by qualifying this ambivalence with its final assertion that, indeed, ‘in truth, divinity lurks.’  So the sentence moves from scepticism to affirmation and as a result pantheistic spirit is transformed from a myth created by the individual to a true divinity inherent in the creative individual.  Venus de Melos is the positive embodiment of this, as a work conceived with the ‘keen and restless eye’ of a pantheist creator, because in the apprehension of the statue: ‘The mind begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part of the spiritual motive.  This motive is not lightly and loosely attached to the sensuous form, as its meaning to an allegory, but saturates and is identical with it’ (R 132).  Just as form manifests content, sensual form embodies the spirit.  In each case they are necessary to each other, and indistinguishable from each other.  Pater defines himself against habitual or Christian views that the spirit transcends the image or that the image points beyond itself to a metaphysics.  The ‘spiritual motive’ exalts art so that spectatorship is itself a spiritual experience, not premised on an after-life or gesturing to a spirit elsewhere in time, but an immanent, immediate experience of the spiritual through aesthetic subjectivity, simply for that moment’s sake.  

This interpenetration of spirit and flesh is analogous to that of artistic form and matter.  There can be a tendency to assume that, in Pater’s writings, materiality erases spirit; but this is a significant misrepresentation of the case.  One may look to the analogous dualism of form and content in art.  In all arts, except for music, he notes, ‘it is possible to distinguish the matter, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it’ (R 86).  Most recently, Angela Leighton argues that form is to ‘obliterate’ content in art (2007, 84ff).  I would suggest, rather, that it is the distinction between form and content that is obliterated, and not the content itself.  This makes more sense when we continue to read the passage from which it is taken in ‘The School of Giorgione,’ when Pater suggests that ‘in their union or identity, [they] present one single effect to the “imaginative reason”’; ‘they inhere in and completely saturate each other’; ‘the perfect identification of matter and form’ (R 88; 88; 90).  This is a fusion of the equally significant elements of art, privileging neither, only readdressing the balance after the over-emphasis on content at the expense of beautiful form in prose.​[46]​  This interpretation reveals a strong analogy between the dynamics of content and form, and those of spirit and matter.  

Dante Gabriel Rossetti once again epitomizes this for Pater, as one in whom ‘the material and spiritual are fused and blent’ and ‘the two trains of phenomena which the words matter and spirit do but roughly distinguish, play inextricably into each other’ (A 212).  This is reflected in Rossetti’s ability to fuse form and matter in his poetry and it echoes his significance as an exemplar of balanced receptivity and creativity.  In this fusion, ‘if the spiritual attains the definite visibility of a crystal, what is material loses its earthiness and impurity’ (A 212).  Pater’s metaphor draws on the fact that at extreme reductions of temperature gases become liquids and are eventually crystallized into solids.  In the same way, his spirit crystallizes so that it becomes something tangible; something that we may commend to the understanding.  Despite the figurative contradiction it proposes to Pater’s accompanying image of creative heat and light, the spirit as crystal suggests its beauty and preciousness, and a little of its ethereal nature.  The transferral of qualities on each side, spiritual to material and material to spiritual, means that we may now perceive the spirit, which could not be perceived before, as a crystal. 

Pater’s characterization of spiritual pantheism links his need for ‘a godlike aim’ with creativity and humanism.  Moreover, it addresses two of his essential problems in the wake of God’s death: it reinstates spirit to the material world and assuages its fragmentation.  Its metaphysics matters not; all that matters is that the creative artist perceives a godliness in the seen world and that the individual feels empathy with all others.  Thus is Pater’s spiritual pantheism founded on the unsteady ground of the subjective mind.


iii. The soul 

When, with dark mischievous humour, Pater declared that he would seek to be ordained in 1862 it was because he thought it the most wonderful game to become a priest who did not believe, like an enemy within.​[47]​  Thirty-two years later, shortly before his death, he was again thinking of taking holy orders.  This time it was without irony.  This section considers Pater’s emergent conception of the Christian soul and his ultimate disavowal of spiritual light.    

Pater’s ‘return’ to the Church has variously perplexed and disappointed critics, who wish to claim him, as others have wished to claim him, as a champion of the atheist cause.  Yet, his return to the comfort of the Church does not create a schism in his thought.  We should see it more as an evolution that brings him, not from atheism to faith, but from one kind of agnosticism to another.  As respective emblems of the secular quality and the God-defined quality in one’s self, Pater’s use of the terms ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ indicate that his religious evolution is fuzzy.  Like a vestige of Christianity, the Abrahamic soul is never fully removed from Pater’s writings.  It is noted in The Renaissance – ‘a wonderful outpouring of soul’; the beating of the soul against its bars’ (R 5; R 122) – where its perennial appearances illustrate Pater’s inability to fully dispense with the ideology of Christianity.  

In 1894, he considers that ‘the doubts never die, they are only just kept down in a perpetual agonia’ (MS 61).   The fundamental shift around the early 1880s was Pater’s realization that he needed belief.  As Thomas Wright records, one friend asked ‘“What […] was your object in writing Marius?” “To show,” replied Pater, “the necessity of religion”’ (II. 87).  By the mid-1880s, Christianity offers Pater one of the very things he rejected as a young man: reassurance.  He resolves an uncertain self into the certainties of religious faith.  In a sense, the nature of this uncertain self will become clearer as we proceed, looking to the pressures that threaten to dissolve the individual in the following chapters, and leave his teetering always on the brink of his own dissolution.  In his later works, Pater sees in Christianity most of what he wanted to see imbued in the pagan world: beauty, mystery and compassion, but gifted with God-ordained certainty.  Gifted with such certainty Paterian light is subverted and rejected, suggesting Pater’s ultimate disavowal of pagan spirituality.  It is in this context that we should understand the dynamics between the individual and Christianity in ‘Pascal,’ ‘Style’, Pater’s Introduction to Dante’s Purgatorio, and his ultimate renunciation of the pagan spirit in ‘Apollo in Picardy’.

God does not have any substantive presence in the world of Pater’s words and he only explores God insofar as He affects one’s sense of one’s own individualism and aesthetics.  Pater presents Christianity through the individual, drawing out its humanism and the sense of hope it gives.  This absolute centrality of the individual and of kindness, compassion, love between individuals is a constant even though the fabric of the world is gradually reconceived.   Pater admires the compassion of Dante’s Christianity, with its ‘assurance that […] “boundless grace/ Hath arms of such a large embrace,/ That they will straight admit/ Whatever turns to It”’ (1892, xxi).  And ‘the breadth of Dante’s theological horizon’; his ‘cosmopolitan genius’ (xxiii), offers Pater a way in which to reconcile his pagan aesthetic with Christianity.​[48]​  In this way, Pater reformulates the humanism of his pantheistic vision of ‘an ever-widening kinship’ in Christianity.  Christianity comes to define the individual by hope:
            An age of faith, if such ever there were, our age certainly is not; an age of 
           love, all its pity and self-pity notwithstanding, who shall say? – in its religious 
           scepticism, however, especially as compared with the last century in its 
           religious scepticism, an age of hope, we may safely call it, of a development of 
           religious hope or religious hopefulness.  (Pater 1892, xx) 
It defines his not by the absence or presence of God, but by that state of mind that is crucial to Pater: a sort of unfulfilled but undenied sense of the possible.

Christian belief gives the validation of tradition to Pater’s faith that there is some metaphysical, mysterious dimension to the individual.  Mrs. Humphrey Ward recalls that later in life ‘he became more endlessly interested in [Christianity] and haunted by the “something” in it which he thought inexplicable’ (121).  In a theological conversation between herself and Pater, he remarked, ‘You think it’s all plain.  But I can’t.  There are such mysterious things.  Take that saying,  “Come ye up to me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden.”  There is a mystery in it – something supernatural’ (122).  The allure of the supernatural was great.  Pater’s favourite word ‘strange’ – repeated again and again in his essays -- is suggestive of at least this much.  Christianity underpinned the inexplicable with faith in an explanation.    

We see this at work in ‘Style’, where God appears as a deus ex machina to justify the inexplicable soul, pulled out in the essay’s final moments to concretize a subtler shift that we see when soul and mind come to define two different aspects of literature: 
          By mind, the literary artist reaches us through static and objective indications of design in 
           his work, legible to all.  By soul, he reaches us, somewhat capriciously perhaps, one and 
           not another, through vagrant sympathy and a kind of immediate contact.  (A 25)
The definiteness of the distinction between mind and soul is in striking contrast to Pater’s uncertain consideration of ‘the idea of the mind itself[,] or of the ego[,] or of personality[,] or will[,] or of the soul[,] or spirit of man[,] as it is variously named’ in ‘The History of Philosophy.’  In ‘Style,’ the soul has vanquished spirit to reign alone over Pater’s aesthetic and it gives him confidence to assert that the difference between the ‘essentially finite’ mind and the infinite soul is ‘real enough practically’ (A 25).  

Pater’s friends tended to stress his aesthetic reasons – the whiff and melody of the bells and smells – for his attendance at the churches of St Aloysius and St Barnabas in Oxford.  However, we see that the Church affects Pater’s aesthetic as much as Pater’s aesthetic defines his religiosity. The distinction, Pater argues, in an attempt to resolve this indeterminacy on his own terms, is made apparent by its expression in art:
       By mind, the literary artist reaches us through the static and objective indications of design in 
       his work, legible to all.  By soul, he reaches us, somewhat capriciously perhaps, one and not 
       another, through vagrant sympathy and a kind of immediate contact.  (A 25)
Again, Pater draws Christianity as a supremely humanistic religion as the soul is cast as a medium through which to attain ‘sympathy’ and ‘contact.’  Paterian soul emerges as a creative force catalysed by ‘the glory of God’ (A 38).  A sense of God’s glory is a prerequisite of ‘great art’ to the extent where the essential quality of great literature is personified as soul: ‘The way in which the theological interests sometimes avail themselves to the force I mean is perhaps the best illustration I can mean to indicate generally in literature, by the word soul’ (25).  In this way, soul and, with it orthodox Almighty God, usurp spirit and the secular sentiment it represented.  There is a sense in which, perhaps, he has settled with an orthodox conception of God-given soul.  His later revisions illustrate a loss of that youthful confidence that defines his later period.  Individualism and creativity are now underpinned by God.  Perhaps it is the tired carelessness of one who no longer has the energy to pursue the uncapturable.

Just how far Pater has moved from his early vision of spiritual light is only really clear when we consider ‘Apollo in Picardy,’ written and published in 1893.  In ‘Apollo in Picardy’ there is distrust and fear of the formerly affirmed spiritual light; it is an allegory of the destructive power of Hellenic light.  Pater’s preamble picks up on the symbolic significance of Apollo that had been celebrated in ‘Winckelmann’ only to subvert it:
           [Apollo] presented a strange example of a cold and very reasonable spirit disturbed 
            suddenly, thrown off its balance, as by a violent beam, a blaze of new light, revealing, as 
            it glanced here and there, a hundred truths unguessed as before, yet a curse, as it turned 
            out, to its receiver, in dividing hopelessly against itself the well-ordered kingdom of his 
            thought.  (MS 122)
Now, the truth-revealing power of light is ‘violent’ and ‘a curse’ to its subject.  The mysterious shepherd Apollyon embodies this duality.  He appears to epitomise innocence, charming his companions and magically attracting animals and birds to his side.  However, his callous murders of these animals and of Hyacinth show that his powers work both for good and evil.  Apollyon symbolizes a destructive spirit that contrasts utterly with the self-affirming spirit at the heart of Pater’s early thought.  

This gives some poignancy to the figure of Prior Saint-Jean.  Under the influence of Apollyon he experiences profound truths: ‘matters no longer to be reasoned upon and understood, but to be seen rather, to be looked at and heard’ (140).  The cruel irony is that this ‘intellectual light’ negates his ability to rationalise and communicate his thoughts.  The threat that it poses to ‘the well ordered kingdom of thought’ is the threat of paganism – of the rejection of God – to the religious status quo.  In 1873 this was Pater’s hope; in 1893 it is his fear.  In ‘Apollo in Picardy’, the ‘white light’ overcomes Prior Saint-Jean with its destructive power: 
            − that astounding white light! – rising steadily in the cup, the mental receptacle, till it   
            overflowed, and he lay faint and drowning in it.  [There was] no way of escape from the 
            baffling strokes, the lightening flashes; flashes of blindness one might rather call them.           
                                                                                                                                           (141)
It is a halting subversion of the light symbolism in ‘Diaphaneitè’ and The Renaissance.    The ‘white light’ that was then the godship in man, here, is an intrusion from an external force, recalling Dante’s blindness in the face of Heaven’s brilliant bright light.  Only here the blindness is not temporary.  It annihilates Prior Saint Jean’s ability to think and does so with such violence that it threatens to annihilate him.  This is realized in the story’s final movement, when we are told that the Prior lost his wits and later died suddenly in an asylum (145-6).  His mind has become, one might say, the ‘“madhouse cell,”’ from which Pater once believed pagan art would deliver the individual (R 23).   



iv. Conclusions

Once we accept that Pater never really gives up metaphysics his return to the Church no longer seems radical.  On the contrary, it seems almost inevitable.  

The difficulty in concluding on Paterian 'spirit or soul', is in not bringing his conceptions to a false conclusion.  The finality of a conclusion suggests a resolution that we never really have in Pater’s gestures to metaphysics.  Though it would be easy to construct a teleology which brings Pater from atheism to ultimate faith this would be all too easy.  In truth the faith does little to resolve matters: it does not create any sense of a Father God, it does not offer any sense of an after-life and it introduces a violent conflict between the spirit and the soul.  In Pater's later writings as in his earlier writings, the individual emerges as a contested site, with spirituality ever-shifting and nebulous. As we will continue to see in the chapters that follow, the nebulous space of the spiritual is located always just beyond the comprehensible. Just.  Pater’s narrative reflects the way that it evades our comprehension and exists, in so far as it exists at all, as something felt.  He strives toward it almost as if to find the limitations of expression.  In this way, the abstract comes to haunt the concrete.  And in this way, Pater pushes the limitations of what can be explored by rational thought alone.  He suggests the necessity of other ways, such as imagination, to explore the vistas of the self.

The only constant is the necessity of this 'spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ (AL 3).  Quite clearly, Pater is no thorough-going materialist.  He enjoys 'the illusive inscrutable mistakable self' too much to have it subjected to a full exposition: fundamentally distinct from temperament, personality or mind, it holds the promise that, after all, the individual is somehow greater than the powers of reason or empirical investigation could determine.  In the silence of those infinite voids it gives a comfort to know that the value of the Romantic individual is confirmed by his imagination.  The intimate relationship between creativity and spirit runs throughout Pater's writings, from pagan to ‘Christian’.  The mystery on which it is founded is not assuaged by music or by any other aesthetic experience. It is impenetrable and incomprehensible.  This is its beauty.  

So the 'spirit or soul' denotes an issue rather than a concept for Pater, and one that is absolutely necessary to his aesthetic.  His writings explore its vistas, wondering between secularism, pantheism and Christianity, infusing the material world with grandeur and seeking to affirm that there is divinity within the individual.  This is where 'analysis leaves off' (R 152): the rigorous engagements with Hume, Berkeley, Locke, Kant and all philosophical thinkers gives way to imagination and intuition.  In this way Pater looks beyond the rational and empirical horizons they offer, asserting the absolute necessity of 'that other sort of knowledge' (HP 12) and seeking to evoke its vicissitudes through his own literary art.

















III. Sense and Sensuality: 
Aesthetic Escape from ‘a Band of Madmen’


















                                     And haply when the tragic clouds of night
 Were slowly wrapping round thee, in the cold
                                    Of which men always die, a sense renewed
       Of the things sweet to touch and breath and sight​[49]​




Walter Pater carefully satiated his desire for innocuous sensations.  He kept a bowl of rose petals on his desk and a bowl of fresh orange peel on his window sill (Bussell 285).  At a lunch party he was once asked, if he had to be an animal, what kind of animal would he be.  To this he replied, ‘a carp.’  In this dry self-parody Pater would be, no doubt, an ornamental carp with luminescent silvery multi-colours to make him a fish of vivid visual beauty.  He would exist to experience pure, unreflective, superficial sensations, aware only of himself and his immediate surroundings.​[50]​  Despite Pater’s quiet enjoyment of heightened sensations and his famous affirmation of sensuality for its own sake, in his broader aesthetic philosophy sensation has ambivalent and complicated status: it is not so much a creed as a problem.  Its troubled vicissitudes are the focus of this chapter. 

There is but little precedent for such trouble in Pater’s formative influences: Hume, Kant and Epicurus.  He begins, as we have seen, from a Humean philosophy in which sensation is understood primarily as that which conveys knowledge of the world.  As discussed in chapter I, Pater respects this ‘epitome of modern scepticism,’ noting particularly ‘the corrective experience of the senses, as exemplified most clearly by Hume’ (HP 10):  
            In so confused a world, so confused as to the final tendency of things, it might well seem 
            to be the part of reason, and the last word of sincere theory about them, to hold by that 
            concerning which doubt has no standing place, the domain of sense.  (AL 6) 
As this passage indicates the locus of Pater’s sensuousness is in epistemology and ethics: sensuous experience is our only source of knowledge. But this proves far more problematic for Pater than it ever was for Hume.  After all, Hume’s conception of sensation is founded on a stable relationship between sensation and the individual.  Sensation, as far as he considers it, is subject to reason, therefore it is moderate and implicitly ethical.  Pater presses this founding assumption with his insistent belief that sensuousness may be an end in itself, marginalizing its role as a vessel for knowledge and putting into question the extent to which it bears any straightforward relation to ethics. 

Paterian aesthetics are underpinned, as Elizabeth Prettejohn argues, ‘not casually but rigorously, by the German tradition of philosophical aesthetics that proceeded from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement’ (2007, 3).  Kant’s aesthetic theory crucially asserts that pure aesthetic judgement is disinterested from the ordinary whims and earthy desires of the subject (Kant 1987, 44-53).  It is precisely because aesthetic judgement transcends such trivia that this subjective judgement has a claim to universality (1987, 53-4).  However, Pater’s aesthetic is a necessarily interested aesthetic.  It involves the passions in a tautology of desire, sensation and pleasure, such that connections with integrity and judgement are loosened irreversibly.  Giving up Kantian disinterestedness as a lost cause, the distinctions between art and sensation are undermined.  The sensations created by art become indistinguishable from those created by other stimuli and each become indistinguishable from emotions or passions.  Thus, in The Renaissance, the sensations of art, nature and personality become one as Pater describes ‘any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange colours, and curious odours, or the work of the artist’s hands, of the face of one’s friend’ and ‘the picture, the landscape, the engaging personality in life or in a book, produces this special impression of beauty or pleasure’ (R 152; xxx).  As aesthetic and physical sensations merge, they give the lie to the idea that reality and the realm of art are separated like ‘some tragic dividing forces on their ways’ (R 152).  And in the Conclusion, Pater’s narrative shifts almost seamlessly from ‘any exquisite passion’ to ‘any stirring of the senses’ to effectively equate the physical feeling of sensation with emotional passion that it may excite (R 152).  Art for art’s sake and sensation for sensation’s sake seem to become analogous. 

Yet Paterian sensation also aspires to Epicurus’ philosophy of moderation, in which sensual pleasure is measured with prudence.  Epicurus asserts that whilst ‘the flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited,’ the intellect teaches moderation so that pleasure is maintained at its sustainable height (1994, 33).  This aspiration is glimpsed in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, of course, as Pater declares that ‘to maintain that ecstasy is success in life’ (152), but the rational control of sensation taken for granted by Epicurus is problematical for Pater.  As we have noted, the scope of human reason is significantly diminished in his writings and he finds it too fallible to trust.  His exploration of sensation is an attempt to understand the implications of his impetuous affirmation to ‘grasp,’ ‘see and touch,’ ‘that which we will hardly have time to make theories about’ (R 152).  As with Epicurus, the pleasures of sensation in Pater’s Conclusion to The Renaissance are tightly bound to their transience, and the fast-burning flame of its narrative extinguishes itself before it must confront their implications.  Unable even to maintain its own ecstasy, it intensifies to reach an unsustainable climax -- after which it must cease to be. 

So whilst Pater’s learning means that he is steeped in Hume, Kant and Epicurus, he also takes on the French decadents’ assertion of art pour l’art, relating sensation not to reason but to passion for its own self-interested sake.  Yet his position is by no means analogous to that of Gautier or Baudelaire, for he endeavours to negotiate the space between this conception and the moderate views taken particularly by Kant and Epicurus.  In Pater’s view, as the significance of sensation spans out from empirical knowledge or disinterested aesthetic judgement to sensual pleasure for its own indiscriminate sake, it assumes a malign, transformative influence over its subject.  His affirmation of sensual experience is thwarted by this self-destructive desire for more and more intense sensations.  And so we see in his writings that whilst intense sensation may initiate liberation from abstract spirituality and affirm individuality (Dowling 1996, 82), it may also conquer and possess the individual, becoming a ‘tyranny’ to torture him like ‘“a band of madmen”’ (R 142; PP 94).  In this way, Pater puts into question the founding assumption of Hume’s ethics and of his own Epicurean-empirical approach: no longer may the individual trust that sensual experience will be subject to the moderate and rational mind.  Moreover, he problematizes the very aestheticist doctrine of which he has been called ‘England’s high-priest’ (R.V. Johnson 54).  Paterian sensation places the individual at a crisis-point where he is vulnerable to the unreasoned passion of pure feeling.  For these reasons, although Pater’s conclusion to The Renaissance evokes comparison with the French decadents (R 153), the matter is not that simple.  His hasty suggestion in the heat of the moment that art and sensation are analogous soon recedes and in the works that follow he is left to confront its implications.

These tensions define our enquiry as it addresses the relationship between sensation, art and the individual.  It argues that the liberation offered by sensation for its own sake contains within it the genesis of self-torment, threatening the individual with ‘possession,’ 'self-revelation,’ ‘passing out of one’s self’ (GS 11): it is a ‘tyranny’ or a spell cast by ‘“a band of madmen”’ (R 142; PP 94).  We explore the way in which the figures of Dionysus and Venus symbolize this: with Venus appearing in The Renaissance as the herald of a sensual renaissance, and Dionysus – with whom she had an affair in mythology​[51]​ – later ushering forth the negative underside of sensual experience for its own sake.  Ultimately Pater redefines the division between sensations in the real world and meta-sensations evoked by art to make aesthetic sensation a means to assuage this ‘tyranny of the senses’ (R 142).  This meta-sensation, is after all, what we experience through Pater’s words: ‘busy with themselves, but not otherwise with the world’ (Donoghue 297).  Certainly, he ‘was the first to make writing a truly composed artifice rather than directly trusting the language of the heart’ (J.P. Ward 63).  As the language of his heart dared not speak its name, Pater’s prose spiritualizes sensual desire and exemplifies his admiration for ascêsis, or what he pointedly calls ‘reserve’ in a review of John Addington Symonds (1980, 202).

This chapter is organized into four parts.  Sections i and ii discuss Pater’s ideal of sensual experience, focusing first on touch and how it acts to confirm the individual in ‘Poems by William Morris’, and then on how Venus brings a further element of erotic liberation as she symbolizes the cultural rebirth of sensual experience in The Renaissance.  Section iii focuses on Pater’s Dionysus as presented in ‘A Study of Dionysus,’ ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ and ‘Denys l’Auxerrois,’ and explores how he comes to subvert Pater’s ideal of sensation into voracious desire for greater and greater sensation which destroys individuality and turns erotic sensuality into a self-destructive obsession.  Finally, section iv addresses how Pater fulfils his speculation that art may be ‘a means to escape from “the tyranny of the senses”’ (R 142).  


i. Touch and individualism 

Pater’s ideal of sensual experience is set out in one of his first works, the anonymously published ‘Poems by William Morris.’​[52]​  This review sets out both how he envisages the significance of sensation in the broad scope of history and the particular effect of the sensual experience of touch on the subject’s conception of his own individuality and freedom.  As Linda Dowling has argued, Paterian sensuousness in the late 1860s and early ‘70s should be understood as ‘a document of Victorian liberalism,’ written in the spirit created by Mill’s On Liberty which precipitated the Second Reform Bill (1996, 79).  Pater brings together the rich liberal ideal of the individual with his own desire to legitimize sensuality.  Dowling notes that Pater’s ‘larger aim was to realize a dream of cultural politics: the social transformation of Victorian life through an enlarged and emboldened sensuousness – his own version of the liberal idea of aesthetic democracy’ (1996, 77).  The connection between this broad vision and the most personal form of sensuousness, touch, is fundamental to ‘Poems by William Morris.’

Of all the senses it is touch that Pater evokes most vividly.  The significance of touch may seem curious given that he is apparently so concerned with fine art and music.  Though it is a moot point whether music really meant much more to him than a conceptual ideal, the priority of touch is particularly significant because it marks the departure from art to sensation as the high-point of human experience.  For Pater as for Tennyson and Lucretius before him ‘[t]he proof of everything that is not void, then, is touch,’ (Leighton 2007, 67).  Touch is the constant tangible evidence that Berkeley’s Idealism cannot be believed.  Although Berkeley’s philosophy ‘has never really been answered’ (HP 41), as long as man has touch to reassure him, he need not fear the dissolution of the world.  Like Samuel Johnson’s famous riposte to Berkeley when, by kicking a stone, he claimed to have refuted the non-existence of matter, Pater clings to the vivid experience of touching and being touched by the external world to constantly confirm its existence. 

Emblematic of the significance of sensation more generally, touch stretches beyond the merely epistemological.  As Lene Østermark-Johansen has noted, touch becomes for Pater ‘a new organ for the human spirit’ (27/07/2006; R 114).  Touch more than any other of the senses offers Pater the conditions to affirm individuality.  For, whilst it confirms the existence of the external world, it also confirms the existence of a unified subjective self.  The sensation of touch is qualitatively different from visual or auditory sensual experience: as sensation created by physical contact with the body, it is the most intimate of the senses.  It may be transitive, involving two bodies in the reciprocal experience of touching and being touched.  In this way touch held singular attractions for Pater as the physical expression of friendship and love.  Writing of the touch between Adam and God in Michelangelo’s Creation of Man,​[53]​ he declares: ‘he hardly has strength enough to lift his finger to touch the finger of the creator; yet a touch of the finger-tips will suffice’ (R 48).  The depiction of touch tantalizes with its promise of a sensual experience; this is sometimes erotic sensation but more often, as here, it is a touch that expresses mutual sympathy.  In Pater’s writings this tends to be a distanced promise, gone before it can be fulfilled. 

In general, Pater’s concern is the individual’s experience not of mutual touch, but of touch experienced alone. In ‘Poems by William Morris’ Pater focuses not on the mutual experience of touch between bodies, but on the touch of water and its affirmation of individuality: 
            This reaction from dreamlight to daylight gives, as always happens, a strange power in 
            dealing with morning and the things of morning.  Think of the most lovely waking with 
            the rain on one’s face.  (WM 305)
                   Everywhere there is an impression of surprise, as of people first waking from the 
            golden age, at fire, at snow, wine, the touch of water as one swims, the salt taste of the sea 
            […] The sea touches are not less sharp and firm [than snow], surest of effect in the places 
            where river and sea, salt and fresh waves conflict.  (WM 306)  
The imagery of water imbues sensation with a rejuvenating power and this power lies in the intensity and subjectivity of its touch.  The water becomes defined in the second passage particularly by the subjective effects it stimulates.  Its intensity is imperative, dissolving the boundaries between pleasure and pain so that the sea, with its ‘sharp and firm’ touch and its ‘salt taste,’ becomes a masochistic pleasure which expands the sensibilities.  These intensely subjective experiences of touch are ephemeral and liberated from any larger aesthetic-intellectual discourse.  This is part of their allure.  Such sensations are utterly subjective because they cannot be legislated by the critic.  Implicitly rejecting Matthew Arnold’s principles of aesthetic criticism,​[54]​ Pater defines a space in the subjective imagination that exemplifies his principles of aesthetic judgement: ‘Does [the sensation] give me pleasure? and if so, what sort or degree of pleasure? How is my nature modified by its presence, and under its influence?’ (R xxix).  At the same time, as Pater’s tight, inexpansive evocations of the water echo the brevity of touch, they indicate that touch evades description: it is too ‘strange’ to be captured by words.  It is impossible to capture with analytic thought or too personal to penetrate.  It enters into the narrative only for a moment, like the moment when first physical contact thrills the skin only to disappear forever.  

While this may seem highly individual or even solipsistic, Linda Dowling rightly notes that it is also implicitly democratic.  The idea that the aesthetic judgement of each individual is valid ‘endows everyone with the freedom to find on an individual basis what was most pleasing and satisfying about the world’ (1996, 82).​[55]​  It is an egalitarian move for which Pater’s discussion of personal and fleeting touch is particularly apt. 

The importance of discrimination in the experience of touch further develops Dowling’s point.  Pater often stresses the importance of discrimination: ‘Not to discriminate every moment […] is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening’ (R 152).  His insistence here is twofold: perception must be exact and exacting, and the experiencing of sensations should be selective.  Discrimination of the sensations in each moment is particularly pertinent with regard to individuality.  Discrimination is, after all, an exactitude in the discernment of sensual experience. Thus Paterian touch is the celebration of individuality because the act of discerning sensation becomes an affirmation of one’s right to personal judgement and, ultimately, an affirmation of individuality.  Sensation – especially touch -- is a mode of self-reflection that consolidates the sense of one’s self as an individuated subject particularly because it is fiercely subjective.  Accordingly, Pater notes the physical experience of sensation rather than its objective source, as in the example of the sea, evoked by its ‘salt taste’ and ‘sharp and firm’ touches.  Further, the ‘mood of passion’ and ‘the exquisite passion’ (WM 311; R 152) foreground the emotional experience of sensation.  That is to say, sensation offers the positive enjoyment of individuality by creating strong feelings.  Accompanying the emotional response, with each fresh sensation we experience a visceral response that manifests itself through the body, thus heightening our awareness of our physical being.  He picks up the former consideration in ‘The Aesthetic Life’ when contemplating the ‘ugliness’ of modern London: 
           one thing is plain if he is to prosecute the life of aesthetic culture he will have to apply 
           largely the faculty of selection.  Well! does not all right conduct of artistic matters always
           involve selection?  Does not the aim of all art lie in the establishment of an ideal 
           depending partly on negative qualifications, culture in its most general sense being in large 
           measure negative or renunciant [with] a fine habit of ignoring or forgetting.  (14)
This active discrimination of sensual experience is not cultivated through books, nor is it brought to life by having the correct theoretical language to articulate this experience. Rather, discrimination is achieved by the cultivation of an acute aesthetic sensibility.  It is a conception of sensuousness in which intellectual education matters less than the more deeply felt intuition and imagination which are accessible to all.  Its democratic foundations are combined with an empowerment of the individual, now charged with aesthetic judgement and discrimination, that quickens the sense of one’s self.  

In Pater’s review of William Morris, the raindrops give way to the sea, which is superseded by the turbulent sea and river and finally by ‘the flood.’  The volume and intensity are ever-heightening: as if the flood cannot be contained within Morris’ poetry, it seeps out beyond it; instead of being described by Morris, it comes to define Morris.  So, writes Pater of The Earthly Paradise, ‘it is not less medicinal, not less gifted with virtues, because a few drops of it are without effect; it is water to bath and swim in’ (309).  He continues, 
            Atlanta’s Race, The Man born to be King, The Story of Cupid and Psyche, and in The 
            Doom of King Acrisium, the episode of Danae and the shower of gold, have all in a pre-
            eminent degree what is characteristic of ?the whole book, the loveliness of things washed 
            with fresh water.  (WM 309)
Like the sea, Morris’ poetry becomes an intense sensual experience, folding us into itself as it stings and caresses.  The final image anticipates Venus rising from the sea, or perhaps recalls the first baptism after which Morris’ poetry – representative of modern literature − emerges as the Truth, the Way, the Life.  The identification between art and nature dignifies the poem as an experience so intense that it transcends the emotional or spiritual and becomes a physical convulsion. ​[56]​  Perhaps Morris’ poetry even displaces the physical touch of water because it is more voluminous, suggesting that the exhilaration it evokes is identified with physical feeling.  The effect of transferring the feeling of water into a metaphor for Morris’ art is to narrow the division between art and nature.  It cleanses literary art of the tawdry marketplace and releases it into unspoilt landscape.  

Pater’s evocation of William Morris’ poetry suggests that the value of literature is its capacity to create intense and rejuvenative sensations.  Moreover, literature may reach beyond itself to touch the reader.  Pater intended to bring this quality to his first edition of The Renaissance.  ‘Pater’s Studies in the History of the Renaissance, in its first edition on ribbed paper (I have the feel of it still in my fingers),’ Arthur Symons recalled in 1906 (qtd. BB 1).  Printed on ribbed paper, bound in dark blue-green cloth binding with chocolate end papers and gold lettering on the back (BB 36), the look and feel of The Renaissance was carefully defined by its exacting author who wished so much to give it an ‘artistic appearance’ (BB 70).  This is Anderstreben with a difference.   It is literary art aspiring beyond its ordinary conditions, not to the conditions of another art but to the purely sensual experience of touch.  

Pater further uses his review of Morris to put the significance of heightened sensuality into a historical frame.  He presents an imaginative short history: from the uninhibited Ancient Greeks, to repression in the middle-ages, to the Renaissance, to another period of spiritual excess, to the present return of sensuality.  This history is a series of dichotomies: a perpetual movement between epochs of uninhibited, acute sensual awareness and periods when these instincts are corrupted by repression into ‘[r]everie, illusion, delirium’ (WM 302).  Such contrasts are crucial to Pater’s definition of sensual awareness, because Paterian sensuality exists primarily in terms of what it is not.  William Morris’ transition from The Defence of Guinevere (1858) to his Life and Death of Jason (1867) serves to symbolize this:
           the change of manner in the interval is entire; it is almost a revolt.  Here there is no 
           delirium or illusion, no experience of mere soul while the body and bodily senses sleep or 
           wake with convulsed intensity at the prompting of imaginative love; but rather the great 
           primary passions under broad daylight as of the pagan Veronese.  (305)  
This contemporary example suggests the possibility of a return to Ancient Greek-Renaissance values.  It appears, once again, as a contrast, ‘almost a revolt,’ persistently present as what it is not.  The emphasis on a transition from repressed sensuality into its opposite, figured by the images of night and day, suggests that free sensuality is plainly the best thing, in contrast to the hallucinations of repression. 

The polar contrast between Pater’s ideal of sensuality and repressed sensuality expands through metaphor.  Sleep and wakefulness had been a single state of unconsciousness in the delirium of sensual repression, but now they form a pertinent dichotomy to articulate the transition from repressed to heightened sensuality; from sleep to wakefulness, from ‘dreamlight’ to ‘daylight’ (WM 305; 305).​[57]​  Elsewhere, Pater puts this as a change from ‘the cloister’ to ‘a later space of life … never anticipated’ (WM 302).  This image prefigures Leavis’ criticism of Pater’s ‘cloistral’ prose (241), anticipating the internal contradictions of his aesthetic to be discussed in section iv.  This is an aesthetic that, while not explicitly secular, strongly prioritizes the sensual over the spiritual.  The phrase  ‘no experience of mere soul’ evokes emergence from dark, enclosed church cloisters out into the free and fresh air.  The Church comes to symbolize ‘mere soul’ and distance from nature.  These images compound each other, identifying uninhibited sensual awareness with freedom and clarity in one’s perceptions of the world and of one’s self.  

The progression of history in these terms of thesis-antithesis anticipates the structure of The Renaissance, in which each essay centres on the drama of ‘revolt’ or renewal.  As Richard Lyons has argued, ‘Pater finds unity most often in moments of transition’, concentrating on these ‘beginning and endings’ to suggest ‘a continuing or dialectical process’ (769-70). ​[58]​  Richard Lyons’ allusion to Hegelian dialectic evokes the resonances between Pater and Hegel, discussed at length by Anthony Ward.  But in a crucial difference, the further stage of synthesis – essential to Hegelian dialectic – is absent.  Pater’s history of sensation is not a progressive dialectic, but instead a cyclical process of thesis-antithesis, thesis-antithesis, and so on, without hope of ultimate resolution: a permanent pendulum.  Our concern here is how Pater conceives periods of sensual awareness in human history.

‘The Aesthetic Life’ expands on the significance of sensation in [the scope of] human life.  This essay looks back to the Ancient Greeks with nostalgia, equating this historical period with the child’s innocent pleasure in sensation:
           It was with the sensible world, with the unsophisticated presentations of eye and ear man 
           man began, as th  children begin still, so delightfully, so well-satisfied: and there was an
            intelligence abo in the eye and ear.  Little by little Afterwards the queries of pure abstract 
           reason disturbed came to disturb him: distrusted he distrusted, little by little, deserted that 
           beyond or below it; substituted for it his own shadowy hypotheses concerning its origin, its 
            issue and under-side, a visionary abstract vision of his own place of what he really saw: 
            and now he might seem, at least, amid the ruins of so many much abstract and artificial 
           theories theory, to have compted completed the circle, to stand again, again, in some 
           respects, as like a little child, at the point when he set out, acquiescing in the sensible 
           world as the ascertained utmost limit of his horizon.  (6-7)
This deploring of the baleful effects of ‘abstract reason,’ ‘shadowy hypothesis,’ and ‘abstract and artificial theory’ reiterates his more famous dichotomy between ‘facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own’ and the ‘exquisite passion’ to be found in ‘courting new impressions’ (R 152).  Here Pater assents to the philosophical premises of empiricism, but does not expand on the epistemological and metaphysical issues that it involves.  His point is essentially an aesthetic one: to turn attention to sensual experience as an end in itself.  

Pater imagines history as a cycle – ever-repeating, as his own repetition of ‘again, again’ suggests - which may still bring us back to childhood.  The individual may aspire to reach beyond the horizon of the sensual realm into abstract reason, but he is brought to earth again ‘amid the ruins of so much abstract and artificial theory.’  Pater’s image of the child mocks the notion of progress, reducing man to an eternal child, but at the same time offering the opportunity to reignite a feeling of wonder at the sensible world.  Moreover, childhood has an innocence which denies any sexual connotations of sensuality, thus effectively absolving the individual from any charge of immorality.  ‘There is always something lost in growing up,’ he asserts years later (PP 18). For Pater, growing up taints sensuality inexorably with assumed moral values; so sensuality becomes inhibited forever after by the ‘thou shalt not’ of a world grown grey with the breath of excessive piety. This transition, as well as the beauty of youth, is the reason why Pater’s protagonists are men in that short span between adolescence and adulthood. 

The idea of a democracy founded on the most personal and unlegislatable sense of touch marks the height of Pater’s visionary aesthetic.  It is his most democratic and inclusive suggestion, enabling all to be equal in aesthetic judgement.  Yet there is an innocence in this vision, based on a terribly simplistic vision of the relationship between sensation and liberty that would grow ever more complicated as pleasure becomes sexualized. So Pater must confront the potentially destructive relationship between pleasure and the individual – with the risk that this may subvert the idealism of his early benign conception.


ii. Venus and ‘the pleasure of the senses’

In The Renaissance the significance of sensual experience is developed through the figure of Venus, goddess of love and sensual pleasure.  Venus enters Pater’s Renaissance as the herald of a cultural rebirth centred on sensuality.  Yet even as she expands his vision of sensuality, she begins to rewrite the vision outlined in ‘Poems by William Morris;’ prioritizing not individualism but erotic freedom, and gesturing toward the negative manifestations of sensual excess. 

The appearances of Venus link moments of transition throughout The Renaissance, leading up to the assertions in the Conclusion.  Venus symbolically heralds the moment at which sensual fulfilment returns to the world in place of abstract spirituality.  Her arrival is first foregrounded in Pater’s evocation of Tannhauser’s Venus where she embodies ‘the medieval Renaissance’: 
           its antinomianism, its spirit of rebellion and revolt against the moral and religious ideas of 
            the time.  In their search after the pleasures of the senses and the imagination, in their care 
            for beauty, in their worship of the body, people were impelled beyond the bounds of the 
            Christian ideal; their love became sometimes a strange idolatry, a strange rival religion.  It 
            was the return of that ancient Venus, not dead, but only hidden for a time…   (R 16)
The explanation of these phenomena in the final sentence is uncharacteristically direct and simple.  Venus becomes identified with the ‘pleasure of the senses’ and hereafter this will define her in The Renaissance.  Her presence expands the rather innocuous conception of sensuality suggested in ‘Poems by William Morris,’ for it brings sensuousness and beauty together with eros, to suggest their interpenetration and to foreshadow the difficulties of setting moral boundaries between them.  Needless to say, the significance of Venus’ return here goes beyond ‘the medieval renaissance.’  Rendered in Pater’s prose, she comes to signify the return of sensual pleasure, liberal imagination and pride in the body which he wishes also to bring about in his own time and place.  

Pater’s evocation of Botticelli’s Birth of Venus develops this symbolism.  It emerges out of Botticelli’s earthy Madonnas, where it vanquishes their spiritual motives.  Pater skirts over the body of Venus before letting his eye dance around the canvas.  He barely returns to his nebulous central figure, instead touching on the painting’s ‘strange draperies,’ its cold light, the ‘emblematical figure of the wind,’ even ‘the dainty lipped shell on which she sails’ and ‘the sea “showing its teeth”’ (R 38-9).  It is as though the spirit of Venus has saturated the canvas completely so that her pronounced sensuality is reflected in its muted pinks and blues and greens.  As it appears to us reading Pater’s Renaissance, this iconic image has a three-fold resonance. In mythology, Venus signifies the dawn of Hellenistic sensibility. Painted by Botticelli, she heralds the return of Greek sensibility to fifteenth century Italy. And Pater’s own evocative words are a knowing attempt to reawaken these sensibilities in the nineteenth century.  Venus thus embodies the turns toward sensuality that mark the movement of history in ‘Poems by William Morris.’

However, even as Venus proclaims the primacy of physical sensation, there are disquieting inconsistencies in her character (Keefe 1987, 161).  Tannhauser’s portrayal of her as ‘the whore-goddess’ (R 16) comes to the fore in The Birth of Venus and whilst she appears as a new-born virgin rising from the sea (R 38), Botticelli’s cold, mournful palette inspires Pater to reflect on the more sombre aspects of her figure.  Thus he reflects, ‘you might think that the sorrow in her face was at the thought of the whole long day of love yet to come’ (R 38).  Pater recalls the ‘consummate moments’ (R 88) of aesthetic contemplation in this suggestion, but revises its conception so that sensual pleasure is finite and can become miserable.  The central concern alters as we consider that ‘[w]hat is unmistakable is the sadness with which [Botticelli] has conceived the goddess of pleasure as the depository of a great power over the lives of men’ (R 39).  There is sorrow in the controlling power of sensual desire and with it, perhaps, fear of its effects.  This is a new turn in her character: Venus emerges as a potential threat to order.​[59]​  In mythology she is said to wear a girdle that gives love, sensuousness and beauty the quality of grace and restraint (Schiller 2006, 127 ff).  In Pater’s retelling, it is unclear whether the quality of grace is implicit in Venus.  

Pater’s aspiration to identify his own era with the Renaissance is clear in ‘Winckelmann,’ when the Venus de Melos represents a visitation of compounded Ancient Greek and Renaissance sensibilities in the contemporary world. The Venus de Melos was excavated in 1820 in the Aegean island of Melos and taken to the Louvre where it was widely publicized.  Pater taps into this contemporary familiarity with the statue to posit it as a tangible symbol of Ancient values resurrected in the modern world.  This is Venus’ final appearance in The Renaissance, and it brings her figure into the present.  Within the text Venus marks a moment of cultural change to Renaissance sensibility, with the text’s particular emphasis on the moment of arrival, while through the text she signals Pater’s endeavour to rebalance the spiritual impulse with sensuality.  Pater explains that in contemplation of Venus,
           The mind begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part of the spiritual motive.  
           This motive is not lightly and loosely attached to the sensuous form, as its meaning to an
           allegory, but saturates and is identical with it.  (R 132)
The way in which Pater fuses sense and spirit in Venus suggests that whilst sensation is primary, the spiritual is implicit.  Pater’s pantheistm would see spirit and matter as one, so obliteration of the space between them is the constant endeavour of the Paterian artist and subject: ‘[t]he physical nature and moral sentiments, matter and mind, earth and heaven, melt together with a marvellous beauty’ (2006, 129).  In this attempt, which is really what underpins Pater’s interest in the Renaissance, Venus also serves to further his aestheticist ambitions for art.  Repeated archetypal images of Venus baring her naked body foreground her femininity, dissociating sensuality from the marketplace and reconnecting it with organic creation.  

The relationship between sensation and emotion is crucial.  Pater argues that heightened sensuality has a profound connection with the subject’s awareness of his emotions:
          Complex and subtle interests, which the mind spins for itself may occupy art and poetry or 
           our own spirits for a time; but sooner or later they come back with a sharp rebound to the 
           simple elementary passions – anger, desire, regret, pity and fear – and what corresponds to 
           them in the sensuous world – bare, abstract fire, water, air, tears, sleep, silence.                     
                                                                                                                            (WM 305)
This correlation re-evokes the pantheistic connections between the individual and the world discussed in chapter II.  Here Pater is a long way from Kantian aesthetics and no doubt self-consciously so.  Kant’s rule of disinterestedness in aesthetic judgement is clear, and was tacitly assumed by the aesthetic critics who followed him in Germany and England: a pure judgement of the beautiful is necessarily distinct from personal desires.  As  a judgement in and  for its own sake, it cannot be made about people because this would be subject to other factors of influence, such as sexual desire and personality.  Pater’s aesthetic is no  less discerning in its conception of beauty, but it insists that beauty is not and cannot be judged in a special, separate category.  Aesthetic judgement, for Pater, is irredeemably rooted in emotions and erotic sensuality.

The Conclusion to The Renaissance exemplifies what is at stake when sensation becomes heightened:
          While all melts under our feet, we may well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any    
           contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment, 
           or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange colours, and curious odours, or the work 
           of the artist’s hands, or the face of one’s friend.  (R 153)
While the three-part list here suggests a balance between the elements of intellect, passion and sensation, the final section threatens to eclipse intellect and passion as the prose expands the stirring of the senses on and on.  In his own effort to attain the highest quality of each moment as it passes, Pater’s narrative loses itself to the seduction of the senses.  The essential problem of sensation is how to moderate it; whereas this sentence portends Dionysian sensual excess, in which sensual pleasure overcomes all other intellectual and spiritual endeavours.  Again, the sensations appear ‘strange’ and the repetition of this word is quite menacing: suggesting not only something unknowable, but substances whose mystery holds power over us.  

Pater mainly characterizes sensation as an ephemeral pleasure: it exists as a moment only, which cannot endure temporality.  Perhaps this is a symptom of intensity, or perhaps Pater cannot envisage the full implications of expanding the consummate moments through all time.  In either case it poses a serious problem for Pater’s idea of cultural renaissance which requires temporality, premised as it is on teleology to ‘perfection’ (A 65).  Possibly Pater conceives these intense sensual moments as crescendos within the ascent to perfection, or points where the line between good and evil becomes blurred.

After ‘Winckelmann’ Venus does not reappear.  Her role as a herald fulfilled, she retreats – with the sensibility that she heralded now fully absorbed into the consciousness of the writer.  Bringing back sensation to assuage an excess of spirit, she symbolizes the transition from spiritualism to sensuality that had been outlined in ‘Poems by William Morris.’  But here a rumble of thunder jolts the bright light of Pater’s new sensual day, for Venus has a darker side.  The dangerous power she holds, and the taint of death that defines her in Botticelli’s Venus, cast long shadows over the cultural rebirth she heralds.   


iii. Dionysus and ‘the tyranny of the senses’

It is through the figure of Dionysus, god of revelry, wine and sensual pleasure, that Pater subverts his ideal of sensation.  For Dionysus illustrates how the desire for sensation may become a dangerous end in itself, unravelling individualism and pushing eroticism to a destructive conclusion.  Dionysus and his modern-day counterpart, Denys, illustrate that ‘[t]he pleasure of the senses’ cannot be simply for the sake of the moment. Rather, indulgence in pleasure and desires may lead to a torturing, frenzied obsession with greater and greater sensations.  As Pater explores this in ‘A Study of Dionysus,’ ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ and ‘Denys l’Auxerrois,’ we begin to realize just how much is at stake when he speaks of ‘the tyranny of the senses’ or when, years later, he reflects on how the senses can become like ‘“a band of madmen”’ (R 142; PP 94). 

In 1876 Pater personally aborted Dionysus and Other Studies when, after the manuscript had gone to print, he had a sudden change of heart (BB 87-9).  The reason, he told Alexander Macmillan, was his unhappiness with ‘so many inadequacies’ in the manuscript (BB 87).  At every turn Pater is ‘a constantly revising author’ (Small 36), never quite content that he had found le mot juste or the right sequence in which to arrange it.​[60]​  This exactitude is often the reason for Pater’s deliberation in publication.  However, Macmillan queries whether this is so in the case of his essays on Dionysus. Macmillan read the proofs himself and replied to Pater, ‘[t]here is no reason so far as I have seen for your apprehension.  I think this will be a quite worthy successor of your Renaissance’ (BB 88).  But this may be precisely the source of Pater’s apprehension: an unwillingness to subject himself again to the censure of critics and the University that had greeted The Renaissance.​[61]​  In the note sent by Pater with his cheque to cover the costs of the aborted publication he tells Alexander Macmillan, ‘I am sorry to have given you so much trouble for nothing’ (BB 89).  

The full humiliation of how he was perceived by some contemporaries was made clear a few months before Pater’s decision to take Dionysus and Other Studies out of production, when W.H. Mallock published The New Republic.  Gosse plays down the impact of Mallock’s parody, suggesting that although Pater ‘thought the portrait a little unscrupulous […] he admired the cleverness and promise of the book, and it did not cause him to alter his mode of life or thought in the smallest degree’ (258).  But perhaps Mallock quickened Pater’s realization that he had in Dionysus and Other Studies far more subversive work than The Renaissance.  Although the most inflammatory essays were published separately in journals,​[62]​ it was quite another thing to bring them together in a book in which ‘[t]he corporate institutional authorship is obfuscated, and authorship is shifted into a context which foregrounds the individual’ (Brake 1991, 46).   Whatever the impact of The New Republic, it is clear that ‘what really did ruffle him, was the persistence with which the newspapers at this time began to attribute to him all sorts of “aesthetic” follies and extravagances’ (Gosse 258).  It is unlikely that the intense sensual extravagances and frenzied violence described in the essays on Dionysus would have done anything other than exacerbate this disapproving critique.

With hindsight we can see that Alexander Macmillan was correct.  Dionysus and Other Studies​[63]​ was indeed an appropriate sequel to The Renaissance.  That earlier work is defined by the pervading spirit of Venus, with Dionysus mentioned just twice.​[64]​  Yet his spirit comes increasingly to brood over it, especially in the irreverent passages at its climactic Conclusion.  It may be perplexing to be told in ‘A Study of Dionysus’ that ‘the artists of the Renaissance occupied themselves much with the person of and story of Dionysus’ (GS 11), when Pater’s debut collection and the artists on whom it focused were in fact preoccupied, as we have seen, with the person and story of Venus.  But what Pater is signalling here is how much the balance of his own thinking on sensation has altered since 1873, towards emphasizing its negative underside.  The depiction of Dionysus in these later essays takes up the momentum of the Conclusion to The Renaissance and carries its principles to dangerous excess, symbolizing the obsession and violent lusts that may destroy the individual possessed by the desire for sensual pleasure.    

In ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’, the connection between Venus and Dionysus as dual symbols of cultural rebirth is emblematized when, echoing the discovery of Venus de Melos, Denys’ legend begins with the discovery of an ancient coffin: 
           Within the coffin lay an object of fresh and brilliant clearness among the ashes of the dead 
           – a flask of lively green glass, like a great emerald.  It might have been ‘the wondrous 
           vessel of the Grail.’  Only this object seemed to bring no effable purity, but rather the 
           riotous and earthy heart of old paganism itself […] And, whether or not the opening of the 
           buried vessel had anything to do with it, from that time a sort of golden age seemed indeed 
           to be reigning there for a while…  (IP 50-1)
The suggestion of ‘a sort of golden age,’ perhaps the ‘old paganism’ of Hellenic sensibility resurrected by the discovery of this relic, promises a reawakening very much like that brought by Venus.  Moreover there are allusions here to the cultural rebirth which Pater espoused in his earlier essays.  The description of the glass vessel found within the coffin recalls at once the purity of Venus risen from the sea and the transparency of the diaphanous man.  And yet, immediately, this ‘golden age’ begins to recast the imagery of his earlier works: her purity, washed fresh from the sea, is replaced by the earthy, fevered and destructive element of fire.  In this way, the sensual reawakening heralded by Dionysus assumes an ambivalence largely absent in the case of Venus.  

Pater introduces Dionysus/Denys as a bipolar god: both manically life affirming and darkly depressed and destructive (GS 37; 76).  To this end he readdresses Euripides’ characterization of Dionysus, arguing that ‘[t]he whole compass of the idea of Dionysus [is as] a dual god of both summer and winter’ (GS 38).  Dionysus is ‘two-fold then – a Döppelganger [with] a full share of those dark possibilities’ (GS 39; sic).  The seasonal metaphor encapsulates the necessity of these contrary states.  In spring we meet the ‘quainter side of Dionysus’ (GS 55):
           …the pines, the foldings of the hills, the leaping streams, the strange echoings and dying 
           of sound on the heights, ‘the bird, which among the petals of many flowered spring, 
           pouring out a dirge, sends forth her honey-voiced song,’ ‘the crocus and the hyacinth 
          disorderly mixed in the deep grass’ – things which the religion of Dionysus loves...  (GS 8)
Dionysus as lover of nature brings to life the most positive relationship between the individual and the sensations of the natural world.  Though focusing on visual and auditory sensations, this recalls the life-affirming bond between the individual and the natural world evoked in ‘Poems by William Morris.’  Further, this organic relationship is redolent of the world-spirit, conjuring ‘the religion of Dionysus’ as a kind of spiritual pantheism.  

Still, spring is short and summer turns too soon to autumn and winter.  Dionysus encapsulates the seasons as they turn inevitably to the dead of winter.  Thus the ‘dark possibilities’ of Dionysus are implicit in the sensual experiences that define his ‘quainter side.’  ‘It is,’ Pater comments, ‘to such ecstasies […] that all nature-worship seems to tend; that giddy, intoxicating sense of spring’ (GS 53).  It is these ‘dark possibilities’ of giddying and intoxicating sensation which come to define Dionysus, subverting Pater’s ideal of sensation as sensual desire becomes an obsessive end in itself.  In the climactic scene of ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides,’ Dionysus’ wild desire for sensations excites the desires of local townspeople who join him in an ever-intensifying ritual dance.  As they become more and more inflamed by sensation, Pater suggest that the ‘wild dancing’ of their Bacchic frenzy has obliterated their individuality:
          [T]he sympathies of mere numbers, as such, the random catching on fire of one here and 
           another there, when people are collected together, generates as if by mere contact, some 
           new and rapturous spirit, not traceable in the individual units of a multitude.  Such 
           swarming was the essence of that strange dance of the Bacchic women.  
                                                                                                             (GS 53; Pater’s emphasis)
Any affirmative undertones of rapture here are undermined when we realize that this is but the beginning of ‘an odd sickness’ (GS 57) inflicted by Dionysus: ‘a sort of madness, a madness which imitates the true Thiasus’ (GS 57).  The Bacchic dance escalates as its movement hypnotizes the women and they become sensuous creatures, their bodies fore-grounded and their minds unreflective.  Echoing this loss of reason, the narrative takes refuge in Pater’s favourite adjective as it wonders at ‘the strange dance.’  In this way it suggests the inexpressible experience of the dance, recasting the strange spirit in The Renaissance as a now menacing power. The subjects become ‘swarming’ flies or ‘wild creatures’ (GS 70), clustered and moving as a body: a sharp contrast to the heightened individualism which sensation evoked in The Renaissance.  In this frenzy, they are dehumanized by their desire for sensations of ‘a fine rain of water,’ ‘a fount of wine,’ ‘skimming the surface with their finger-tips,’ ‘[an] abundance of milk’ and ‘streams of honey’ (GS 69).  The Biblical symbol of ‘the land of milk and honey’ (Exod. 3.8, 58) is subverted here from its religious origins as God’s promised land to become an image of sensual excess and decadence.  In contrast to the organic cultural rebirth heralded by Venus, Pater follows Euripides in a graphic description of how‘[s]ome, lately mothers, who with breasts still swelling had left their babes behind, nursed in their arms antelopes, or wild whelps of wolves, and yielded them their milk to drink’ (GS 69).  Leaving their families to engage in the Bacchic dance, possessed by lust for sensation, these women become symbolic of Dionysian hedonism, eschewing the organic regeneration of culture for the excessive, atemporal now.  

Thus Bacchic dance becomes a distortion of Pater’s Conclusion to The Renaissance; an apocalyptic vision in which life spent ‘in art and song’ becomes self-destructive.  The suggestion that ‘we will hardly have time to make theories’ (R 152) is here realized in a new and darker world, to horrific effect.  This dance is a parodied, frenzied art, overwhelming and eradicating the moderate, sustainable sensual experience central to Pater’s Epicurean vision in the Conclusion to The Renaissance. The Bacchic women cannot ‘maintain that ecstasy’ because it escalates out of control, to a climactic height where it transmutes into lust for the ultimate sensation: murder.  Lost to the ecstasy of movement and madness, the women fling themselves into a ‘grotesque scene’ of murder, as they tear peacefully grazing calves limb from limb (GS 71).  

If these orgiastic scenes derive from Euripides, those in ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’ are of Pater’s own invention. Here a parallel scene explores the troubled relationship between sensuality and individualism further.  The revolutionary ‘assertion of individual freedom’ led by Denys in Auxerre (IP 50) returns to the identification between sensuality and political liberalism which Dowling finds in The Renaissance.  Denys arrives in Auxerre at a particular moment in medieval France, when some cities are ‘turning their narrow, feudal institutions into a free communistic life’ (IP 50).  The emergence of the individual from the homogenizing forces of society and its institutions again underlines Pater’s concern to establish the possibility of free, autonomous individuality.  However, the ‘new spirit’ brought by Denys does not liberate the citizens of Auxerre but takes them into a new form of slavery – to his pernicious influence.  In contrast to the light, unobtrusive presence of Venus as she heralds cultural rebirth, Denys is a persistent and insidious influence who undermines the autonomy of the citizens of Auxerre.  ‘It was,’ as Pater explains, ‘a period, as older men took note, of young men and their influence’ and, at the height of Denys’ influence, ‘[h]e was making the younger world mad’ (IP 52; 55).  In effect, ‘Denys at his stall was turning the grave, slow movement of politic heads into a wild social license’ (IP 53).  As in the case of Dionysus the presence of Denys catalyses passions and desires that had lain dormant.  With his calls for political freedom he stimulates a radical desire for sensual freedom that overtakes the call for political rights.  Denys’ ‘freedom’ marches become sordid scenes like the Bacchic dance, where the individuals of Auxerre become enslaved to their own dormant passions:
          The hot nights were noisy with swarming troops of dishevelled women and youths with 
           red-stained limbs and faces, carrying their lighted torches over the vine-clad hills, or 
           rushing down the streets to the horror of timid watchers towards the cool spaces by the 
           river.  A shrill music, a laughter at all things was everywhere.  And the new spirit repaired 
           even to the church to take part in the novel offices of the Feast of Fools.  Heads flung back 
           in ecstasy – the morning sleep among the vines, when the fatigue of the night was over – 
           dew-drenched garments – the serf lying at his ease at last… (IP 53)
These unindividuated ‘swarming troops,’ tainted with the colour of blood, recall the Bacchic women.  As Pater wrote in a letter to William Sharp, ‘imagination is a Divine gift, as was the Bacchic vine; but each can intoxicate the heedless, and so enslave where it should serve’ (L 85-6).  Here we see the people of Auxerre intoxicated, heedless and enslaved to the sensation that might have liberated them.  The images of the ‘lighted torches’ and the ‘hot nights’ re-evoke Pater’s metaphor for creativity, ‘heat and light’ (R xxxiii), in order to corrupt it into an empty signifier suggesting, if anything, the squandered passions of these dishevelled persons who do not create but only destroy.  Allusions to the music and ecstasy that characterize the climactic finale of The Renaissance serve to compound this impression.  For here the melody has become ‘shrill’ and the glorious irreverence of ephemeral ecstasy is grotesque in the lamplight, as we see this Feast of Fools glutted on sensual excess to the point of stupidity and incoherence. 

So the nature of Dionysus and, accordingly, the nature of sensuality remain ambivalent.  For all that we see its effects, its power is to a great extent inexplicable.  As noted above, Pater most often takes refuge in his favourite adjective, ‘strange,’ to suffice for this. But in an orientalist trope, an analogy between Dionysus and Asia expands the suggestion that sensation may undermine one’s self with excess and irrationality.  The arrival of Denys is marked by a stage play entitled Return from the East, ‘in which the God of Wine […] return[s] in triumph from the East’ (IP 54; 61).  Later Denys returns from ‘one of many inexplicable disappearances’ having ‘ trafficked with sailors from all parts of the world, from Arabia and India, and bought their wares, exposed now for sale, to the wonder of all, at the Easter fair’ (55).  This identification between Denys and the East expands into a new savagery and excess, suggested by the ‘richer wines and incense’ from Arabia and India and ‘seeds of marvellous new flowers, creatures wild and tame, new pottery painted in raw gaudy tints, the skin of animals, meats fried with unheard-of condiments’ (IP 55).  Pater tantalizes with the exoticism of Denys’ market stall, but as his description continues he once again uses that adjective − ‘strange’: ‘His stall formed a strange, unwonted patch of colour’ (IP 55).  

Like the strangeness of Botticelli’s Venus, there is a sense in which the origin of Denys is intangible and unnerving.  Here Pater attributes characteristics to Denys/Dionysus which earlier, in ‘The Marbles of Aegina’, he had used to define Asia.  This appears as beautiful, intensely sensual and hardly comprehensible to the faculty of reason, instead haunting the imagination (GS 163; 231). Pater expands and qualifies this notion as he defines ‘the centrifugal, the Ionian, the Asiatic tendency’,
           flying from the centre, working with little forethought straight before it, in the 
           development of every thought and fancy; throwing itself forth in endless play of undirected 
           imagination; delighting in brightness and colour, in beautiful material, in changeful form
           everywhere, in poetry, in philosophy, even in architecture and its subordinate crafts. 
                                                                                                                                     (GS 264) ​[65]​
This rather orientalist characterization of Asia clarifies and expands Pater’s conception of Dionysian sensation.  The combination of beauty, random imagination and fluctuation, which defines Asia is reminiscent of the stream of fleeting phenomena apprehended by the diaphanous man.  Both are sensations without reason, ‘flying from the centre’; irrational and lacking the unity necessary to foster creativity. The dichotomy between Asia and Europe, as centrifugal and centripetal tendencies respectively, is analogous to that between Dionysus and Venus.

Asia and Europe may also represent the dynamic between Dionysus and Apollo, although how far Pater’s Dionysus is antithetical to Apollo is subject to debate.  Robert Keefe argues that The Renaissance encapsulates Pater’s ‘anti-Apollo campaign’: to undercut the Victorian cult of Apollo and effect a cultural rebirth with ‘a more sensuous, alluring art than that of his fathers’ (1987, 161). However, Billie Inman argues that a more subtle appreciation of Pater’s conception admonishes against so emphatic a statement.  Inman is quite right to demand a nuanced consideration of Pater’s thought; he seldom presumed to wage campaigns in print.  Nor, as she points out, was there any uniform praise of Apollo in society at this time (1989, 541).  Thus to suggest that Pater is self-consciously defining himself against Apollo is to over-simplify his characteristically complex response.  This said, Keefe’s comments do draw attention to an implicit contrast between the sensual primacy of Pater’s Venus and Dionysus and the rational, ordered side of Apollo.  But this is less an antithesis (much less antipathy) than a re-centring, and a typically troubled one. Apollo will gain significance later as Pater attempts to reconcile his conception of self-identity with society and Christianity.

Dionysus also challenges the erotic ideal of sensuality as represented by Venus in The Renaissance.  Amidst the fevered sensuality of Dionysus the dual drives of sex and death are confounded and erotic sensuality leads to destruction.  The ambiguous sexuality attributed to Dionysus in mythology becomes integral to Pater’s Dionysus (GS 53; 59; 61) and when he considers with what difficulty painters have attempted to capture Dionysus he settles on a modern interpretation with strong personal resonances: 
          In a Bacchus by a young Hebrew painter, in the exhibition of the Royal Academy of 1868, 
           there was a complete and very fascinating realization of such a motive; the god of the 
           bitterness of wine, ‘of things too sweet’; the sea-water of the Lesbian grape become  
           brackish in the cup.   (GS 37)
The ‘young Hebrew painter’ is, of course, Simeon Solomon: a friend of Pater, who had been arrested for indecent exposure with the intention of sodomy in 1873 and 1874.  Solomon’s painting of Dionysus is reproduced on the title page of this chapter.  These allusions equating Solomon with Dionysus, sensation 'too sweet' with male-male desire are uncharacteristically explicit for Pater.  Invoking Solomon, Pater ventures to define the sensual excess of Dionysus specifically as the erotic sensual excess of deviant sexuality.  

This is not loosely connected with liberation.  Pater comments that ‘[t]here were some who suspected Dionysus of a secret democratic interest; though indeed he was liberator only of men’s hearts’ (GS 15n).  Reducing the ostensible political significance of Dionysus, Pater concentrates elusively on the emotional freedom he offers; emotional freedom which would, in the context of Solomon, legitimize male-male love or desire.  Yet the organic decay that renders sweet things bitter and brackish makes the shift from life-affirming sensation to bitter aftertaste inevitable.  Echoing the duality of Dionysus, Pater implies that the negative elements of sensation inevitably progress to destruction.  To become intoxicated, possessed, by sensation is to lose the capacity to discern society’s boundaries – and to transgress as Solomon did brings retribution.  This also suggests that obsessive lusts are integral to erotic sensation itself.  Can Denys be a true liberator of men’s hearts when he enslaves the individual to the passions?

The personal resonances of Dionysus offer some background explanation for Pater’s quite singular sympathy for him.  Pater’s Dionysus is the fallible, half-mortal god who ‘has suffered after a manner of which we must suppose pagan gods incapable’; ‘a beautiful soft creature’ who is simply unable to control his wild desires or the effect he has on others (GS 49; 42).  This ‘tortured, persecuted, slain god – the suffering Dionysus’ (GS 46) is Pater’s innovation on the old myths, and especially poignant in the light of the analogy with Solomon. Pater invites us to sympathize with Dionysus as with very few of his characters.​[66]​  His sympathetic narrative tone and the quite singular closeness of this narrative to its subject portray Dionysus as a terribly vulnerable figure.  At the end of ‘A Study of Dionysus’ Pater alludes to the Orphic poem in which Dionysus is violently slain by the Titans, torn limb from limb by those who once followed him in the violent frenzy of the moment he himself has unleashed in them: ‘[t]he fragments of the body […] boiled in a great cauldron’ (GS 47).  

Like the diaphanous man, Dionysus is an aesthetic genius of sorts in ‘[a] world which has no sense fine enough for [his] evanescent shades' (D 154).  His is, perhaps, the ultimate fate of the diaphanous man: to be destroyed by those who neither know nor understand him.  Billie Andrew Inman convincingly argues that Pater figures himself as Dionysus torn to pieces (1991, 19-20).  Certainly, the personal crises caused by the episode when he was reprimanded for his intimate relationship with undergraduate William Hardinge​[67]​ and fierce criticism of his Renaissance, not to mention his personal battles with faith, indicate a man pulled in different directions.  But perhaps we could nuance Inman’s suggestion a little.  The terrible sight of Dionysus torn apart is not quite what Pater was; it is what he might have become.  Pater was no Solomon because his sense of self-preservation was too strong.  The image of Dionysus presents itself as a nightmare vision of another possible world where Pater could be destroyed by the forces that assailed him, had he not put up barriers between himself, sensation and ‘the world.’    

In ‘A Study of Dionysus,’ the final lines briefly and ambivalently introduce the birth of a new Dionysus, sprung from the heart of dead Dionysus.  Pater leaves hanging the question of the nature of this new Dionysus.  The ultimate message is mixed.  Dionysus arrived to herald the return of sensuality; this mutated into an ugly parody of excess, yet somehow Dionysus may rise again.  The parallel scene in ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’ also has Denys/Dionysus ‘torn at last limb from limb’ (IP 61), but there is to be no resurrection.  The heart of Denys ‘moulder[s] into dust under the stone, marked with a cross’ (IP 66). It is as if in the space of the decade between ‘A Study of Dionysus’ in 1878 and this story in 1887 Pater had given up his hopes of a cultural rebirth.    

His later images of Venus seem to confirm this.  In 1889 he would refer back to Venus, criticizing ‘the praisers of what is old and accustomed’ as people ‘who would never really have been made glad by any Venus fresh-risen from the sea, and who praise the Venus of old Greece and Rome, only because they fancy her now grown into something staid and tame’ (A 242).  This almost melancholic reflection indicates a longing, now understood to be futile, for the cultural rebirth of Venus.  In Marius, Pater toys with the possibility that Venus encapsulates violent excess within her as he evokes the sensual excesses of Flavian, a follower of Venus (M, I, 99).  Or again, in ‘The Heroic Age of Greek Art,’ the identification between Asia and Dionysus slips and Asia becomes identified also with Aphrodite (GS 229).  These tarnished Venuses suggest something dangerous at the heart of erotic sensuality.  An innocent vision of sensual freedom is rewritten to suggest that it must always become self-undermining.  The spectrum of sensation has collapsed: that which once liberated is now equated with sensation as possessive and destructive.  

This is confirmed in Pater’s lecture on ‘Prosper Mérimée’.  In a passage which deviates significantly from his earlier position, he describes Kantian subjectivism, worrying that the individual is ‘[d]eprived of that exhilarating yet pacific outlook, imprisoned now in the narrow cell of [his] own subjective experience’ (MS 2).  The very subjectivity that in The Renaissance liberates the individual, imprisons him in ‘Prosper Mérimée’ because he is too introverted.  The disillusioned subjects become like men who ‘turn in despair to gambling or narcotics, and in a while the narcotic, the game of chance is valued for its own sake’ (MS 2).  Pater’s figure implies the futility of this individuated life, while his imagery suggests being in the grip of powerful sensations.  He thus reverses and subverts the affirmative link in his earlier writing between sensation and individualism.

Overall, sensual experience puts the individual in a precarious position.  Pater’s depiction shows at every turn that Epicurean and Humean accounts of sensation are inadequate to grasp the complexity and conflicts which this visits on the individual.  As this subversive underside of sensation comes to the fore it eradicates alike Epicurean moderation, Hume’s analogy between sensual pleasure and the good, and Kant’s vision of aesthetic disinterestedness.  Sensation here has a transformative role: a role which may strengthen one’s conception of himself as a free autonomous individual.  But it also makes the individual vulnerable to its seduction and – therefore – to losing one’s self.  Pater’s suggestion that sensual experience is not only a mode of transferring information or values – as Hume suggests – but an end in itself, endows it with fresh power.  Hence he cannot simply assert the power of reason over it, like Heraclitus.  He realizes that sensation for sensation’s sake releases it from ethical bonds. The centrifugal tendency identified with Dionysus recalls Pater’s characterization of empirical reality as a constant flux of ‘what is relative, temporal, apparent only’ (HP 13).  So Dionysus is, perhaps, the acme of the individual under the ‘fugitive condition of things’ of an empirical world (A 103), as in revelry he turns sensation from the epistemological foundation of reality into a fatal fetish.  The problem becomes how to know the difference between good and evil, if the quality of sensation can no longer be held to correlate with these values.  Pater’s most famous pupil, Oscar Wilde, would later create in Dorian Gray the ultimate subject of Dionysian sensuality, craving sensation after sensation (128ff). 


iv. Ascêsis and aesthetic sensation

Thomas Wright correctly identifies that which too often is missed in relation to Paterian sensuality, when he notes that Pater’s motto is ‘Discipline rather than Pleasure […] The beauty of Discipline is henceforward his constant theme, and one word was continually slipping from his mouth or his pen – the word ascêsis’ (II. 65).  Art offers to both Pater the man and Pater the writer a refuge from the dark possibilities of sensual pleasure because it promotes ascêsis.​[68]​  The notion of an ascetic aesthetic sounds paradoxical, but for Pater the beauty of art is that it fuses Dionysian passion with Apollonian reserve: impressing order upon the potentially self-annihilating sensual desires which lie deep within.  To create art is the triumph of the individual over the emotions, desires and sensations that threaten to engulf him, whilst the experience of the spectator is a meta-sensuality involving only the imagination.  This is evident alike in ‘Poems by William Morris’, The Renaissance and Plato and Platonism, in all of which reserve is defined as an essential aspect of artistic creation.

In the ordinarily genteel microcosm of Pater studies twenty years ago, Billie Inman launched a spirited attack on Robert and Janice Keefe for opposing Apollo and Dionysus in Walter Pater and the Gods of Disorder.  She might have added Gerald Monsman, who also argued in Pater’s Portraits that Pater’s narratives are constructed on the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo, ultimately resulting in the supremacy of the latter.  What each of these critics is getting at is the question of how to understand the balance of disorder and order or passion and reason in Pater’s works, but in a sense they are looking for answers in the wrong place.  Apollo has an ambiguous presence in Pater’s writing, but he is emphatically not equated with Reason.  The Victorian cult of Apollo was already waning by 1876, when Pater published ‘A Study of Dionysus’ (Inman 1989, 540).  Pater presents ‘Dionysus and Apollo as brothers, and they were both “embodiments” of opposing tendencies, constructive and destructive, rational and irrational' (Inman 1989, 541).  With the dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus broken down and faith in reason diminished, as noted in chapter II, Pater does not abandon the idea that revelry must be held in balance by an opposing quality.  Reserve is this quality.  It becomes synonymous with restraint or self-control and Pater deems it essential to art. Pater’s 1875 review of John Addington Symonds’ Renaissance in Italy: The Age of the Despots indicates this.  It is a generally positive review, which ends on this odd note:
          Not withstanding Mr. Symonds’s many good gifts, there is one quality which I think in 
           this book is singularly absent, the quality of reserve, a quality by no means merely         
           negative, and so indispensable to the full effect of all artistic means […] I note the absence 
           of this reserve in many turns of expression, in the choice sometimes of detail and metaphor, 
           in the very bulk of the present volume.  (201-202)
Reserve here assumes Epicurean significance.  It is essential to Pater’s aesthetic, to temper the passions involved.  It recalls ‘the law of restraint’ which ‘keep[s] passion always below that degree of intensity at which it must necessarily be transitory, never winding up the features to one note of anger, or desire, or surprise’ (R 139).  

Symonds’ book, the ostensible subject of discussion, fades from view for a moment as Pater’s narrative turns to ‘Mr. Symonds’.  The writer and his work merge into each other.  When he wrote, Pater would have known of Symonds’ disgraced departure from Balliol in 1863 following an affair with another man, and it is possible he had read Symonds’ unabashed affirmation of male-male desire in his poetry.​[69]​  Reserve is indeed one quality that Symonds had not.  Pater’s allusion to him, like the allusion to Solomon, which appeared in the following year, gestures toward the excesses of deviant sexuality.  But this is also an implicit dialogue in print between Pater and himself.  For him, perhaps, ‘the quality of reserve’ is the only possible solution to tendencies that, if indulged, may lead to one’s destruction at the hands of those who condemn but do not understand.   

Pater’s view of an essential tension between passion and reserve in both art and the artist goes beyond the sexual, infusing also his attitude towards the proper subject of art.  George Moore recalls a letter written to him by Pater in 1887, in which   
           he made me understand very well that descriptions of violent incidents and abnormal states
           of mind do not serve the purpose of art […] He made me understand that the object of art 
           is to help us forget the crude and the violent, to lead us towards certain normal aspects of    
           nature…  (qtd. L 74)  
The final sentence is striking in its assertion of art as a normalizing force, against the ‘crude and violent’ aspects of our reality.  In Pater’s earlier writings we saw that aesthetic experience may be a space in which the individual is liberated from the strictures of civil society.​[70]​  None the less, art has a moral duty to lead the deviant individual back to the paths of normality.  Here a schism emerges between the sensations of life and the meta-sensations evoked by art, in which the latter promote ascêsis from the excesses that characterize Dionysian sensuality.  Ironic then that violent passion in Gaston de Latour is problematic.  It indicates that even one who wished to forget ‘the crude and violent’ in art could be drawn into this; it presents the possibility that art is as vulnerable to the excesses of sensation as the real world.  Just as Pater withdrew Dionysus and Other Studies he withdrew his unfinished novel from serial publication in Macmillan’s Magazine in mid-run, an almost unprecedented move by an author. 

Pater came to admire how Plato fuses the sensual and spiritual realms in his philosophy.  Of course, his own Renaissance sought this too, but with the fundamental difference that while for Plato this fusion was to take place in the realm of ideas; Pater sought to place it in the realm of the senses. In his later work Pater inverts his original insistence that spirit is sensualised by its immanence in the sensual world.  To the contrary, he comes to admire Plato for doing the opposite in his ability to spiritualize the sensual:
           The lover, who has become a lover of the invisible, but still a lover, and therefore, literally, 
           a seer of it carrying an elaborate cultivation of the bodily senses, of eye and ear, their 
           natural force and acquired fineness […] into the world of intellectual abstractions; seeing 
           and hearing there too, associating for ever all the imagery of things seen with the 
           conditions of what primarily exists only for the mind…  (PP 96)
Sensuality here becomes redefined as the imaginative idea of sense.  Though Pater insists that this is analogous to sensuality in the corporeal world, and the thematic similarities suggest some affinity with his earlier view, in truth early and later Pater are very much at odds. For imaginative sensuality privileges the mind over the body.  It is the triumphant transcendence of the imagination, offering the lover of sensation a means to sublimate the urge to act out his desires. We are far from Venus, let alone Dionysus or Denys.

Plato’s imaginative sensation subverts Pater’s earlier depiction of spiritualized sensation as a ‘somnambulistic […] beautiful disease or disorder of the senses; and a religion which is a disorder of the senses must always be subject to illusions’ (WM 302).  This ‘passion of which the outlets are sealed’; this ‘wild, convulsed sensuousness’ (WM 303) was the life-negating counterpoint to the sensuality heralded by Venus.  Now, by contrast, it is spiritualized sensation that liberates the individual from the tyranny of the senses.  Pater’s shift here is not unrelated to the conceptual move from spirit to soul noted in chapter II.  The Platonic soul, which comes to rewrite spirit also, crucially claims to be a substance distinct from the material body.  Similarly here, the spiritualization of desire in Plato and Platonism suggests disjunction – a positive disjunction – between soul and body: a notion quite opposed to Pater’s earlier project of reconciling them.  Consequently, the concept of ‘imaginative reason’ ascribed to Plato in this passage from Plato and Platonism has significantly different implications from that in ‘The School of Giorgione.’  Once again Pater is ‘the constantly revising author’, reworking his own concepts as his ideas shift across the years. And perhaps this is also how, over time, he came to terms with life:  free in his heart to love who he loved, desire whoever he desired – but bound by society never to let this become manifest in flesh.

Pater’s own prose style exemplifies meta-sensation, muting the passion of sensation.  With this in mind, F.R. Leavis’ judgement on Paterian sensation should be recast: 
           Pater may talk of burning always with a hard gem-like flame, but there is nothing 
            answering in his prose; it notably lacks all sensuous vitality.  Indeed, to point to Pater’s 
            prose − cloistral, mannered, urbane, consciously subtle and sophisticated, and actually 
            monotonous and irresponsive in tone, sentiment and movement (the eyelids always a little 
            weary) − is a way of giving force to the judgement that for the Victorian aesthete art is 
            something that gets between him and life.  (241) 
This suggestion of schism between Pater’s affirmation of intense sensuality and his own form is, of course, quite right.  There is an obvious irony about a book which professes to advocate the reawakening of our physical being – our body and our senses – yet immerses us entirely into its dense purple prose, distancing us from real sensation; especially if that book calls for ‘the perfect identification between matter and form’ (R 40).  What Leavis does not understand is that this irony is the point.  Pater’s gem-like flame must never be allowed to burn out of control.  Pater’s prose is an endeavour to contain the flame, to tame it and contain it within the world of words he has created.  His characteristic parataxis makes his sentences ‘busy with themselves, but not otherwise with the world’ (Donoghue 297), to the extent that in the act of reading we too can be drawn out of our physical life and deeply into the dense world of his prose.  In The Renaissance, sensation is distanced by a factor of three: we are reading Pater, who is interpreting a work of fine art, which depicts a sensual being or experience.  

So, although Pater sees abstract reason as a life-negating force, he recognizes the significance of some principle of order or discipline to balance the passions.  Just as he admits spirit into his conception of the world when it is implicit in matter, so he allows ‘reason’ when it is saturated in art.  Pater chooses art for art’s sake over sensation for sensation’s sake.  Despite his insistence in the Conclusion that sensations felt in the world and sensations evoked through art are qualitatively the same, from the outset there is evidence to the contrary. In ‘Winckelmann’ Pater concedes that ‘the spectacle of supreme works of art takes from the life of the senses something of its turbid fever’ (R 142).  Art assumes a moral role, bringing reason to check the passions and sensual desires that may otherwise become unruly and dangerous.

The triumph of reserve is not absolute.  In Plato and Platonism there is a sense in which the battle has been won: reason has triumphed over the passions.  Pater focuses his thoughts through the Ancients as he writes, ‘Sophocles had said of the happy decay of the passions as age advanced: it was “like being set free from the service to a band of madmen”’ (PP 94).  Yet Dionysus still looms over Pater’s writings: it is hard to keep Dionysian passions under control in a world where Apollonian reason is fragile.  Removing Gaston from the pages of Macmillan’s Magazine resolved an immediate practical problem, but the shadow it cast over the moral role of art remains. We shall return to this in chapter VI. 


v. Conclusions

Sensuality begs us to reconsider the interface between the individual and world, discussed in chapter I.  For this interface is significantly problematized by Pater’s conception of sensation and, in consequence, the clear vision of the diaphanous man is clouded.  After all, the quality of diaphaneitè rests on disinterested experience of sensations, as Pater writes, ‘without any struggle at all’ (D 155).  It is no longer possible for the individual’s relationship with the world, like clear glass, to remain uninfected by attachment to sensual pleasure once we have admitted desire and passion into the picture.  Sensation offers pleasure and freedom, but it also threatens to overwhelm the individual, subverting him into an animal whose only motivation is sensual pleasure.  The individual is thus defined by struggle: whether this be a struggle for more sensations, or a struggle to assert one’s right to erotic sensations, or a struggle to attain mastery over one’s desire for sensation.  Sensual experience becomes a site of tension at which one’s individuality may be undermined be the forces within one’s self.  

With his departure from Hume, Epicurus and Kant, Pater implicitly asserts that sensation has not been fully grasped by philosophical discourse.  The inherently rational discourse of philosophy could not ever hope to fully grasp the complexities of subjective, personal, passionate response to sensation and in this way, yes, ‘analysis leaves off’ (R 152).  However, the endeavour to think the unthinkable never leaves off.  It just means that we must find new modes of ‘analysis’, capable of engaging the imagination as well as the mind.  The vivid, irrational relationship between the individual, sensuality and passion demands new modes of discourse, flexible enough to gesture beyond the utterable.  In the meandering and suggestive forms of the essay and imaginary portrait, Pater ventures into these realms. 

We have seen that the troubled relationship between the individual and sensation defines the relationship between the individual and art.  Art assumes crucial significance as a mediator between the individual and the world, spiritualizing sensation into an unthreatening ideal.  In contradistinction from Pater’s own assertion, then, the sensations evoked by art are fundamentally distinct from those evoked by the world.  Art fuses passion with Puritanism and in so doing suggests itself as a sort of aesthetic education.  In Plato and Platonism, it is as a teacher of young men that Pater presents himself.  In the epigraph to this collection he writes ‘The Lectures of which this volume is composed were written for delivery to some young students of philosophy, and are now printed with the hope of interesting a larger number of them.’  Yet such an audience also carried its risks. The most famous passage, Pater’s supreme distillation and crowning glory, the four-page Conclusion to The Renaissance, was for a time suppressed by its author. As he writes: ‘This brief Conclusion was omitted in the second edition of this book, as I conceived it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall’ (R 150 n1). However hard he tried to make it safe with a distancing aesthetic of 'reserve', art for Pater could never quite lose its sense of danger.


iii. Dionysus and ‘the tyranny of the senses’

It is through the figure of Dionysus, god of revelry, wine and sensual pleasure, that Pater subverts his ideal of sensation.  For, Dionysus illustrates how the desire for sensation may become a dangerous end in itself, unravelling individualism and pushing eroticism to a destructive conclusion.  Dionysus and his modern-day counterpart, Denys, illustrate that ‘[t]he pleasure of the senses’ cannot be simply for the sake of the moment because its involvement with the pleasure and desires may lead to and torturing, frenzied obsession with greater and greater sensations.  As Pater explores this in ‘A Study of Dionysus,’ ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ and ‘Denys l’Auxerrois,’ we begin to realize just what is stake when he speaks of ‘the tyranny of the senses’ or when, years later, he reflects on how the senses can seem to become ‘“a band of madmen”’ (R 142; PP 94). 

Dionysus and Other Studies was aborted personally by Pater in 1876 (BB 87-9) when, after the manuscript had gone to print, he had a sudden change of heart.  The reason, he told Alexander Macmillan, was his unhappiness with ‘so many inadequacies’ in the manuscript (BB 87).  At every turn Pater is ‘a constantly revising author’ (Small 36), never quite content that he had found le mot juste or the right sequence in which to arrange it.​[71]​  This exactitude is often the reason for Pater’s deliberation in publication.  However, Macmillan queries whether this is so in the case of his essays on Dionysus. Macmillan read the proofs himself and replied to Pater, ‘[t]here is no reason so far as I have seen for your apprehension.  I think this will be a quite worthy successor of your Renaissance’ (BB 88).  But this may be just the source of Pater’s apprehension: a sense in which he was unwilling to subject himself to the censure of the critics and the University in the way he had with The Renaissance.​[72]​  In the note sent by Pater with his cheque to cover the costs of the aborted publication he admits to Macmillan, ‘I am sorry to have given you so much trouble for nothing’ (BB 89).  The full humiliation of how he was perceived by his contemporaries was perhaps only fully apparent in the months before his decision to take Dionysus and Other Studies out of production, when W.H. Mallock published The New Republic.  Gosse plays down the impact of Mallock’s parody of Pater, suggesting that although Pater ‘thought the portrait a little unscrupulous […] he admired the cleverness and promise of the book, and it did not cause him to alter his mode of life of thought in the smallest degree’ (258).  But perhaps Mallock quickened Pater’s realization that he had in Dionysus and Other Studies far more subversive work than The Renaissance.  Although the most inflammatory essays were published separately in journals,​[73]​ it was quite another thing to publish them together in a book in which ‘[t]he corporate institutional authorship is obfuscated, and authorship is shifted into context which foregrounds the individual (Brake 1991, 46).   Whatever the impact of The New Republic it is clear that ‘what really did ruffle him, was the persistence with which the newspapers at this time began the attribute to him all sorts of “aesthetic” follies and extravagances’ (Gosse 258).  It is unlikely that the intense sensual extravagances and frenzied violence described in the essays on Dionysus would have done anything other than exacerbated this. 

With hindsight one can see that Alexander Macmillan was correct.  Dionysus and Other Studies​[74]​ was an appropriate sequel to The Renaissance.  The Renaissance is defined by the pervading spirit of Venus with Dionysus mentioned just twice,​[75]​ but his spirit increasingly comes to brood over it, especially in those irreverent passages at its climactic Conclusion.  It may be perplexing to be told in ‘A Study of Dionysus’ that ‘the artists of the Renaissance occupied themselves much with the person of and story of Dionysus’ (GS 11).  Pater’s debut collection and the artists on whom it focused were occupied, as we have seen, with the person and story of Venus.  With this statement, Pater signals just how much the balance of his thought on sensation has altered to prioritize the negative underside of sensation since 1873.  The depiction of Dionysus in these later essays takes up the momentum of the Conclusion and carries its principles to dangerous excess, symbolizing the obsession and violent lusts that may destroy the individual possessed by the desire for sensual pleasure.    

The connection between Venus and Dionysus as dual symbols of cultural rebirth is emblematized when, echoing the discovery of Venus de Melos, Denys’ legend begins with the discovery of an ancient coffin: 
           Within the coffin lay an object of fresh and brilliant clearness among the ashes of the dead 
           – a flask of lively green glass, like a great emerald.  It might have been ‘the wondrous 
           vessel of the Grail.’  Only this object seemed to bring no effable purity, but rather the 
           riotous and earthy heart of old paganism itself […] And, whether or not the opening of the 
           buried vessel had anything to do with it, from that time a sort of golden age seemed indeed 
           to be reigning there for a while…  (IP 50-1)
The suggestion of ‘a sort of golden age,’ perhaps the ‘old paganism’ of Hellenic sensibility resurrected by the discovery of this relic promises a cultural rebirth very much analogous to that brought by Venus.  Moreover, there are allusions to the Paterian cultural rebirth suggested by his earlier essays.  The description of glass found within the coffin recalls at once the purity of Venus risen from the sea and the transparency of the diaphanous man.  And yet, immediately, this ‘golden age’ begins to rewrite the imagery of his earlier works: her purity, washed fresh from the sea, is replaced by the earthy, fevered and destructive element of fire.  In this way, the sensual reawakening heralded by Dionysus assumes an ambivalence largely absent from that of Venus.  

Pater introduces Dionysus/Denys as a bipolar god: both manically life-affirming and darkly depressed and destructive (GS 37; 76).  To this end he readdresses Euripides’ characterization of Dionysus, arguing that ‘[t]he whole compass of the idea of Dionysus [is as] a dual god of both summer and winter’ (GS 38).  Dionysus is ‘two-fold then – a Döppleganger [with] a full share of those dark possibilities’ (GS 39).  The seasonal metaphor encapsulates the necessity of these contrary states.  In spring we meet the ‘quainter side of Dionysus’ (GS 55):
           …the pines, the foldings of the hills, the leaping streams, the strange echoings and dying 
           of sound on the heights, ‘the bird, which among the petals of many flowered spring, 
           pouring out a dirge, sends out her honey-voiced song,’ the crocus and the hyacinth 
          disorderly mixed in the deep grass’ – things which the religion of Dionysus loves.  (GS 8)
Dionysus lover of nature brings to life the most positive relationship between the individual and the sensations of the natural world.  Though focusing on visual and auditory sensations, it recalls the life-affirming relationship between the individual and the natural world evoked in ‘Poems by William Morris.’  Further, this organic relationship recalls the world-spirit, conjuring ‘the religion of Dionysus’ as a kind of spiritual pantheism.  

Still, spring is short and summer turns too soon to autumn and winter.  Dionysus encapsulates the seasons as they turn inevitably to the dark dead winter.  The ‘dark possibilities’ of Dionysus are implicit in the sensual experiences that define his ‘quainter side.’  ‘It is,’ Pater comments, ‘to such ecstasies […] that all nature-worship seems to tend; that giddy, intoxicating sense of spring’ (GS 53).  The ‘dark possibilities’ of giddying and intoxicating sensation come to define Dionysus, subverting Pater’s ideal of sensation as sensual desire becomes an obsessive end in itself.  In the climactic scene of ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides,’ his wild desire for sensations excites the sensual desires of local townspeople who join him in an ever-intensifying dance ritual.  As they become more and more desirous of sensation, the ‘wild dancing’ of their Bacchic dance suggests this has obliterated their individuality:
          [T]he sympathies or mere numbers, as such, the random catching on fire of one here and 
           another there, when people are collected together, generates as if by mere contact, some 
           new and rapturous spirit, not traceable in the individual units of the multitude.  Such 
           swarming was the essence of the strange dance of the Bacchic women.  (GS 53)
Affirmative undertones of rapture here are undermined when we realize that this is but the beginning of ‘an odd sickness’ (GS 57) inflicted by Dionysus: ‘sort of madness, a madness which imitates the true Thiasus’ (GS 57).  The Bacchic dance escalates as its movement hypnotizes the women and they become sensuous creatures, their bodies fore-grounded and their minds unreflective.  Echoing this loss of reason the narrative takes refuge in Pater’s favourite adjective as it wonders at ‘the strange dance.’  In this way, it suggests the inexpressible experience of the dance and rewrites the strange spirit in The Renaissance as a menacing power. The subjects become ‘swarming’ flies or ‘wild creatures’ (GS 70), clustered and moving together to present to sharp contrast to the heightened individualism evoked by sensation in The Renaissance.  In this frenzy, they are dehumanized by their desire for sensations of ‘a fine rain of water,’ ‘a fount of wine,’ ‘skimming the surface with their finger-tips,’ ‘[an] abundance of milk’ and ‘streams of honey’ (GS 69).  The Biblical symbol of ‘the land of milk and honey’ (Exod. 3.8, 58) is subverted here from the religious utopia beloved of God to become an image of sensual excess and decadence.  It is in contrast to the organic cultural rebirth heralded by Venus that Pater describes ‘[s]ome, lately mothers, who with breasts still swelling had left their babies behind’ (GS 69).  Leaving their families to engage in the Bacchic dance, possessed by lust for sensation, these women become symbolic of Dionysian hedonism, eschewing the organic regeneration of culture for the excessive, atemporal now.  

Thus, Bacchic dance becomes a distortion of Pater’s Conclusion to The Renaissance; an apocalyptic vision in which life is destructively spent ‘in art and song.’  It realizes the suggestion that ‘we will hardly have time to make theories’ (R 152) in the world reborn after the Conclusion with horrific effects.  The dance is a parodied, frenzied art that eradicates the moderate, sustainable sensual experience central to Pater’s Epicurean vision at The Renaissance Conclusion.  The Bacchic women cannot ‘maintain that ecstasy’ because it escalates beyond control to a climactic height where ecstasy transforms itself into the desire for the ultimate sensation: murder.  Lost to the ecstasy of the movement and the madness, the women participate in the ‘grotesque scene’ of murdering a calf (GS 71).  

A parallel scene in ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’ explores this troubled relationship between sensuality and individualism further, and creates a dialogue with the liberalizing significance of sensation suggested by Linda Dowling.  The revolutionary ‘assertion of individual freedom’ led by Denys in Auxerre (IP 50) revives the identification between sensuality and political liberalism Dowling identifies in The Renaissance.  Denys arrives in Auxerre preaching the ‘individual freedom’ that defined the political zeitgeist in medieval France as people began to demand that their ‘narrow, feudal institutions’ turned into ‘a free communistic life’ (IP 50).  The emergence of the individual from those homogenizing forces of society and its institutions again draws attention to Pater’s concern to establish the possibility of free, autonomous individuality.  However, in the ‘new spirit’ brought by Denys does not liberate the citizens of Auxerre but takes them into a different form of slavery; slavery to his pernicious influence.  In contrast with the light, unobtrusive presence of Venus as she heralds cultural rebirth, Denys is a persistent and insidious influence that undermines the autonomy of the individuals in Auxerre.  ‘It was,’ as Pater explains, ‘a period, as older men took note, of young men and their influence’ and, at the height of Denys influence, ‘[h]e was making the younger world mad’ (IP 52; 55).  In effect, ‘Denys at his stall was turning the grave, slow movement of politic heads into a wild social licence’ (IP 53).  Like Dionysus, the presence of Denys catalyses passions and desires that lay dormant and with his calls for political freedom he stimulates a radical desire for sensual freedom that over-takes the call for political rights.  Denys’ ‘freedom’ marches become sordid scenes like the Bacchic dance in which the individuals of Auxerre become enslaved to their own dormant passions:
          The hot nights were noisy with swarming troops of dishevelled women and youths with 
           red-stained limbs and faces, carrying their lighted torches over the vine-clad hills, or 
           rushing down the streets to the horror of timid watchers towards the cool spaces by the 
           river.  A shrill music, a laughter at all things was everywhere.  And the new spirit repaired 
           even to the church to take part in the novel offices of the Feast of Fools.  Heads flung back 
           in ecstasy – the morning sleep among the vines when the fatigue of the night was over – 
           dew-drenched garments – the serf lying at his ease at last… (IP 53)
These unindividuated ‘swarming troops,’ are tainted with the colour of blood, recall the Bacchic women.  As Pater wrote in a letter to William Sharp, ‘imagination is a Divine gift, as was the Bacchic vine; but each can intoxicate the heedless, and so enslave where it should serve’ (L 85-6).  Here we see the people of Auxerre intoxicated, heedless and enslaved to the sensation that might have liberated them.  The image of the ‘lighted torches’ and the ‘hot nights’ re-evoke Pater’s metaphor for creativity, ‘heat and light’ (R xxxiii), in order to corrupt it into an empty signifier suggesting, if anything, the squandered passions of these dishevelled persons who do not create but only destroy.  Allusions to the music and ecstasy that characterize the climatic finale of The Renaissance, here, serve to compound this impression.  For, the melody has become ‘shrill’ and the glorious irreverence of ephemeral ecstasy is grotesque in the lamp light as we see this Feast of Fools glutted on sensual excess to the point of stupidity and incoherence. 

The nature of Dionysus and, accordingly, the nature of sensuality remain ambivalent.  For all that we see its effects, its power is to a great extent inexplicable.  As noted above, Pater most often takes refuge in his favourite adjective, ‘strange,’ to suffice for this.  However, an analogy between Dionysus and Asia expands the suggestion that sensation may undermine one’s self with excess and irrationality.  The analogy between Dionysus and Asua is suggested in ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’ when the arrival of Denys is figured by a stage play visiting the town and entitled Return from the East, ‘in which the God of Wine […] return[s] to triumph from the East’ (IP 54).  And again, it tells that ‘he had trafficked with sailors from all parts of the world, from Arabia and India, and bought their wares, exposed now for sale, to the wonder of all, at the Easter fair’ (55).  The identification between Denys and the East expands into a new savagery and excess is suggested by the ‘richer wines and incense’ from Arabia and India and ‘seeds of marvellous new flowers, creatures wild and tame, new pottery painted in raw gaudy tints, the skin of animals, meats fried with unheard-of condiments’ (IP 55).  Pater tantalizes with the exoticism of Denys market stall but, as his description continues he once again uses that adjective − ‘strange’: ‘His stall formed a strange, unwonted patch of colour’ (IP 55).  Like the strangeness of Botticelli’s Venus, there is a sense in which the origin of Denys is intangible and unnerving.  Pater uses this analogy to transfer characteristics of Denys/Dionysus that he earlier, in ‘The Marbles of Aegina’, uses to define Asia.  It appears as beautiful, intensely sensual and hardly comprehensible to the faculty of reason, instead haunting the imagination (GS 163; 231) and Pater expands and qualifies this notion as he defines ‘the centrifugal, the Ionian, the Asiatic tendency’,
           flying from the centre, working with little forethought straight before it, in the 
           development of every thought and fancy; throwing itself forth in endless play of undirected 
           imagination; delighting in brightness and colour, in beautiful material, in changeful form
           everywhere, in poetry, in philosophy, even in architecture and its subordinate crafts. 
                                                                                                                                     (GS 264) ​[76]​
This rather Imperialist characterization of Asia clarifies and expands Pater’s conception of Dionysian sensation.  The combination of beauty, random imagination and fluctuation with which it defines Asia recall the stream of fleeting phenomena apprehended by the diaphanous man, and like it, they are sensations without reason, ‘flying from the centre’; irrational and lacking the unity necessary to foster creativity. The dichotomy between Asia and Europe, as centrifugal and centripetal tendencies is analogous to that between Dionysus and Venus.​[77]​ 

Dionysus also comes to challenge the erotic ideal of sensuality presented by Venus in The Renaissance.  Amidst the fevered sensuality of Dionysus the dual drives of sex and death are confounded and erotic sensuality leads to destruction.  The ambiguous sexuality attributed to Dionysus in mythology becomes integral to Pater’s Dionysus (GS 53; 59; 61) and when he considers with what difficulty painters have attempted to capture Dionysus he settles on a modern interpretation with strong personal resonances: 
          In a Bacchus by young Hebrew painter, in the exhibition of the Royal Academy of 1868, 
           there was a complete and very fascinating realization of such a motive; the god of the 
          bitterness of wine, ‘of things too sweet’; the sea water of the Lesbia grape became brackish 
          in the cup.  (GS 37)
The ‘young Hebrew painter’ is, of course, Simeon Solomon: the friend who had been arrested for indecent exposure with the intention of sodomy in 1873 and 1874.  Solomon’s painting of Dionysus is reproduced on the title page of this chapter.  The allusions that equate Solomon with Dionysus and with sensation too sweet and with male-male desire are uncharacteristically explicit for Pater.  Invoking Solomon, Pater ventures to define the sensual excess of Dionysus specifically as the erotic sensual excess of deviant sexuality.  This is not loosely connected with liberation.  Pater comments that ‘[t]here were some who suspected Dionysus of a secret democratic interest; though indeed he was liberator only of men’s hearts’ (GS 15n).  Reducing the ostensible political significance of Dionysus, Pater concentrates elusively on the emotional freedom he offers; emotional freedom that would, given the links to Solomon, legitimize male-male love or desire.  However, the organic development that makes sweet things turn bitter and brackish makes the shift from life-affirming sensation to bitter sensation inevitable.  It echoes the duality of Dionysus to suggest that the negative elements of sensation develop to destructive sensation.  To become intoxicated, possessed, by sensation is to lose the capacity to discern society’s boundaries and to transgress as Solomon did brings retribution.  It also suggests that obsessive lusts are integral to erotic sensation itself.  Can Denys be a liberator of men’s hearts when it enslaves the individual to the passions?


The personal resonances of Dionysus offer some background explanation for Pater’s quite singular sympathy for him.  Pater’s Dionysus is the fallible, half-mortal god who ‘has suffered after a manner of which we must suppose pagan gods incapable’; ‘a beautiful soft creature’ who is simply unable to control his wild desires or the effect he has on others (GS 49; 42).  This ‘tortured, persecuted, slain god – the suffering Dionysus’ (GS 46) is Pater’s innovation on the old myths and it is particularly poignant in light of the analogy with Solomon, and Pater invites us to sympathize with Dionysus as with very few of his characters.  His sympathetic narrative tone and the quite singular closeness of this narrative to its subject portray Dionysus as a terribly vulnerable figure.  At the end of ‘A Study of Dionysus’ Pater alludes to the Orphic poem in which Dionysus is violently slain by the Titans as he describes how Dionysus is torn limb from limb by those who once followed him in the violent frenzy of the moment he himself has unleashed in them: ‘[t]he fragments of the body […] boiled in a great cauldron’ (GS 47).  Like the diaphanous man he is an aesthetic genius of sorts in ‘[a] world which has no sense fine enough for [his] evanescent shades (D 154).  His fate is, perhaps, the ultimate fate of the diaphanous man: to be destroyed by those who neither know nor understand him.  Billie Andrew Inman convincingly argues that by Pater figures himself as Dionysus torn to pieces (1991, 19-20).  Certainly, the personal crises caused by the episode with William Hardinge and fierce criticism of his Renaissance, not to mention the personal battles with faith indicate a man pulled in different directions.  But perhaps we could just nuance Inman’s suggestion a little.  The terrible sight of Dionysus torn apart is not quite what Pater was; it is what he might have become.  Pater was no Solomon because his sense of self-preservation was too strong.  The image of Dionysus presents itself as a vision of another possible word in which Pater could be destroyed by the forces that assailed him had he not put up barriers between himself and sensation and ‘the world.’    

In ‘A Study of Dionysus,’ the final lines briefly and ambivalently introduce the birth of a new Dionysus, born from the heart of dead Dionysus.  Pater leaves hanging the questions of the nature of this Dionysus.  The effect of this is to present him as an ambivalent herald.  He arrived to herald the return of sensuality but somehow the message mutated into an ugly parody of itself.  The parallel scene in ‘Denys l’Auxerrois’ also has Denys/Dionysus ‘torn at last limb from limb’ (IP 61), but there is to be no resurrection.  The heart of Denys ‘moulder[s] into dust under the stone, marked with a cross’ (IP 66), as though in the space of the decade between ‘A Study of Dionysus’ in 1878 and this story in 1887 Pater had given up hope of his cultural rebirth.    

His later images of Venus seem to confirm this.  In 1889, he would refer back to Venus as he criticizes ‘the praisers of what is old and accustomed’ as people ‘who would never really have been made glad by any Venus fresh-risen from the sea, and who praise the Venus of old Greece and Rome, only because they fancy her now grown into something staid and tame’ (A 242).  This almost melancholic reflection indicates a longing, understood to be futile, for the cultural rebirth of Venus.  In Marius, Pater toys with the possibility that Venus encapsulates violent excess within her as he evokes the sensual excesses of Flavian, follower of Venus (M 99).  Or, in ‘The Heroic Age of Greek Art,’ the identification between Asia and Dionysus slips and Asia becomes identified also with Aphrodite (GS 229).  These tarnished Venuses suggest something dangerous at the heart of erotic sensuality.  They rewrite the innocent vision of sensual freedom to suggest that there is, within it, the means for its own subversion.  The spectrum of sensation has collapsed and liberating sensation is at one with possessive and destructive sensation.  

This is confirmed in Pater’s lecture on ‘Prosper Merimèe’ as, in a passage that deviates significantly from his earlier position, he describes Kantian subjectivism, worrying that that individual is ‘[d]eprived of that exhilarating yet pacific outlook, imprisoned now in the narrow cell of its own subjective experience’ (MS 2).  The subjectivity that in The Renaissance liberates the individual, imprisons him in ‘Prosper Merimèe’ because he is too introverted.  The subjects become like men who ‘turn in despair to gambling or narcotics, and in a while the narcotic, the game of chance is valued for its own sake’ (MS 2).  Sensation for its own sake becomes, here, the symptom of Pater’s figure suggests the futility of this individuated life and, moreover, the imagery suggests being in the possession of powerful sensations.  It reverses and subverts the affirmative link between sensation and individualism.

The individual is placed in a precarious position by sensual experience.  Pater’s depiction of sensation at every turn shows that its Epicurean and Humean accounts of sensation are inadequate to really grasp its altered relationship with the individual.  As this subversive underside of sensation comes to the fore it eradicates the Epicurean moderation, Hume’s analogy between sensual pleasure and the good and Kant’s vision of aesthetic disinterestedness.  Sensation here has a transformative role; a role which may strengthen one’s conception of himself as a free autonomous individual.  But it also makes the individual vulnerable to its seduction and – therefore – to losing one’s self.  Pater’s suggestion that sensual experience is not only a mode of transferring information or values – as Hume suggests – but an end in itself means that it gives it a new power.  Pater cannot simply assert rational power over it like Heraclitus.  He realizes that sensation for sensation’s sake releases it from ethical bonds.  The problem becomes one of how to know the difference between good and evil if the quality of sensation can no longer be said to correlate to these values.  Dorian Gray, the ultimate subject of Dionysian sensuality, would later illustrate this as he craves sensation after sensation (128ff). 


iv. Ascêsis and aesthetic sensation

Thomas Wright correctly identifies that which too often is missed in relation to Paterian sensuality, when he notes that Pater’s motto is ‘Discipline rather than Pleasure […] The beauty of Discipline is henceforward his constant theme, and one word was continually slipping from his mouth or his pen – the word ascêsis’ (Wright II. 65).  Art offers to Pater the man and Pater the writer a refuge from the dark possibilities of sensual pleasure because it promotes ascêsis or reserve.  For art fuses Dionysian passion with Apollonian reserve.  It impresses order over the potentially self-annihilating sensual desires that lie deep within.  Its creation is the triumph of the individual over the emotions, desires and sensations that threatened to engulf him, whilst the experience of the spectator is a meta-sensuality involving only the imagination.  This is evident in ‘Poems by William Morris’, The Renaissance and Plato and Platonism, where reserve is defined as an essential aspect of artistic creation.

In the ordinarily genteel microcosm of Pater studies twenty years ago, Billie Inman launched a spirited attack on Robert and Janice Keefe for opposing Apollo and Dionysus in Walter Pater and the Gods of Disorder, and she might also have included Gerald Monsman who argued that Pater’s narratives are constructed on the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo, ultimately resulting in the supremacy of Apollo in Pater’s Portraits.  What each of these critics is getting at is the question of how to understand the balance of disorder and order or passion and reason in Pater’s works but in a sense they are looking for answers in the wrong place.  Apollo has an ambivalent presence in Pater’s writing that emphatically does not make him analogous to reason.  The cult of Victorian cult of Apollo was already waning by 1876, when Pater published ‘A Study of Dionysus’ (Inman 1989, 540).  He presents ‘Dionysus and Apollo as brothers, and they were both “embodiments” of opposing tendencies, constructive and destructive, rational and irrational (Inman 1989, 541).  With the dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus broken down and faith in reason, as noted in chapter II, diminished, Pater des not abandon the idea that revelry must be held in balance by an opposing quality.  Reserve is this quality.  It becomes synonymous with restraint or self-control and Pater deems it essential to art. Pater’s 1875 review of John Addington Symonds’ Renaissance in Italy: The Age of the Despots indicates this.  It is a generally positive review, which ends on this odd note:
          Not withstanding Mr. Symonds’s many good gifts, there is one quality which I think in 
           this book is singularly absent, the quality of reserve, a quality by no means merely        
           negative, and so indispensable to the full effect of all artistic means […] I note the absence 
           of this reserve in many turns of expression, in the choice sometimes of detail and 
           metaphor, in the very bulk of the present volume.  (201-202)
Reserve assumes Epicurean significance. Reserve is essential to Pater’s aesthetic to temper the passions in involves.  It recalls ‘the law of restraint’ which ‘keep[s] passion always below that degree of intensity at which it must necessarily be transitory, never winding up the features to one note of anger, desire or surprise’ (R 139).  

Symonds’ book, the ostensible subject of discussion, fades from view for a moment as Pater’s narrative turns to ‘Mr. Symonds’.  The writer and his work merge into each other.  When he wrote, Pater would have known of Symonds’ disgraced departure from Balliol in 1863 following an affair with another man, and it is possible that he had read Symonds’ unabashed affirmation of male-male desire in his poetry.​[78]​  Reserve is indeed one quality that Symonds had not.  Pater’s allusion to him, like the allusion of Solomon which appeared in the following year, gestures toward the sexual excesses of deviant sexuality.  It creates a dialogue in print between Pater and himself in which, perhaps, ‘the quality of reserve’ is the only possible solution to the tendencies that may lead to one’s destruction at the hands of those who cannot understand.   

The essential relationship between passion and reserve in the artist and art spans beyond the sexual and it infuses Pater’s attitude toward apt subject of art.  George Moore recalls a letter written to him by Pater in 1887, in which   
           he made me understand very well that descriptions of violent incidents and abnormal states
           of mind do not serve the purpose of art […] He made me understand that the object of art 
           is to help us forget the crude and the violent, to lead us towards certain normal aspects of    
           nature…  (qtd. L 74)  
The final sentence is striking in its assertion of art as a normalizing force in contrast to the ‘crude and violent’ aspects of our reality.  In his earlier writings, we see that aesthetic experience may be a space in which the individual is liberated from the strictures of civil society.​[79]​  However, that art has a moral duty to lead the deviant individual back to the paths of normality.  In this way, a schism emerges between the sensations of life and the meta-sensations evoked by art, in which the meta-sensations of art promote ascêsis from the excesses that characterize Dionysian sensuality.  Ironic then that violent passion in Gaston de Latour is problematic.  It indicates that even one who wished to forget ‘the crude and violent’ in art could be drawn into this.  Just as Pater withdrew Dionysus and Other Studies he withdrew his unfinished novel, from serial publication in Macmillan’s Magazine, mid-run.  An almost unprecedented move by an author.

Pater admires how Plato fuses the sensual and spiritual realms in his philosophy.  Of course, his Renaissance sought this too but with the fundamental difference that for Plato this fusion was to take place in the realm of ideas; for Pater this was to take place in the realm of the senses.  His early insistence that the spirit is sensualised by its immanence to the sensual world is introverted.  In Plato he admires the contrary ability to spiritualize the sensual:
           The lover, who has become a lover of the invisible, but still a lover, and therefore, literally, 
           a seer of it carrying an elaborate cultivation of the bodily senses, of eye and ear, their 
           natural force and acquired fineness […] into the world of intellectual abstractions; seeing 
           and hearing there too, associating for ever all the imagery of things seen with the 
           conditions of what primarily exists only for the mind.  (PP 96)
Sensuality becomes redefined as imaginative idea of sense.  Pater insists that this form of sensuality is analogous to sensuality in the corporeal world.  Though the thematic similarities suggest some affinity with his earlier view it is very much at odds with this.  After all, imaginative sensuality privileges the mind over the body.  It is the transcendence of the imagination over the body and offers the lover of sensation a means to transcend the impetus to act on his desires.  

Plato’s imaginative sensation subverts Pater’s earlier depiction of spiritualized sensation as a ‘somnambulistic […] beautiful disease or disorder of the senses; and a religion which is a disorder of the senses must always be subject to illusions’ (WM 302).  This ‘passion of which the outlets are sealed’; this ‘a wild, convulsed sensuousness’ (WM 303) was the life-negating contrast to the sensuality heralded by Venus.  Now, by contrast, it is spiritualized sensation that liberates the individual from the tyranny of the senses.  In this way, Pater’s shift here is not unrelated to the conceptual shift from spirit to soul noted in chapter II.  The Platonic soul, which comes to rewrite spirit also, crucially, claims to be a distinct substance from the material body.  Similarly, here, in Plato and Platonism the spiritualization of desire suggests disjunction – a positive disjunction – between soul and body and this is quite opposed to Pater’s early principles of reconciling them.  It may be an acceptance of the life that he himself had been living; free in his heart to love who he loved, desire whoever he desired; bound by society to never let this become manifest in flesh.  Consequently, the concept of ‘imaginative reason’ that describes Plato in the passage from Plato and Platonism has significantly different implication to that in ‘The School of Giorgione.’  Once again, Pater is ‘the constantly revising author’, rewriting his own concepts as his ideas shift across the years. 

Pater’s own style exemplifies meta-sensation, muting the passion of sensation.  With this in mind, F.R. Leavis’ judgement on Paterian sensation should be recast: 
           Pater may talk of burning always with a hard gem-like flame, but there is nothing 
            answering in his prose; it notably lacks all sensuous vitality.  Indeed, to point to Pater’s 
            prose − cloistral, mannered, urbane, consciously subtle and sophisticated, and actually 
            monotonous and irresponsive in tone, sentiment and movement (the eyelids always a little 
            weary) − is a way of giving force to the judgement that for the Victorian aesthete art is 
            something that gets between him and life.’  (241) 
This suggestion of schism between Pater’s affirmation of intense sensuality and his own form is, of course, quite right.  There is an obvious irony about a book that professes to advocate the reawakening of our physical being – our body and our senses – yet immerses us entirely into its dense purple prose, distancing us from a real sensation; especially if that book calls for ‘the perfect identification between matter and form’ (R 40).  What Leavis does not understand is that this irony is the point.  Pater’s gem-like flame must never be allowed to get out of control.  Pater prose is an endeavour to contain the flame, to tame it and contain it within the world of words he has created.  His characteristic parataxis makes his sentences ‘busy with themselves, but not otherwise with the world’ (Donoghue 297), to the extent that in the act of reading we too can be drawn out of our physical life and deeply into the dense world of his prose.  In The Renaissance, sensation is distanced by a factor of three, with us reading Pater, who is interpreting a work of fine art, which depicts a sensual being or experience.  

So Pater chooses art for art’s sake over sensation for sensation’s sake.  Despite his insistence in the Conclusion that sensations felt in the world and sensations evoked through art are qualitatively the same, from the outset, there is evidence to the contrary. So, in ‘Winckelmann’ Pater concedes that ‘the spectacle of supreme works of art takes from the life of the senses something of its turbid fever’ (R 142).  Art assumes a moral role, bringing reason to check the passions and sensual desires that may otherwise become unruly and dangerous.

The triumph of reserve is not absolute.  In Plato and Platonism, there is a sense in which the battle has been won: reason has triumphed over the passions.  Pater focuses his thoughts through the Ancients as he writes, ‘Sophocles had said of the happy decay of the passions as age advanced: it was “like being set free from the service to a band of madmen”’ (PP 94). Only, Dionysus looms still over Pater’s writings.  It is difficult to maintain control over passion in a world where reason is fragile.  Removing Gaston from the pages of Macmillan’s Magazine resolved the immediate problem but the shadow it cast over the moral role of art remains and we will return to this in chapter VI. 


Conclusions

The individual has an ambivalent relationship with sensation.  It shows Pater thinking deeply about the fallible nature of the individual and the contradictions that define our being in the world.  The relationship that emerges between the individual and the world is one based on passion and desire.   Sensation brings us back to consider the interface between the individual and world, discussed in chapter I.  This interface is significantly problematized by Pater’s conception of sensation and, in consequence, the clear vision of the diaphanous man is clouded.  After all, the quality of diaphaneitè rests on disinterested experience of sensations, as Pater writes, ‘without any struggle at all’ (D 155).  It is no longer possible for the individual’s relationship with the world, like clear glass, to remain uninfected by attachment to sensual pleasure.  Struggle is implicit in sensual experience, whether this be a struggle for more sensations, or a struggle to assert one’s right to erotic sensations, or a struggle to attain mastery over one’s desire for sensation.  Sensual experience becomes a site of tension where even the division between good and evil is blurred by the intensification of sensation, as in the Bacchic dance and Denys’ freedom marches. Pater’s consideration of sensuality probes the limitations of philosophical discourse.  

With his departure from Hume, Epicurus and Kant Pater implicitly asserts sort that sensation has not been fully grasped by philosophical discourse.  In this way, Pater uses his own essayistic discourse to venture into the corners of sensuality that may lie beyond the tangible. Pater finds sensuality beyond the bounds on philosophical discourse.  Its vivid and irrational relationship with the passions demand new modes of discourse with the elasticity to reach into the corners of the fallible, human relationship with sensation and Pater seeks this in the imaginative language of his imaginary portraiture.  Modest enough to realize he cannot tell us definitively what sensation is, he evokes its effects by stimulating the imagination of his reader, as he does with regards to the spirit.  He is suggesting that philosophical discourse cannot hope to fully grasp the complexities of subjective, personal, passionate response to sensation and in this way, yes, ‘analysis leaves off’ (R *; ch ref).  Traditional analysis is struck dumb by the conditions of being left to us by this Conclusion, but thought never leaves off.  It just means that we must find new modes of ‘analysis’, capable of engaging the imagination as well as the mind.  

In consequence, the relationship between the individual and art is considerably altered.  Art assumes crucial significance as a mediator between the individual and the world, spiritualizing sensation into an unthreatening ideal.  In contradistinction from Pater’s own assertion, this suggests that the sensations evoked by art are fundamentally distinct from those evoked by the world. Pater anticipates Arthur Symons’ complaint about ‘the hesitations and compromises, and timorous advances, and the shocked retreats, of Puritan conscience, once emancipated, and yet afraid of liberty’ (1993, xii).

With his departure from the French decadents he is suggesting that the dangers of sensation have not been realized.  The vision of sensation for its own sake is ultimately ignoble and unsustainable and art for its own sake comes to redeem sensual pleasure by spiritualizing it into the ideal.  

The centrifugal tendency identified with Dionysus, to a large extent, recalls Pater characterization of empirical reality in a constant flux of ‘what is relative, temporal, apparent only’ (HP 13).  Dionysus is, perhaps, the acme of the individual under the ‘fugitive condition of things’ of an empirical world (A 103), as, in revelry, he turns the sensation from the epistemological foundation of reality into a fetish.  The centrifugal, ‘flying from the centre’ in ‘changeful form,’ is a world seen now without a unifying principal, with the potential for chaos in surpassing forever after the Platonic cosmos to which Pater would poignantly look back (PP *).


In the Phaedrus, Socrates had distinguished two different sorts of lover: the philosophic lover versus the man who has abandoned himself to a murderous passion’ (Dellamora 114) 

The narrative’s identification with the pederast Sophocles is particularly poignant.  It is as a teacher of young men that also Pater presents himself in the epigraph to this collection: ‘The Lectures of which this volume is composed were written for delivery to some young students of philosophy, and are now printed with the hope of interesting a larger number of them.’ 








IV. Pater’s Copernican Revolution: 
Chaos and the Body 


















I love to recall those ancient times when all was naked, those days when Phoebus gladly touched the human frame with gold.  Then men and women rejoiced in their lithe bodies without deceit or shame, and with the loving sky caressing their backs...​[80]​




In Pater’s image of Myron’s Discobulus​[81]​ the discus whirls round and around into an orbit that places the athlete at the centre of the universe (GS 304-5):
            the vigorous head also, with the face, smooth enough, but spare, and tightly drawn over 
            muscle and bone, is sympathetic with, yields itself to, the concentration, in the most literal 
            sense, of all beside; -- is itself, in very truth, the steady centre of the discus, which begins 
            to spin; as the source of will, the source of the motion with which the discus is already on 
            the wing, − that, and the entire form.  (304-5)  
Appearing in ‘The Age of Athletic Prizemen,’ an essay published months before Pater’s death, this is emblematic of the significance of the body in his philosophical aesthetic.  The individual becomes the sun around which the universe revolves; but unlike the ‘Copernican Revolution’ by which Kant refigures Western philosophy around the mind of the individual, it is specifically the body of the individual around which Pater refigures his aesthetics.  This intention is set out in the Preface to The Renaissance, where Pater draws on Renaissance and ancient Greek ideas to pronounce ‘the care for physical beauty, the worship of the body’ (xxxii).  His comment heralds a humanistic turn from spiritualism and a holistic epistemology of the individual that follows logically from the sensual self considered in the previous chapter and the immanence of spirit in matter discussed in chapter II.  

The Paterian body emerges as an idiosyncratic combination of influences and reactions.  True, Pater's concern with the body puts him at odds with his contemporary classicists at Oxford.  As Lesley Higgins notes, ‘[a]t the heart of Pater’s enterprise is that which Jowett finds unspeakable: the body’ (1993, 53).  Even so, Pater’s re-embodiment of thought is not as unprecedented in the nineteenth century as the tone of his Preface to The Renaissance may suggest.  To some extent, he takes his cue from the centrality of sensual experience in the aestheticist discourses of Gautier, Rossetti and Swinburne in seeking to bring the unashamed body to bear on thought.  In contrast though to the pale and languid bodies of Swinburne or the Fleshly School, Pater’s ideal of the body is bronzed and muscular.  At Brasenose, renowned for sporting rather than academic prowess,​[82]​ Pater had considerable inspiration for such thoughts.  One imagines him sat in the window seat of his college sitting-room, gazing over a book at the rowing team as they straggled across Radcliffe Square after training, contemplating their youth and sculpted beauty, too soon to pass.  From this perspective, James Eli Adams has traced how this ideal of the athletic body may be closely compared to that of Charles Kingsley.  Certainly, ‘throughout their careers both writers were centrally concerned to reclaim the male body from the antagonisms of orthodox, ascetic morality’ (Adams 1995, 150ff).  Perhaps this is because Pater is inspired by the same discourses of ancient Greece and Romanticism which influenced the ‘muscular Christianity’ of Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes.​[83]​  Only, the Kingsleyan notion of cultivating the body for moral improvement and ‘manly’ character is subverted by Pater: morality is released from its Christian objectivity, ‘manliness’ becomes contested by the very effeminacy that Kingsley sought to overcome, and the heavenly eternity sought by the ‘muscular Christians’ is undermined by the finitude of the decaying human flesh.  Returning to the Ancients and the Romantics, Pater writes an alternative, secular, revaluation of the male body.  

Pater's body is, moreover, a contested site as it never was for Jowett, Swinburne or Kingsley. Like other areas of Pater's thought, his conception of the body is ridden with contradictions and his confident assertion of the body in his Preface to The Renaissance is elsewhere belied by his stuttering portrayal of the fallible body.  Robert Keefe has suggested that in Pater's writings ‘[t]he human face, the human body, the human mind have imprinted themselves, their own beauty, covering the moral void of a threatening universe, overcoming the sense of helplessness’ (1987, 164).  This is Pater’s ideal.  Human beauty and the humanistic values that it symbolizes offer the individual a new order of values to replace the void left in the wake of God the Father.  The body had, after all, given Swinburne 'a way out of Christian discourse' (Armstrong 1993, 393).  Yet Pater is ever balancing on a wire above the precipice of ‘the moral void of a threatening universe’.  It dizzies him as it never had Swinburne because Pater lacks his defiance.  It dizzies him as it never dizzied the 'muscular Christians' because Pater lacks their faith.  Pater's 'void' is a void of death, of helplessness and of deviance, and it will not be stilled.  Much as he would like to paper over the cracks of religious metaphysics and ethics with humanistic beauty, the body beautiful lets him down.  If it covers this void it simultaneously uncovers it, emerging out of and merging into the intangible.  As an object it is untouchable, as a subject it is fallible and as the feminine body it is unknowable.  So in truth the body is somewhat more ambivalent than Robert Keefe suggests.  This considered, the central philosophical question that this chapter asks is in what ways and how far it is true that the individual covers ‘the moral void of a threatening universe’?  This chapter argues that as both subject and object, the body has a dual nature: promising pleasure and eternity in one moment, but casting one into the void of dashed expectations in the next.

This broad focus on the body also aims to redress an imbalance.  In the main, critical consideration of the Paterian body − or more accurately, the male Paterian body − has been far too narrow.  It was first raised as an issue by queer theorists writing on Pater and has since remained on the periphery of their main interest, which is his presentation of male-male desire.  Critics including Richard Dellamora, James Eli Adams, Linda Dowling, Thaïs Morgan and Matthew Kaiser variously assume that the Paterian body is a homoerotic object of desire. Yet they tend not to look more extensively at the bodies in question or their broader significance.  The Paterian body must be reconsidered if we are to give a fully fleshed account of it.  Pater’s motivations for re-embodying thought and value in the physical form of the individual were in fact several. Certainly, he was in part moved by a desire to legitimize male-male desire by covert means, though the nature of this desire is more nuanced than that suggested by some critics. But no less importantly, his quivering faith begged that we reinstate value to the material individual; because whilst he assented to Darwin’s view of man’s descent from apes, he believed that through cultivation of the flesh we can at least aspire to be God-like.  Hence one must explore beyond the rather narrow preoccupations of queer theory, to get a fully rounded view of the ethics and metaphysics of the Paterian ideal of the body as object and as subject. 

Section i discusses the Pateresque male body as an object of unobtainable desire and unattainable eternity, evoked through the classical nude.  Section ii considers the human body as subject, focusing on Pater’s intense consciousness of how the fit and healthy body organically degenerates in illness and old age.  This ‘perishing human clay’ (A 49-50) reopens the schism between spirit and matter: the frail, mouldering flesh ultimately betrays us to death, whilst the spirit soars in search of eternity.  The concluding comments serve also to gesture to Pater’s much maligned female bodies, whose absent presence represents the mystery at the heart of the universe. 


i. The body as object

In the fusion of early spring, bright sunlight reached into the corners of the quad chilled by still wintry air.  Walter Pater ducked out of a doorway and out of the shadows into the squinting light of early afternoon.  In appearance, as in philosophy, he was defined by contradictions: his tall frame, pronounced features and dark bushy moustache contrasting with his delicate garments and shy manner.  Leaving the rooms of Benjamin Jowett with his features set in concentrated grimace, he braced himself against the cold, hurried along the Balliol quad, through the porter’s lodge, and into the bustle of Broad Street where he crossed towards his own college, Brasenose.  

This was a day in the spring of 1874.  At a dreadful meeting with Jowett, Pater had been confronted with evidence of his romantic attachment to a student called William Hardinge, in consequence of which Jowett permanently withdrew his nomination for a University Proctorship.  In the couple of months during which they had become close friends, Hardinge had sent intimate poems to Pater and Pater had returned with letters signed ‘yours lovingly.’  Details of the affair were subject to gossip and suppression but the letters alone were evidence enough for Jowett’s intervention.  After Pater’s disciplining, Hardinge was sent down and Pater is not known to have had any later romantic relationships.​[84]​  

Although this episode was soon hushed in Oxford, it was a crescendo in Pater’s life and values, bringing to its height the conflict between his homoerotic ideal of sensuality and the Victorian strictures against homoerotic desire.  This starkly illustrated the dangerous space between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ (A 62), contemplation and action, the imagined body and the consequences of touching a real body.  

Over fifty years ago, in a quite different context, Kenneth Clark noted that the nude ‘takes the most sensual and immediately interesting object, the human body, and puts it out of reach of time and desire’ (22).  It is striking that Pater’s critics have yet to explore his marble bodies in these terms.  Not to say that Pater's views on sculpture have gone unconsidered.  Lene Østermark-Johansen has spoken of how Pater goes against the grain of contemporary criticism by Baudelaire's Salon of 1859 and Swinburne's Notes on Poems and Reviews, who declared the death of sculpture in modernity (28/02/2008).  Sculpture fulfils Pater's desire for greater aesthetic subjectivity, with the spectator able to move around the figure viewing it from any point, at the same time as it satisfies his desire for the centrality of the individual.  The critical problem has come in bringing together Pater's view of sculpture with his presentation of homoerotic desire; some all too easy assumptions have been made here.  We are, perhaps, too quick to accept the explanations of Linda Dowling and Thaїs Morgan that behind Pater’s gaze is a defiant modern homosexual sensibility merely directed to idealized, inanimate art-objects in order to conceal itself from those who would be unsympathetic.  The ‘homosexual code’ identified by Dowling in Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford offers one way of conceiving the triangle between Pater, his sexuality and his expression in print (125).​[85]​  In truth, though, the matter is broader and more complex.  The inanimate idealized nature of the sculptured body is absolutely necessary to Pater's mode of homoeroticism for a different reason rooted in Pater's sensibility.  By directing his gaze not toward the living, breathing body but toward the idealized bodies of sculpture, Pater’s narrative gaze in ‘Winckelmann’ comes to encapsulate a futile longing for both an untouchable lover and an unattainable eternity.  Such longing and the 'restraint' that denies its expression are essential to the Paterian individual.    

Pater's narratives linger on the contours of the athletic male body in ‘The Age of Athletic Prizemen’ and ‘Winckelmann’.  His eyes rest on discrete elements of the statues, locating itself in very close proximity to its object, examining, dismembering and fetishizing its elements: ‘no member of the human form is more significant than the rest; the eye is wide and without pupil; the lips and brow are hardly of less significance than hands and breasts and feet’ (R 136).  As Dellamora suggests, when Pater composed these lines ‘he was aware that Swinburne’s new volume of poetry had moved the discussion of sexual difference far beyond the approach that he himself had taken in ‘Diaphaneitè’ (102).  Pater wishes to take the discussion in quite a different direction to Swinburne.  He places us, his readers, at a triple remove from real flesh.  So, in the act of reading, we imagine a body out of Pater’s description, itself re-imagined from the representation in fine art of a real body.  At each stage the body is infused with the ideals of its interpreter, so that it comes to exist in a realm far removed from touchable, living, dying reality.  Rendered in Pater’s prose, then, the strength and beauty of Discobulus is eternal, whilst the desire he expresses is ethereal and unrequitable, as its object is unobtainable.  The gaze of Pater’s narrative at once points doubly beyond itself: to an object of desire that will never be held, and to the eternal beauty, youth and freedom that it will never possess.  It is an ironic glance that holds within it the knowledge of its own futility.  This is the void it conceals and reveals. 

Therefore, Lene Østermark-Johansen’s suggestion that these bodies fulfil Pater’s intention to make touch his ‘new organ for the senses’, or Richard Dellamora’s belief that ‘Pater […] bases the aesthetic in bodily response’ are a little puzzling (27/07/2006; 111).  Sculpture is no more meant to be touched than a painting.  In its grandeur, it stands cold and hard to the touch; a stark reminder that its eyes are glazed, it is impervious to its admirer and its secrets are impenetrable.   Thus the sculpted body is removed from the realms of the touchable.  It is not and cannot be possessed by the desiring gaze.  Whilst one may gaze on it in desire, its eyes, ‘wide and directionless, not fixing anything in their gaze’ (R 140), they return a blank stare to the would-be lover.  It tantalizes the imagination with the thought of touch, only to deny the reality of warm responsive flesh and reciprocal desire.  Its beauty is an empty promise that rests forever in the air of eternity; a moment made perfect because it cannot be disappointed by intrusive and inadequate reality.  Thus it fulfils Pater’s vision of perfect love: ‘defined by the absence of the beloved, choosing to be without hope, protesting against all lower uses of love, barren, extravagant, antinomian’ (WM 301).  One begins to realize that, whilst at times ‘Pater refuses to disengage the pleasures of the body from the pleasures of the mind’ (Higgins 1993, 53), at others the disengagement of imaginative pleasure from physical pleasure is central.  In this vision of love there is a sense in which, despite his Hellenic tendencies, Pater retains those Hebraising principles of ‘conduct and obedience’ (Arnold 1949, 91).  These qualities – ‘reserve’ again -- are what he admires in the celibate priests of his imaginary portraits, such as Prior Saint Jean, and they inhibit the physical expression of love.  The unobtainable nature of Pater’s male bodies exalts love to a higher plane.  It is now and forever will be an imaginative love; unconstrained, unsoiled and unthwarted by the real.​[86]​  It is preserved in the realms of eternity by longing.  This is the irony at the centre of Pater’s presentation of the body as object of male-male desire.  Dellamora tells us that ‘Winckelmann’s career showed Pater how a freely expressed eros could become part of a cultural ideal’ (110), but there is nothing ‘freely expressed’ about Pater’s homoerotic desire.  On the contrary, the dynamic created between the living spectator and the inanimate art-object is based on reserve.  It is symbolic of that tendency discussed in the previous chapter, in which Dionysian passion is brought under the control of 'reserve' in aesthetic experience.  

Pater's disengagement of realizable bodily desires from imaginative desire undermines his fusion of spirit and body.  In this way, he suggests that it is possible, even necessary, to live the life of the spirit alone.  This move recalls his suggestion that ‘the end of life is not action but contemplation – being as distinct from doing’ (A 62) and the spiritualization of sensual desire into imagination in light of which some qualifications should be made to Dellamora’s influential discussion of homoerotic desire in Pater’s writings.  The unobtainable nature of the beloved, and the unfulfillable nature of desire for an inanimate object suggest that Pater shies away from the ‘freely expressed eros’ attributed to him by Dellamora (110).  Dellamora’s argument, which has been the basis for subsequent queer approaches, lends to Pater a very late-twentieth century sensibility.  It gratuitously assumes that notwithstanding the religious and cultural disapproval which surrounded him, and despite the strong influence of ancient Greece, the quiet, gentlemanly and terribly conflicted Walter Pater had no reservations about the full enjoyment of homoerotic experience; and that the gaze in ‘Winckelmann’ gestures toward a liberal, Dionysian vision of desire between men.  This emphasis on desire and purported reclamation of Pater are frankly anachronistic and not fully grounded in Pater's aesthetic principles.  Instead of claiming Pater as a starting point for modern gay identity we might do better to consider how he defines his own position in terms of Plato.  Whilst this vision challenges the heterosexual norms at the centre of Pater's contemporary aesthetics, at the same time it is centred in being not doing.  In other words homoerotic desire becomes a beautiful disposition rather than a power of action.  Like Dante's evocation of Beatrice in the Divine Comedy and Schiller's assertion that art spiritualizes erotic love into the beautiful, Paterian reserve suggests that the emotions of erotic love, unexpressed, quicken the beauty and poignancy of existence and may be channelled into the into the creation of art.

This idea can be taken further with reference to Plato's dialogues on love: the Phaedrus and the Symposium.  For, the ideal nature of the Paterian body elevates it to the realm of the Platonic Forms.  Pater draws on Plato's connections between desire, art and the Good to suggest that love is the beginning of ascension to ethereal, ultimate Good.  Plato’s Socrates in the Symposium, desire is the first stage in an ascent to the Good in which it is refined into a love of the Good exalted above physical desire to the ethereal realm of the Forms.  As we turn to consider the objects of his homoerotic gaze in more detail, we see that Pater’s object of desire is more like a Platonic Form than a living being.  Contra Linda Dowling's thesis, Pater’s desiring gaze is not simply focused on sculptured figures so as to cloak his illicit desires from unsympathetic eyes under the pretext of aesthetic criticism.  Rather, the idealized inanimate nature of the sculptural figure is essential to the nature of Paterian desire.  

The eroticized body becomes a site where Pater redefines the dynamics between aesthetics and sexuality.  Identifying his own narrative with the words of Winckelmann, he famously affirms the necessity of homosexual desire to aesthetic sensibility:
            ‘…I have noticed that those who are observant of beauty only in women, and are moved  
            little or not at all by the beauty of men, seldom have an impartial, vital, inborn instinct for 
            beauty in art.  To such persons the beauty of Greek art will ever seem wanting, because 
            the supreme beauty is rather male than female.’  (R 123)
This close analogy between appreciation of physical beauty in men and aesthetic appreciation legitimizes the homoerotic gaze, but does so by redeeming and ennobling homoerotic desire as a preparation for the highest realm of the aesthetic.  The immediate connection between homoerotic desire and aesthetic appreciation underlines the tensions between Pater’s aesthetic and Kant’s arguably naïve separation of the aesthetic from self-interest.

The otherworldly ideal created by motionless nude statues and paintings, nearer to the Heavens than to this world, is as pertinent to time as to desire.  For Pater, in marked contrast with Baudelaire's view in Salon, sculptural art transfers the male body into a privileged realm, ungoverned by the laws of time.  There is a suggestion of this in ‘Winckelmann’ when Pater describes the beauty of sculpture: ‘All that is accidental, all that distracts the simple effect upon us of the supreme types of humanity, all traces in them of the commonness of the world, it gradually purges away’ (R 138-9).  Sculpture eradicates all but the essence of the individual.  The passage is similar to one quoted in chapter II, when Pater writes of spiritual light: ‘That white light purged from the angry bloodlike stains of action and passion, reveals not only what is accidental in man but the tranquil godship in him as opposed to the restless accidents of life’ (R 137).  In both passages Pater is gesturing toward some immutable, essential element of individuality that may be distinguished from the mere 'incidents of life' that inscribe themselves on the individual.  The purging away of this element with regard to the body removes individuality, so that aesthetic appreciation may take the shape of admiration at least as much as desire.  After all, does not desire for another take its fire from that which is ‘incidental,’ unique and personal to him?  Pater’s purge effectively makes the sculpted body into a Platonic Form.    

Thus do Pater’s bodies defy time and the fragilities of the human body, to capture the individual at the eternal, infallible moment of his youth.  Jacques Kalip has gone a little way towards grasping this when he argues that Pater only appreciates a body when it has become ‘a non-sentient, […] working stiff’ (249).  Kalip is right, of course, to pick up on the inanimate nature of Pater’s bodies, but he quite misses the main point. The difference between the living, subjective body and Pater’s sculpted, objective bodies is not the difference between life and death.  The Greek sculptures on which Pater’s gaze rests are emphatically not ‘working stiffs’, because these bodies never had life.  They are immortal – and this immortality is a significant part of their ideality for Pater.  As he goes on to describe in ‘Winckelmann’: 
            Greek sculpture deals almost exclusively with youth, where the mouldering of the bodily              
            organs is still as if suspended between growth and completion, indicated but not 
            emphasised; where transition from curve to curve is so delicate and elusive, that 
            Winckelmann compares it to a quiet sea, which, although we understand it to be in 
            motion, we nevertheless regard it as an image of repose.  (R 140)
The frozen splendour of the statue is essential to its perfection.  It exists somehow beyond the time continuum, in a moment of invincible youth poised eternally on the brink of the future.  Fresh, athletic, idealistic youth is paused forever in time, ‘in the repose of his unchanging characteristics’ (R 136-37).  Uninvolved in the world of work which had defined heterosexual masculinity, above the ethics of contemporary society, exempt from the laws of decay that constrain the merely human, the statue exists to be eternally beautiful, and that is all.  

Sculpture is located in the tranquil realm of the ideal, lifting us from reality in the act of spectatorship.  As an object of desire and eternity, then, the body in sculpture ‘covers the void of a threatening universe’ by enrapturing the spectator in a moment of beauty and pleasure.  The void of inadequate reality and the threat of a society which condemns homoerotic desires are forgotten in the moment of aesthetic contemplation.  The vortex of Dionysian passion and madness is spiritualized into the ideal by the statuesque body, which in this way is the epitome of spiritualized sensuality discussed in chapter III.  Yet the body in sculpture also covers the void of decay and of death, and the void of an eternity without God.  It allows the spectator to glimpse the possibility of eternal beauty.  If only for a moment, aesthetic experience is for Pater an experience of the infinite.  


ii. The body as subject 

One should not linger overlong on Pater’s objectified bodies, because it is the subjective body -- the body involved in contemplation and concealed behind its own gaze – that is really central to his work.  For Pater’s ancient Greeks ‘Beauty becomes a distinction, like genius or noble place’ (R 133).  The same is not true for Pater.  He is no Oscar Wilde.  The objects of Pater’s gaze are bodies, and that is all.  The genius is the subjective self who gazes on the body beautiful, the fallible dreamer who, unlike one captured in art, is made of fragile flesh.  The subject’s experience of his body brings us back to the relationship between spirit and matter.  For the self-conscious individual is located at the point of fusion between these forms, as the relationship between the body and self-identity is constructed on a tension between the finite flesh and the spirit that longs for eternity.  This vivid sense of the human body constantly at odds with itself – striving for health and fitness, yet slowly dying, cell by cell – is crystallized in Marius the Epicurean.  Marius’ first ‘vivid sense of the value of mental and bodily health’ is juxtaposed with the death of his mother: ‘He came home brown with health to find that the health of his mother was failing’ (M, I, 41).  Youthful health and demise mark the polarities of our multifarious experiences of our own body.  Thus, for the subject, his own body covers and uncovers the void of death.   

In contrast to the dominance of mind over body in later Western thought, ‘Greek thought finds its happy limit,’ Pater writes; ‘it has not yet become too inward; the mind has not yet learned to boast its independence of the flesh’ (R 132).  In athletic cultivation, the individual has a heightened consciousness of the pantheistic identification of spirit and matter.  The immanence of spirit in flesh is exemplified by making one’s body the objectification of the will.  There is ‘blending and interpenetration of intellectual, spiritual, and physical elements, still folded together, pregnant with the possibilities of a whole world closed within it’ (R 140).  Pater’s subjective individual aspires to a symbiotic relationship between spirit and body that is attained through physical cultivation, as in Muscular Christianity.  Pater suggests this when he characterizes Greek gymnastics as ‘one half music, […], a matter, partly, of character and of the soul, of the fair proportion between soul and body, of the soul with itself’ (GS 296).  He terms this balanced unity of soul and body in athletic sport ‘bodily soul’ (GS 302).  It is a feature of athletic exertion which characterizes Winckelmann, described by Pater as ‘[t]he quick, susceptible enthusiast, betraying his temperament even in appearance, by his olive complexion, his deep-seated piercing eyes, his rapid movements’ (R 124).  The vivid appearance of the spirit manifested in the body reminds us of the transparent quality of the diaphanous man.  Whilst the spirit affects the body, Winckelmann illustrates that the body also affects the spirit:  ‘[his] enthusiasm, dependent as it is to a great degree on bodily temperament, has a power of reinforcing the purer emotions of the intellect with an almost physical excitement’ (R 122).  The effects of physical cultivation on the spirit are rendered more explicit in Marius.  For example, when Marius walks to Rome, he experiences
            [t]he formative and literary stimulus, so to call it, of peaceful exercise which he had 
            always observed in himself, doing its utmost now, the form and the matter of thought 
            alike detached themselves clearly and with readiness from the healthfully excited brain. – 
            ‘It is wonderful,’ says Pliny, ‘how the mind is stirred to activity by brisk bodily exercise.’  
                                                                                                                            (M, I, 164) 

Although this relationship between spirit and matter resembles Muscular Christianity, it is really quite distinct.  The premise of Muscular Christianity is, of course, that cultivation of the body serves the development of the spirit for the ultimate glory of God.  This was an influential notion, glimmers of which can be seen in Matthew Arnold’s view in Culture and Anarchy:
           The moment we disjoin [bodily health and vigour] from the idea of a perfect spiritual 
            condition, and pursue them, as we do pursue them, for their own sake and as ends in 
            themselves, our worship of them becomes a mere worship of machinery, as our worship of 
            wealth or population, and as unintelligent and vulgarising a worship as that is […] ‘Bodily 
            exercise profiteth little; but godliness is profitable unto all things,’ says the author of the   
            Epistle to Timothy.  (1949, 14)   
As one would expect given Pater’s vision of spiritual light, he is fundamentally opposed to this attempt to make the body ‘but a quiet handmaid of the soul’ (M, I, 28).  Curiously enough, even after he has ‘returned’ to the Church, declaring art’s purpose as ‘the glory of God’ (A 38) the body retains its secularity.  The passage quoted above from Greek Studies was published in 1894, the year of Pater’s death, but it retains the endeavour for fusion between soul or spirit and body for its own sake that defined Pater’s Winckelmann twenty-seven years earlier.​[87]​  In each case the purpose of athletic training is quite different to that envisaged by Arnold or Kingsley.  No longer must cultivation of the human body be legitimized by God.  The unity and balance brought by athletics to one’s sense of self-identity serves as its own end.  Though the Greek athletes garnered prizes, Pater stresses that these were meagre: athletic training was undertaken for the disinterested sake of beauty.  As he writes, ‘the beauty of the palaestra, and the beauty of the artist’s workshop reacted on one another.  The youth tried to rival his gods; and his increased beauty passed back into them’ (R 134).  Here again, the ultimate purpose of athletic training is reconciled within the individual; its purpose is found within the human form only.  

It is for the sake of beauty.  Only that is not all.  The athlete assuages the struggle, ‘a Streben, as the Germans say, between the palpable and limited human form, and the floating essence it is to contain’ (GS 28).  Pater was not a sportsman himself, but his comments gesture toward a state of being that is certainly true: in athletics, often, ‘spirit’ loses sight of itself as it saturates the physical actions of its bodily form.  In the act of the purposive exertion of athletics the restless spirit is quelled.  The athlete is ‘as [he] moves or rests just there for a moment, between the animal and spiritual worlds’ (GS 304).  The feeling is finite but within its moment one may glance at eternity and feel invincible.  The effect is analogous to the ‘perfect identification of matter and form’ that describes ideal art (R 90).  It makes the spirit immanent in empirical reality.  The prominence of the athletic body in art illustrates the artist’s ‘full and free realization’ of the material world, and the athletic body demands that the artist render him ‘within the limits of the visible, the empirical world’ (GS 297).  This assertion of the material world recalls the contrast which Pater makes between Angelico’s frescos, which are ‘only the symbol or type of a really inexpressive world’ (R 131), and Greek art, which ‘begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part of the spiritual motive’ (R 132).  It rests not on a rejection of spirit, but rather on an assertion that the spirit is immanent in the material realm; and that art must render the material realm, first and foremost, finding the spirit within it. 

The effect of the equilibrium between spirit and flesh is to tame the wild Dionysian spirit.  The athletic body is created out of hard graft for its own sake.  This graft is fundamental, and it distinguishes athletics most decidedly from the gratuitous pleasure of Dionysian dancing.  Pater stresses the strong work ethic of the athlete when he speaks of his ‘discipline’, and this is etched on his sculpted, economic body: ‘the vigorous head also, with the face, smooth enough, but spare, and tightly drawn over muscle and bone’ (GS 304).  There is no excess and no extravagance; the athletic body is the determined will made flesh.  The ‘habitual and measured discipline’ of the Greek athlete (GS 293) is characteristic of Pater’s endeavour to bring control to extreme emotions.  In an analogous effect to art’s sublimation of sensuality, the athlete brings reasonable order to his ‘Asiatic, or archaic’ tendencies: it is the triumph of the centripetal over the centrifugal; of Apollo over Dionysus; and, therefore, of measured, rule-governed, disciplined athletics over the ‘wild dancing’ of Dionysian fever.  The artists of Ægina capture this in their images of Ancient Greek warriors: 
            not in the equipments they would really have worn, but naked, − flesh fairer than    
            that golden armour, though more subdued and tranquil in effect on the spectator, 
            the undraped form of man coming like an embodiment of Hellenic spirit, and as an 
            element of temperance, into the somewhat gaudy spectacle of Asiatic, or archaic 
            art.  (GS 276)  
The naked body symbolizes Hellenic reason and pride in the secular human form.  More importantly in this passage, Pater draws attention to the toned, naked flesh of the Greek warrior as evidence of temperance brought to the ‘gaudy’, ‘Asiatic’ spectacle of the spirit that is ridden with desire.  

In sharp contrast to the loss of personal identity that takes place in Dionysian frenzy, athletic cultivation is a constant reaffirmation of one’s identity and autonomy:
           Variety and novelty of experience, further quickened by a consciousness trained to an 
           equally nimble power of movement, individualism, the capacities, the claim, of the 
           individual, forced into their utmost play by a ready sense and dexterous appliance of 
           opportunity…  (PP 56) 
Pater makes movement analogous to individualism, suggesting that the power of movement is the exercise of individualism itself.  It is a different facet of autonomy to the one we saw in ‘Poems by William Morris’, discussed in chapter III.  Autonomy, which in that review was affirmed by touching, is gained here by the entirely self-sufficient and fiercely disciplined exercise of one’s own power.  

Ultimately, though, the finite body is an inadequate match for the spirit which yearns for eternity.  It may conceal the void of chaos that is the reality of human existence, but this is a temporary state.  The individual can make a work of art of himself, but time will etch itself on his sinews till they turn to dust – because the flesh betrays us all eventually.  As we have seen, Pater espouses the same conception of spirit and flesh brought into balance by athletic training in The Renaissance of 1873 as in ‘The Age of Athletic Prizemen’ of 1894.  However, in the twenty-one years that separated these works his tone has altered somewhat.  In the latter essay, ‘emphatic historical framing distances Pater from the achievement he celebrates’ (Adams 1995, 181).  With this, Pater seems to renounce the possibility of recovering the Hellenic ideal he once invited his readers to share.  Perhaps it is his increasing realization of the frailty of the flesh that makes attainment of the athletic ideal remote.  Pater had suffered illness from an early age and Thomas Wright records that after a severe beating at The King’s School, he lay ill for six months, ‘he never, it has been assumed, really recovered.’  By the age of fifty he was in ‘feeble health’ (Wright I.110; II.134) and he suffered increasingly from his own illnesses.​[88]​  There is a slight hint that he was conscious of how the advancing years affected his appearance. When sending a recent photograph of himself to Arthur Symons in 1889, he writes: ‘I enclose the photograph you so kindly wished to have.  It may amuse you to compare it with the other enclosure’ (L 102).  The ‘other enclosure’ is an earlier portrait of himself from around 1870. Comparing the two, Symons would see his friend’s thick hair recede to leave him almost bald, his slender face become almost stout, and his grey eyes lose the quiet intent of their youth to become quite wistful.  

Pater’s acute consciousness of passing time is brought to bear on the living body at the end of The Renaissance, where he says that ‘physical life is a perpetual motion of […] the passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues under every ray of light and sound’ (R 150).  Even the fittest and the most beautiful are condemned by time as with each passing year the once-firm muscles grow weaker and the smooth skin wrinkles and sags.  It is this ‘waste’ that we see most vividly in Pater’s final uncompleted essay, ‘Pascal,’ which he was writing on the day he died.  Pater reflects on the physical malady that blighted the final years of Pascal’s life and his description of his ‘long-continued physical sufferings,’ his ‘insupportable languor, alternating with supportable pain, as he died little by little through eight years’ provide an objective correlative to ‘the soul malade’ (MS 62).  And so the spectre of sickness and decay looms ever larger over the Paterian individual.  As Pascal slopes through darkness toward his death, it is as a creator that he is redeemed; as the author of the Pensées he may find the life everlasting.  Pater presents this final work as a defiance of physical illness, woven from an imagination that could take flight from his sick-chamber and there find eternity in creation.  

The way in which Pascal’s masterwork is written against impending death suggests that in some sense, the schism between the spirit and the body is necessary to creative genius.  The ailing flesh is a terrible catalyst to the spirit so that it might create beauty out of this ‘void’ and, indeed, in spite of it.  This is clearer when he writes of Shakespeare’s Claudio, who
            gives utterance to some sense of the central truths of human feeling, the sincere, 
            concentrated expression of recoiling flesh.  Thoughts as profound and poetical as 
            Hamlet’s arise in him; and but for the accidental arrest of sentence he would descend into 
            the dust, a mere gilded, idle flower of youth indeed, but with what are perhaps the most 
            eloquent of all Shakespeare’s words upon his lips.  (A 181)
The beauty and truth of Claudio’s words are quickened by his own flawed and ephemeral nature. Untimely death releases the individual from ‘the mouldering of bones and flesh’ (R 150).  This avoids Michelangelo’s problem of ‘lingering beyond his time in a world not his own’ and confirms Pater’s assertion that ‘[s]ome of those whom the gods love die young’ (R 58; 57​[89]​).  Pater’s essays and imaginary portraits are of course populated by young men whose lives have been abbreviated before they could run their course into the ugliness of decay which betrays the individual’s mortality: Duke Carl of Rosenmold, Sebastian van Storck, Emerald Uthwart, Antony Watteau, Marius, and the others.  Untimely death captures the individual forever at the moment of his perfection.  

Not for long does Pater’s prose linger on the mouldering of human flesh.  Humankind cannot bear very much reality.  Yet this theme underlies almost everything he writes.  Cultivation of the body is an attempt to exalt oneself above the chaos and void of mortality at the heart of being.  By his strength and beauty, the individual seems himself to fill the void as Robert Keefe suggests.  However, the inevitable decay of the body means that ultimately each one of us is betrayed to the eternal void of death.  The resulting schism between spirit and flesh offers a further context for Pater’s perennial concern with the fusion of spirit and matter in imaginative pantheism, and of form and matter in art. 







iii. Conclusions and the female body

The body is essential to Pater’s conception of self-identity.  Both as voyeur of the body beautiful and as ambivalent subject of one’s own flesh, the Paterian individual is conceived on Robert Keefe’s precipice with chaos just a step away, always.  In the case of the objective body we saw chaos defined as transgression in the real world, when desire is acted on.  In the case of the subjective body chaos emerges as something inherent in the degenerating body.  And so, the chaos that is at the heart of the body, like the chaos of Dionysus or the centrifugal forces more generally, is really the constant threat of disintegration: the disintegration of reserve, beauty and unity of spirit and flesh.  The body is our liberation but it is also our prison and sentence of death.  

All of which applies to Pater's men but leaves his women in a rather ambivalent position.  In all of this, Pater’s women risk being forgotten.  Women for the most part in Pater’s writings barely make ripples on the calm waters of his refined prose, and still less have they been considered by Pater’s critics.  If, indeed, the only subject of discussion is the erotic body and if ‘the supreme beauty is male rather than female’ (R 123), then one might justly question the significance of the female body in his writings.  Just as one may question whether the Paterian individual is necessarily male or whether there could be a female Paterian aesthetic.  Leaving aside this larger issue, the female body has a curious significance if we shift our focus to the relationship between the female body and the void.  In this context, Jacques Kalip’s suggestion that ‘Pater’s real misogyny’ is tacitly understood amongst scholars of his work (247) has been detrimental.  This unfortunate comment closes down all discussion of women or the female body in Pater’s writings when Pater's concentration on the eroticized male body should not obscure the distinct importance of the female body in his writings as a symbol of the ‘strange’ mysteries that lie just beneath materiality. 

Granted, Pater passes lightly over many a woman. Dante’s Beatrice (D 154), Charlotte Corday (D 158), Simonetta (R 39), Judith (R 39) and Leonardo’s Medusa are but noted, functioning as barely embodied symbols of an idea or mood.  About Madonnas he has more to say: those of Michelangelo, Da Vinci and Botticelli, whose earthiness and energy humanize them in contrast to the sickly, ethereal Madonnas of the middle ages.  Or again, in Pater’s evocations of Venus and the Mona Lisa the female body becomes the site where the material and spiritual spheres meet; where materiality is spiritualized and spirit becomes flesh.  Through them, Pater ventures beyond the limitations of empirical reality to the intangible. The singular nature of how their womanhood signifies is the focus here.  It moves between the tangible and the intangible, pointing beyond itself to the ‘strange’ metaphysics discussed in chapter II.  The female body points beyond itself to the intangible secrets which lie at the centre of being.  The position in which the individual is placed is one of intellectual ignorance; the intellectual endeavours of the German Idealists to journey to the centre of the mind have been – despite their influence on Pater’s thought – ultimately unsuccessful, belying the fact that the secrets of being remain beneath that which we can perceive, barely glimpsed by us and just touched on by Pater’s narratives from time to time.  This creates a subtle but acute sense that the seen world conceals a spiritual realm of which we have only intimations, which come to us through aesthetic experience.  

Robert Keefe’s comment on the body might, therefore, be expanded.  Female figures, including the Madonna, Mona Lisa, Venus, Charlotte Corday, Medusa, Demeter and Persephone, enter Pater’s narratives as ciphers: barely embodied, symbolic spirits, whose bodies gesture from the finite to the infinite and inconceivable.  We may wonder whether Pater’s evocation of women exemplifies his comments on Angelico:
          For him, all that is outward or sensible in his work […] is only the symbol or type of a 
           really inexpressible world, to which he wishes to direct the thoughts; he would have 
           shrunk from the notion that what the eye apprehended was all.  (R 132)
The figure of woman signifies the mysterious, unknowable, divine and her body is cloaked or distanced from our eyes.  In this way the female body or, more to the point, the absent presence of the female body is a useful counterpoint to the male body, transvaluing the seen world for the unseen.  The image of Botticelli’s Venus, rising from the sea and noted in the previous chapter, is a good example.  Pater’s ekphrastic description first evokes her body through ‘the faultless nude studies of Ingres’ (R38).  Her figure is immediately made hazy by the distancing of myth in painting evoked in words by allusion to other paintings.  The image of Botticelli’s Venus in truth hardly resembles Ingres’ nude studies.  Its typical Renaissance matte, realistic texture would later inspire Ingres’ handling of the brush, but the composition and figure are wholly different.  Botticelli’s Venus is lithe and ethereal, in contrast to Ingres’ voluptuous, often guarded and earthy women.  These images are at odds, inserting a tension that undermines the visual image of Venus.  Between these mental images, her body is lost.  She becomes an unembodied style and type but not a woman; not a body, but mythical, the mysterious temptation.  Skirting over the face and hands of Mona Lisa – ‘we all know the face and hands of the figure’ (R79) – Pater enters into a meditation on the mystical body of Mona Lisa.  He rests on her ‘unfathomable smile, always with a touch of something sinister in it’ in its ‘subdued and graceful mystery’ (R79).  Her beauty points beyond itself to the unknown and unknowable.   

The conflict between spirit and flesh makes the Paterian individual a contested site.  At its youthful, beautiful zenith the body is an object to be worshipped, but it also betrays us to decay and death.  Previous chapters have seen a pattern emerging in which, for Pater, creativity assuages various threats to the autonomy of the individual.  Yet this is not the end of the matter when we look to the body, for in the end the body is matter. The body returns its subject always to the ultimate realities of the material world.  Even creativity is turned ashes to ashes, dust to dust, and the irony is that whilst this condemns us, without it creativity would not be possible.  It is the fallibility of the flesh that makes the spirit soar.  The next chapter will discuss how the real, subjective body is defined at the nexus of passing time, in its grand evolutionary sweep. 










V. ‘At the Still Point of the Turning World’: 
Evolutionary Time and the Aesthetic Moment





                                                                      








Science grows and Beauty dwindles​[90]​


At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;
                    Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
                    But neither arrest nor movement…​[91]​
                                                            



At the ambivalent centre of the Paterian individual, evolutionary time converges with psychological time.  In this most vivid collision between self and world, the individual is at the fulcrum of time passing and the eternal moment, as the body bears the erosion of linear time and the mind soars in aesthetic experience to seemingly eternal moments, ‘exquisite pauses in time’ (R 97).  Through the individual Pater grapples with both vast evolutionary time and subjective time-consciousness; continuous time as it passes in seconds, days, months, years and centuries, and our imaginative sense of time which may flit between past, present and future – where it creates not a line but a dimension. Convinced that in the rapture of aesthetic contemplation the individual may resolve these quite different experiences of time and, if only for a moment, experience eternity, Pater’s vision of the individual in time centres on art. 

Time is truly ‘Pater’s most hauntingly pervasive principle’ (Leighton 2007, 38).  It is insistent.  It haunts his every moment.  At Oxford Pater was steeped in the continuities of tradition, reflective of its ‘progressive detachment […] from the realities of contemporary society’ (DeLaura xv).  He maintained a pace of life determined more by his body’s rhythms than by external time, according to which he often stayed in bed till midday.​[92]​  Yet he was acutely aware of the ambivalence that more broadly defined later nineteenth century temporalities: with the multifarious periodical press ‘operat[ing] like multiple chronometres, all marking different times’ (Mussell 94) and technological advances seeming to annihilate space and time, whilst the vast scope of evolutionary time seemed itself to annihilate the individual’s pretensions to grandeur.  ‘Consider the earth’s history as the old measure of the English yard, the distance from the King's nose to the tip of his outstretched hand.  One stroke of a nail file on his middle finger erases human history’ (Gould 3).  It is this realization that Pater is coming to terms with when he writes about the individual.  He is preoccupied by the contrast between the individual as Lord of All and as now conceived by science: as merely one of a ‘species’, which is itself subject to ‘descent’ and eventual extinction. 

Though his thoughts are shaped by Heraclitus, Hegel and Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’, he is acutely aware that the problems of time encountered in modernity are fundamentally different from those they faced.  Pater re-patterns these writers, taking inspiration from their ideas but ultimately doing so in a way that charts the immense distance between himself and them; a distance created by evolutionary science.  For whilst Pater’s strongest influences and inspirations tend to come from the history of philosophical thought, philosophy had not caught up with the question of how we understand ourselves in time that were being formed by evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century.​[93]​  Still, before academic specialization brought the emergence of C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ in the early twentieth century, the views of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Alfred Wallace and John Tyndall appeared in mainstream journals, some of which Pater also published in.  Pater read Darwin’s Origin of Species as an undergraduate and his friend, Matthew Moorehouse, suggests that it was a significant influence on his early religious scepticism (Wright I. 203).  Yet to look for concrete or substantial engagements with scientific thought in Pater’s writings is to labour in vain.  Its significance to him is like that of music: his prose is steeped in its form, and it inspires his ideas of the possible – but the details are unimportant. Unfashionable though it is to admit, therefore, Darwin is not important to Pater.  For him Darwin, Darwinism and evolutionary science blur into each other, with aspects of Herbert Spencer’s ‘Social Organism’, leaving him with a nebulous but basic question: how to reconceive the individual’s place within the vision of history, natural selection and ‘descent’ temporality presented by evolutionary science.  This is what matters to Pater.  This is what he is trying to come to terms with through art when he speaks of time.  

Pater stands at the fulcrum of evolutionary science looking back to the Romantic moment of Wordsworth and Goethe and forward to the Eeternal Rrecurrence of Friedrich Nietzsche.  This chapter considers Pater’s ambivalent presentation of the individual in time, and how the individual may reconcile evolutionary time with psychological time in aesthetic experience.  Aesthetic contemplation liberates the individual from relentless time; not denying the modern world but affirming the power of imagination, undimmed still, within it:
           Well!  We are all condamnés, as Victor Hugo says: we are all under sentence of death but 
            with a sort of indefinite reprieve […] Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in 
            high passions, the wisest, at least among ‘the children of this world,’ in art and song.  For 
            our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible 
            into the given time.  (R 153) 
In this most famous of passages the individual is confronted with the vast expanse of evolutionary history and eternal death and, in consequence, his ‘brief interval’ is shrunk in significance.  Art offers the individual a sense of expanding this interval of life, dignifying ‘each moment as it passes’ never to be repeated.  Thus the significance of the individual life is reinstated: the individual is once again at the centre of time, where aesthetic experience gives him a sense of mastery.  Following this, Pater’s appropriation of 'art for art's sake' is critical: ‘For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake’ (R 153).  It is time that distinguishes what Pater is saying from Gautier's art pour l’art or Swinburne's appropriation of the term in William Blake (101).  Pater opens out the central tautology of 'art for art's sake' to include the individual and time.  Art, in other words, is not for its own sake but for the sake of those ephemeral moments of time.  In Pater’s essays, continuous time and the eternal aesthetic moment quicken and rewrite each other, urgently asserting that the individual is both subject to time’s arrow and the all-powerful creator of the moment, rendering death and eternity in each moment as it passes.  Peter Allan Dale argues that ‘what interested [Pater] in particular was the expression of the historical mind in art’ (189).  This chapter intends to turn that statement inside out; suggesting, rather, that Pater is interested above all in how the artistic mind can express history.  It considers Pater’s ambivalent attempt to reconcile evolutionary time with psychological time in aesthetic experience, arguing that his acceptance of evolutionary time is conditioned on a reconfiguration of history into the simultaneous experience of past, present and future brought about in aesthetic experience.  
 
Pater is realistic enough to know that art cannot exist in a temporal vacuum, but idealistic enough to believe that it could redefine ourhow we experience this of time.  His writings are underpinned by his attempts to reimagine the shape of time, so that the subject’s experience of continuous time passing, moment after moment, becomes an eternal dimension.  In this endeavour, aesthetic experience is granted the potential to give the individual a sense of each moment expanding, making time into a dimension in which ‘the motives, all the interests and effects of a long history have condensed themselves and which seem to absorb past, present and future in an intense consciousness of the present’ (R 95).  And so, whilst the individual is subject to passing time, he has the creative power to redefine time; to triumph over the diachronic movement of history that betrays us to death, and puts our race firmly in its place as descended from apes.

Such an enquiry demands consideration of Pater’s conceptions of both the moment and history.  Each has received dense critical attention in the past: Peter Allan Dale, Carolyn Williams and J.B. Bullen have made significant contributions to understanding Pater’s historiography, mainly eschewing the aesthetic moment, while Lee McKay Johnson and Leon Chai have concentrated on the aesthetic moment, mainly eschewing history.​[94]​  One of the assumptions challenged here is that history and the moment may thus be discussed separately.  Our exploration of how Pater achieves this concentrates on his evocations of evolutionary history, the ephemeral moment and time as it is perceived through aesthetic experience.  In the rapture of aesthetic experience Pater’s individual’ is ‘[a]t the still point of the turning world’: not halting the moment of history but liberated from the material shackles of its conditions to experience it in an alternative state of consciousness where past, present and future inhere in each other, if only for a moment.

The four sections of this chapter may be conceived as Pater’s theses, antithesis and synthesis on the problem of time and the individual.  Section i discusses his cautious affirmation of evolutionary history as a spectacle of beauty, while section ii considers how he distances himself in various ways from the implications for the individual.  In contrast to the vast scope of evolutionary history, section iii concerns the fleeting moment.  We argue that, whilst Pater is convinced of the veracity of evolution, he challenges its marginalization of the subjective individual with his evocation of the moment of subjective, sensual perception.  In this way Pater atomizes continuous time into intense sensual moments, and thus retrieves them from the wastes of history.  Section iv discusses the Paterian moment of aesthetic perception, arguing that this is a moment of imaginative insight in which the lines between past, present and future become indistinct, and evolutionary time is reconciled with the atomistic moment in the imagination. 


i. Evolutionary time

It is in Pater’s final collection, Plato and Platonism,​[95]​ in 1894, that he draws together the ideas of evolution which had implicitly defined his thinking since his essay on ‘Coleridge’ in 1866.  Presenting evolutionary history as a confirmation of Herclitean philosophy, Pater concentrates on its abstract shape and ‘development’ as a thing of beautiful organicism, a ceaseless cycle ‘going nowhither’ but slowly degenerating.  We see that Pater captures evolution with the imagination, using metaphors and imagery, not only to create a vivid sense of it but also to assert the ultimate mastery of the imagination over it. 

Pater’s aesthetic philosophy is founded on a positive assertion that ‘[m]odern thought is distinguished from ancient by its cultivation of the “relative” spirit in place of the “absolute”’ (A 66), committing him to a vision of reality defined by indeterminacy and potential drift.  Yet ever conscious of the links between ancient and modern thought, he realizes that relativity is not wholly a modern phenomenon.  For Pater, what Darwin offers is a ‘cautiously reasoned’ expression of Heraclitus' idea of flux: ‘The entire theory of ‘development,’ in all its various phases, proved or unprovable, − what is it but old Heracliteanism awake once more in a new world, and grown to full proportions?’ (PP 10).  Pater’s own conception of evolutionary development emerges as a fusion of Heraclitean flux and evolutionary theory: a fusion, that is, of ancient and modern visions of temporal continuity. 

Evolutionary ‘development’ satisfies Pater’s admiration for reasonable or reserved behaviour, according to which ‘slow development’ (PP 11) is characterized as an organic dialectic:
           Nature, which by one law of development evolves ideas, hypotheses, modes of inward 
            life, and represses them in turn, has in this way provided that earlier growth should propel 
             its fibres into the later, and so transmit the whole of its forces in an unbroken continuity 
            of life.  Then comes the spectacle of the reserve of the elder generation exquisitely refined 
            by the antagonism of the new.  (A 65) 
Unlike the scientific language in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, this passage is no mere ‘tendency of modern thought’ (R 150): the scientific language here and the ideas it represents are fully assimilated into Pater’s perspective.  This expresses an absolute materialism, subjecting all aspects of continuity to material forces.  Moreover, this vision of development by antagonism after antagonism echoes Hegel’s conception of dialectical history.  Here too, temporal continuity is preserved by the eternal movement from thesis to antithesis.  However, Pater’s dialect is defined by two significant refusals: he rejects Hegelian metaphysics and Hegelian synthesis alike.  

The first refusal, of Hegelian metaphysics, is an implicit wider dismissal of any notion that history could be driven by metaphysical principles.  Without such a metaphysical teleology, the dialectic of development becomes continuity devoid of direction.  As though fortified by the language of science, Pater suggests an organic vision of temporal continuity in which history is defined not by teleology, or Progress of any other kind, but by a directionless modification of its present conditions.  Pater’s assertion that temporal continuity is preserved in material fibres admonishes dualistic concepts of spirit and matter, but in a quite different way to the fusion of spirit and matter suggested by his pantheism.  Here, the autonomous spiritual imagination is subjected to the material world.  The idea that continuity is given purely by material forces and therefore that memory is preserved in fibres, giving it an entirely explicable scientific basis, creates tensions with ‘that finer sort of memory’ (IP 3) discussed in chapter I.  To accept that the imagination may be reduced entirely to the physical life is to undermine the supremacy of creativity, which stands at the centre of Pater’s aesthetic.  It is to agree that we are no more than a ‘bundle of ideas’ who desires and destructs and at last dies leaving no trace.  Pater is quite clearly aware of the tension but it is insoluble.  He weighs material continuity and imaginative continuity, unable to resolve where he stands but left somewhere in between: looking one moment to the Romantic spirit, and the next to a modernity defined by science.  In this way, Pater embodies the modern individual as one in a constant state of indeterminacy, as seen in this passage from his essay ‘On Style’:
           the ornamental word, the figure, the accessory form or colour or reference, is rarely
            content to die to thought precisely at the right moment, but will inevitably linger awhile,
            stirring a long “brainwave” behind it of perhaps quite alien associations.  (A 18)
Pater’s ‘brainwave’ is a ‘lovely cross between a sound-wave and an idea, which is also a very recent word, havering between figurative and physical’ (Leighton 2007, 36).  Indeed, Pater’s havering ‘brainwave’ is both a declaration that he acquiesces to a materialistic view of the mind and a metaphorical renunciation of this in which those ‘quite alien associations’ suggest an imaginative flight of fancy that cannot be reduced to the purely materialistic. 

Pater’s second refusal in the passage above – the refusal of Hegelian synthesis – is really a positive assertion that evolution is defined by regular, ‘unbroken’ antagonisms, like Heraclitus’ conception of opposites.  Whilst Heraclitus’ doctrine of opposites ‘contains the germ of Hegel’s philosophy’ (Russell 2005, 51), they have significantly different views on the relationship of opposites.  The former proceeds as an eternal thesis-antithesis-thesis-antithesis, without synthesis.  Each object is simultaneously its own contrary, not leading to further progressive change but integrally unstable.  Thus, ‘good and ill are one’; ‘the way up and the way down is one and the same’; ‘God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger…’ (qtd Russell 2005, 51).  Pater points toward this view of opposites when he comments of man, ‘[i]t seems as if the most opposite statements about him are true’ (A 67) and it is this same conception of thesis-antithesis-thesis-antithesis that characterizes Paterian temporality with ‘unbroken continuity’ of development and repression (A 65).  We saw this eternal cycle of development and repression, development and repression in ‘Poems by William Morris’, where cultural history is figured as ‘revolt’ after ‘revolt’ (305): an epoch of spirituality is superseded by an epoch of sensuality which is in turn superseded by another epoch of spirituality, and so on for ever with no resolution.  So it is that Pater surveys the position of the individual, ‘who might seem, at least, amid the ruins of so much abstract and artificial theory, to have completed the circle, to stand again, again, in some respects, a little child, at the point at which he set out’ (AL 7).  This repetition, which presented itself as an opportunity in the context of cultural renewal through sensuality, is more ambivalent here.  The repetition of ‘again, again’ echoes through hollow time with its futility. The knowledge that history shapes itself in ceaseless cycles denies the permanence of any such renewal.  It asks us revaluate our expectations and accept that historical progress is but a myth, locating value in some ultimate goal that should rightly be implicit in the present moment.

In The Renaissance Pater speaks of ‘the grandeur of nothingness’ (R 111).  Like the beautiful pointlessness of art pour l’art, there is a certain rare beauty in historical change for its own sake.  It is quite a different echo of Darwin’s view that ‘[t]here is grandeur in the view of life’ presented by evolutionary science (1899, 403).  Pater evokes evolution as an aesthetic spectacle, dissipating its threatening immediacy and reinstating its mystery.  For Pater, this is an aesthetic grandeur made all the more beautiful because not directed to any ultimate end.  It is a dynamic grandeur that, very much like art, is for its own sake and this entrances him.  We see this in his aestheticized evocation of Herbert Spencer’s First Principles.  In this book, first published in 1863, Spencer extends the theory of evolution to society:
            …this law of organic evolution is the law of all evolution.  Whether it be in the 
           development of the Earth, in the development of Society, of Government, of 
           Manufacturers, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same advance 
           from the simple to the complex, through successive differentiation, holds uniformly.         
                                                                                                                                 (148)
Pater takes up this expansion of evolutionary theory as an aesthetic principle, commenting that ‘[r]aces, laws, arts, have their origins and end, are themselves ripples only on the great river of organic life; and language is changing on our very lips’ (PP 11).  Implicitly accepting the application of evolution to society, Pater’s metaphor transforms this multifarious, ceaseless change into an aesthetic spectacle. The metaphor of the river has several aspects.  It is, of course, an allusion to Heraclitus’ river: ‘The river where you set your foot just now is gone – those waters giving way to this, now this’ (2003, 27); so making a link between ancient and modern thought.  Or again, this image effectively evokes the grandeur of evolution and the relative insignificance of the individual as an aesthetic phenomenon, distancing its implications of our sense of self-identity.  So although in evolutionary history the individual becomes an inconsequential speck of dust, ‘just one of the possible outcomes’ of selection and development (R 150), Pater asks us to think of this only as beautiful.  Such an aestheticizing tendency is evident elsewhere as he transforms the concept of evolution into a theatrical performance when he describes the ‘great dramatic evolution’ (AL 22).  With this move, Pater takes the individual out of the vastness of history to position him as its spectator.  Metaphor reinstates the ‘strangeness’ and ‘mystery’ in which Pater delights.  It opens an ambiguity and a space to restore the imaginative potential closed down by science’s strict adherence to facts.  

The entropic echo of this cycle of nothingness emerges as the passage continues.  The ‘physical enquirer of to-day’, Pater writes, realizes that the world is
            as Heraclitus had declared (scarcely serious, he seemed to those around him) as literally in 
            constant extinction and renewal; the sun going out more gradually than the human eye; the 
            system meanwhile, of which it is the centre, in ceaseless movement nowhither.  (PP 11)
The circularity suggested by the thesis-antithesis of history is altered here by the suggestion of degeneration, coming in after the semi-colon to revise the reassurance of ‘renewal’.  The conception of circular history is superseded by a conception of history in constant degeneration.  The sun is shadowed by its gradual ‘going out’, like a light extinguished.  With this we are reminded of Pater’s spiritual light, giving this also a metaphorical significance for the extinction, too, of our belief in the spiritual.  Thus, the circle becomes a spiral of decay.  The image alludes to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, formulated by William Thompson in 1852, in which the sum of useful energy throughout the universe would be constantly reduced by diffusion of heat until all had reached a state of entropy.  But it also suggests the subversive underside of Pater’s exquisite nothingness: the nothingness of decadence that Pater was afraid to have extolled in his Renaissance Conclusion and which by the time he published the passage above in 1894 he had grown most fearful.  

In a sense, Pater screws evolutionary theory up into a ball of beautiful nothingness when he subjects it to the imagination.  He is asserting that evolution is important to him only as an aesthetic phenomenon and, with this taking refuge in subjectivity against the assaults of scientific truth.  Perhaps the entropy to which he gestures is in fact the spiral of decadence, encouraged by his own writings, and defined by the wilful aestheticization of all.  


ii. The individual and the species

When Pater turns to consider the individual, it becomes more difficult to subject evolutionary science to the imagination because this science comes to challenge the individualism on which his aesthetic is founded.   As part of an evolving species in ‘endless history’ (PP 11), the individual is subject to the ‘unbroken continuity’ of material development.  His identity is without essence because, as Pater notes, ‘Darwin and Darwinism proposes a theory in which ‘“type” itself properly is not but is only always becoming’ (PP 10).  Pater cannot reject evolution, nor would he want to, but when it comes to the individual he cannot come to terms with it either.  In three essays, ‘Coleridge’, ‘A Study of Dionysus’ and Plato and Platonism, we see how Pater distances himself from the conception of the individual presented by evolutionary science, ultimately reasserting the schism between ancient and modern thought that seemed to have been vanquished by his identification between Darwin and Heraclitus.  Far from disappearing as ‘irrelevant’ (Williams 17), the Paterian self gains a new significance under these conditions.  It becomes defined as the central site of resistance to the threat that evolution may reduce its freedom and significance. 

In the ‘infinite stages of descent’ in evolution the individual is reduced to an instance of the species, lost somewhere in time’s vast expanse.  The littleness of the individual in history’s vast scope, as well as his ‘descent’ and its implications for the (im)possibility of an afterlife, conspire against him.  Flux penetrates his body, dissipating his identity and committing him to an uncertain future.  In his essay on ‘Coleridge’ Pater uses metaphor, as he does in his contemplation of the shape of history, to aestheticize this terrifying phenomenon: 
           Man’s physical organism is played upon not only by the physical conditions about it, but 
            by remote laws of inheritance, the vibration of long-past acts in the midst of the new order 
            of things in which he lives.  When we have estimated these conditions he is not yet simple 
            and isolated; for the mind of the race, the character of age sway him this way or that 
            through the medium of language and current ideas […] he is so receptive, all the 
            influences of nature and society ceaselessly playing upon him, so that every hour in his 
            life is unique, changed altogether by a stray word, or glance, or touch.  (A 67; my italics)
Pater’s characterization takes its inspiration from the Darwinian view that the individual is ‘not a new and complete act of creation, but only an occasional scene, taken almost at hazard, in an ever slowly changing drama’ (1899, 274).  The infinite, interrelated forces of evolution are romanticized and somehow rendered beautiful by Pater’s musical metaphors.  Even so, the overall effect is ambivalent.  The identity of the individual becomes utterly dissolved by the music of time.  He becomes an instrument animated by this music as, in Pater’s vision of it, its pace accelerates from Darwin’s ‘slowly changing drama’ to something more like Ravel’s La Valse.  The music of ‘long-past acts’ and the ever-changing present oppress the individual.  These elements are insistent, as Pater’s metaphors suggest by stressing the physical vulnerability of the individual to this image.    No longer balanced by receptivity and creativity, he is ‘so receptive’ that his identity is altered by each thing he comes into contact with.  In other words, he loses his identity to the external world.

Pater is acutely aware that this integral relationship between personal identity and evolutionary history cannot be contained within metaphor.  The insistence on inheritance and change creates a tension within the extended metaphor of music, and when Pater returns to this issue twenty-seven years later it has broken free: 
           For in truth we come into the world, each one of us, “not in nakedness,” but by the natural 
            course of the organic development clothed far more completely than even Pythagoras 
            supposed in a vesture of the past, nay, fatally, shrouded, it might seem, in those laws or 
            tricks of heredity which we mistake for our own volitions.  (PP 48) 
Contrary to the dynamism that defines evolutionary history in Pater’s abstract vision, here it impedes the progress of the individual.  The outline of the individual is discernable beneath the garments of inheritance, but they condemn him to death.  He is ‘fatally shrouded’ by a history that both condemns the idea of the individual as an autonomous, spiritual being and suggests – picking up the hint that the sun is ‘going out’ -- that the ‘species’ is degenerating.  As Oscar Wilde writes, distilling Pater as often he does, ‘[h]eredity […] has hemmed us round with the nets of the hunter, and written upon the wall the prophecy of our doom’ (2001, 254).  Wilde’s (spurious) analogy between heredity and loss of freedom is critical.  Pater’s image of the individual is, indeed, an individual hemmed in and doomed by heredity.  The ‘laws or tricks of heredity’ snatch the notion of free will from the individual.  Pater cannot help a note of scepticism as he tempers the absolutism of ‘laws’ with the possibility that these might be, after all, mere ‘tricks’.  As he continues, the note of dissent comes again: 
            in the language which is more than one half of our thoughts; in the moral and mental 
            habit, the customs, the literature, the very houses which we did not make for ourselves; in 
            the vesture of a past, which is (so science would assure us) not ours, but of the race, the 
            species.  (PP 48) 
The parentheses are halting, undermining the rhetorical power of a list that with each stroke reduces the individual to merely one of a species.  This parenthetical qualification both distances Pater from its charge and interjects a note of scepticism and irony.  If the individual becomes insignificant because in this scheme of things his heritage is ignoble and God at best a precarious notion, it is not at Pater’s hands but at the hands of ‘science’.  He stands back from the fray with us, not quite ready to believe the assurances of science.  This distancing becomes characteristic of Pater’s narrative as he portrays the individual under the conditions of evolution.  Elsewhere, Pater entertains the idea that the individual can reduce evolution with words, teasing that it is ‘(perhaps only a fancy)’ (PP 22).  He is at least half serious.  

Other distancing strategies are at play when Pater addresses the contrast between ancient and modern conceptions of creation: 
            the Darwinian theory – that ‘species,’ the identifying forms of animal and vegetable life, 
            immutable though they seem now, as of old in the Garden of Eden, are fashioned by slow 
            development, while perhaps millions of years go by: well! every month is adding to its
            evidence.  (PP 11)   
Despite the tapestry of influences in Pater’s works, he so seldom encloses borrowed words and phrases in quotation marks that his care to do so here indicates uneasiness with the language of evolution.  Such unease was wholly absent from his conception of abstract organic development, suggesting that it is the move from evolution as a spectacle of beauty to evolution’s implications for the individual which is difficult.  Even as he asserts the apparent truth of evolution, he seems unable to believe in it.  After all, belief is not a recognition that something is factually true, but an identification of one’s self with that truth so that it saturates one’s view of being.  This is what is missing from Pater’s presentation of the individual in evolution.  His parentheses and speech marks create a duality within the narrative, in which the assertion of evolutionary theory is undercut by doubt, incredulity and even the hope that it is not so.  

This suggestion is supported in the passage above by the dichotomy between the Darwinian individual and the God-ordained beings of the Garden of Eden.  With this we begin to see the schism reopen between ancient and modern thought, a tendency that is exacerbated as Pater considers evolution in contrast to ancient Greek conceptions of the individual.  Alluding to Darwin’s concept of natural selection, Pater presents ‘abstract humanity’, ‘making use of and casting aside in its march, the souls of countless individuals, as Pythagoras supposed the individual soul to cast aside again and again its outworn body’ (PP 49).  The formal similarity between the theories of Pythagoras and modern science marks the revolution from Pythagoras’ idea of an eternal soul to the de-individuated ‘species’ of Darwin, as the essence of selfhood is transferred from an immutable soul to a body that will die.  The repetition of ‘again and again’ signals a cycle, once more, but this time the individual is at its centre; not watching the spectacle from a safe distance but defined completely by it.  This parallels the individual in the Conclusion to The Renaissance, who is defined by ‘birth and gesture and death’ (R 150); a degenerative cycle that is internalized to become ‘the whirlpool […] still more rapid, the flame more eager and devouring’ (R 151), and does so in order to expand this degenerative cycle to the scale of the whole species.  The individual is powerless against this unceasing, unsentimental march and one may hears echoes of Tennyson’s tortured evocation of cruel Nature: ‘So careful of the type she seems,/ So careless of the single life’ (lines 1047-48, 231).  In this context, perhaps we could think again about the significance of Pater’s young ill-fated protagonists.  In the context of the ailing body untimely death seemed to release the individual from terminal decline.  However, in terms of evolution, it illustrates the cruelty and carelessness of nature, ‘casting aside in its march’ Florian, Marius, Sebastian, Watteau, Duke Carl, Emerald Uthwart and the others of Pater’s young protagonists: all dead in the flower of their youth. 

The schism between ancient and modern views of the individual suggests an alternative vision to Pater, as he looks to the ancients to find a way to regain a sense what the individual could be.  He explains this a little more in ‘A Study of Dionysus’: 
           The body of man, indeed, was for the Greeks, still the genuine work of Prometheus; the 
            connection with earth and air asserted in many a legend, not shaded down, as with us, 
            through innumerable stages of descent, but direct and immediate; in precise contrast to our 
            physical theory, which never seems to fade, dream over it as we will, out in the light of 
            common day.  (GS 27)
The modern individual is a beleaguered shadow of Promethean Man, and the narrative shift from impersonal third person to inclusive first person in this passage gives immediacy to the implications of this.  The allusion to Darwin’s Descent of Man foregrounds the sharp contrasts between the divine man of the Greeks and Darwinian man: evolved, descended down from apes, still bearing the traces of his ignoble ancestry.  The term ‘descent’ becomes extended to suggest that the individual has been cast down from the Heavens by making him subject to evolution.  Prometheus, by contrast, extricates the individual from the ravages of history and ennobles him.  For, in classical mythology, Prometheus created man ‘immediately’ when, in defiance of Jupiter, he modelled man out of clay, stole fire and took it to earth to give artistic creativity to Man.  The passage above develops this Romantic notion into an alternative conception of continuous time, located not in material evolution but in the imagination where the individual is autonomous and unique: ‘Their story went back, as they believed, with unbroken continuity, and in the very places where their later life was lived, to a past, stretching beyond, yet continuous with, actual memory, in which the heaven and earth mingled…’ (GS 27).  Although the ‘physical theory’ of evolution ‘never seems to fade, dream over it as we will, out of the light of common day’, the Greeks’ mythologized, organic relationship between Man and the earth offers itself as a nostalgic relief from this reality.  Once again, the imagination becomes central to one’s sense of self.  Only, here, this ‘dream’ does not replace reality, as ‘that finer sort of memory’ may replace continuous consciousness in ‘The Child in the House’; it offers only momentary relief from insistent evolution.  

One must look to Pater’s ‘Aesthetic Life’ to see him wax more positive about how the individual may deal with modern conceptions of time.  He writes:
          Space and time, though if infinite, are still drearily mechanical space and time, with their 
           hard successing of phenomena, and leave the pe conscious individual, the personal 
           organism, a somewhat hopeless being, calling on upon Heaven no longer, only bracing 
           himself to face with what stoicism he may the actual circumstances of his condition.  (3)
Pater pictures the organic individual as a victim of human aspirations, oppressed by a mechanized, modern world.  In particular, ‘drearily mechanical space and time’ alludes to the mechanisms of public clock time that would become increasingly at odds with the personal experience of time in early modernist works.  There is an ironic tragedy about a ‘progress’ which alienates the individuals who trusted it to yield knowledge and a better quality of life. It is the disillusionment of the imagination that oppresses the Paterian individual, as though by capturing these formerly infinite and mysterious qualities, technology has uncovered a terrible truth about our being: its explicability.  In contrast to mechanical space and time, Pater reassures himself with the repetition of ‘the conscious individual, the personal organism’; this seems to confirm the entity of the self, stood firm and whole in the midst of infinite time and space.  The individual is crucial here, standing at the centre as a site of resistance to their assault.  If Pater presents a regretful image of this stoic yet ‘hopeless being,’ at the same time he opens the possibility that if the individual could again take possession of space and time from the oppressive mechanisms that define them, he would be empowered.  The endeavour to redefine the terms of modernity by looking to the history of ideas has emerged as a recurrent concern in Pater’s work. One is reminded of his charge that empirical philosophy has ‘narrowed the spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ (AL 2) and the way he looks back to the ‘older and more spiritual philosophy’ of pantheism (GS 95), or the apocryphal anecdotes about his views on the fate of university education.  There is, in each case, a sense that values have been eroded in the modern world.  Such is the classic claim of the conservative – but then on many fronts Pater was indeed a conservative, often resistant to reform (Gosse 258). 

Although he  gestures to ‘drearily mechanical space and time,’ hereafter physical space is notable in his writings only by its absence.  In his own life Pater walled out public space, preferring intimate personal and institutionalized spaces: ‘[his] real home was in his rooms at Brasenose, where he passed a quiet, cloistered, and laborious existence, divided between his college duties and his books’ (Gosse 259).  In his narratives, space is dissolved into a shapeless, imaginative realm.  It is our sense of time that he perceives to be threatened.  As he comes to consider the implications of evolutionary time for the individual, then, he becomes disillusioned with it and even sceptical of it.  Evolutionary time threatens the individual in two central ways.  First, it takes away one’s freedom by seeming to determine the self by heredity and external conditions.  Secondly, it threatens the imagination with its suggestion that it may explicate all that had once been mysterious; all areas in which the imagination once had free rein.  The individual is marginalized.  The question left by this scene is how exactly Pater might deliver the ‘somewhat hopeless being’ from evolutionary and mechanized time to regain a sense of his individuality.  


iii. ‘A moment – and the thing has vanished…’

Don’t you understand that the moment would not take on such incomparable vividness, if it were not thrown up, so to speak, on the dark background of death?​[96]​

Pater’s conception of the moment challenges the reduction both of the individual to a ‘species’ and of the unique moment to nothingness amidst ‘endless’ history.  The moment prioritizes one’s internal sense of time over the external scientific conception of evolutionary history, understanding that ‘subjective time-consciousness defies analysis, measurement; contracting and expanding at will, mingling before and after without ordered sequence’ (Hamilton Buckley, 8).  He who was shrunken to a speck by Darwinian evolution now comes to the fore as the moment – a minute unit in those ‘innumerable stages of descent’ – is explored through the subjectivity of the individual.  With his concept of the moment, Pater prioritizes the smallest unit of time and consciously foregrounds the subjective view of the individual over the objective grand scale of natural science.  This is not to invalidate science but to recover within it the significance of concrete, sensual moments of personal experience.  It emerges in Pater’s thought from the very different schools of Romanticism to assuage the blows dealt to the individual by evolution. There are echoes of Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’, Goethe’s Augenblick​[97]​ and, of course, most contemporaneously, Baudelaire’s transient, evanescent moment.  This section discusses the concept of the moment as it emerges in The Renaissance to inform Pater’s later writings, considering its immutable and potentially transgressive character and the way it is implicated in continuous time as a relic in the memory.  

Whilst continuous time defines the physical world and flows through the individual with fleeting impressions, subjective perception atomizes this into clear, distinct moments.  The issue is abstractly put in the Conclusion to The Renaissance:
            Each of [the impressions of the individual mind] is limited by time, and … as time is 
            infinitely divisible, each of them is divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single 
            moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it 
            has ceased to be than that it is.  To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on 
            the stream, to a single sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of 
            such moments gone by, what is real in our life fines itself down.  (R 151)
There is a sense in which the atomism of time ‘scatters the core self in pieces’ (Leighton 2007, 91) especially amidst the bewildering flow of impressions and theories that come to assail him in this first part of the Conclusion to The Renaissance.  However, one must always bear in mind that it is the mere ‘tendency of modern thought’ of which Pater speaks here (R 150). Taking these views to be Pater’s own has become the most common error in studies of Pater (Williams 27).  With this in mind, there is another sense in which the discrete moment is the genesis of Pater’s reconception of the individual, developed in the second part of the Conclusion – from the Novalis quotation (R 152) – as Pater’s revaluation of the individual builds itself around the intense experience of the single moment.  Atomistic and fluid conceptions of time are reconciled here as Pater suggests that the mind of the individual perceives ‘the single moment’ within time’s stream.  Atomistic time is defined by sensual impressions, just as sensual impressions are defined by the flow of time, which leaves each one almost immediately in the past.  The power of the individual lies in the ability to divide time down to the smallest units of experience, defining within it a moment of significance, held in the memory against the flood.  This ‘brief interval’, poised between present and future, is a moment when reflection is suspended in willing surrender to beauty. 

One could almost miss the description of the moment in this passage as ‘a relic’, but it is crucial.  Angela Leighton has argued that amidst the constant flow of time Pater salvages ‘relics’ of the past, which become memento mori, reminding us too that the decayed body will become a relic of that which was our life, when our time has run its course (2007, 93ff).  This is a useful concept, and when one begins to look for relics in Pater’s writings they appear in several forms.  In her recent book, On Form, Leighton defines the Paterian relic in terms of Duke Carl of Rosenmold. But this may also help us to understand the reappearances of Venus and Dionysus in the modern world and in terms of personal experience, and the fleeting sensual moment as it returns again and again in the memory.  Pater’s moments are relics in the memory; nostalgic longing for the moment is integral to their being, because of each moment ‘it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is.’ (R 151).  For this reason, the absence of the moment is as important as the moment itself.  By definition it occurs at the self-conscious interface between now and the future.  It is poised on the cusp of the dialectical move from what is to what is not.  It is only possible to recognize, or at least to express, the moment in retrospect because the intensity of the sensual experience – in a state of pure receptivity -- leaves no space within it for reflection.  The moment is implicated in the time continuum because it is expressible only in retrospect and it may only be comprehended, as the extract above suggests, by its contrast to the ‘stream’ of time.  

The moment is necessarily ephemeral for the very reason that its being is defined in this temporal space that is conscious of nothing except now.  The Conclusion meditates on this: ‘With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch’ (R 152).  Though Pater’s Conclusion itself embodies the spirit of the moment, expiring too soon at the height of its intensity, it is not of course the end of the matter.  For all that Pater imagines the possibility of unreflective sensation, he is unable to realize this.  That ‘cogitating spirit’ bids him to return again and again to theories, unable to complete them but finding time still to wonder about how far they explain modernity.  The final sentences of ‘Joachim du Bellay’ illustrate these qualities:
            A sudden light transfigures some trivial thing, a weather-vane, a windmill, a winnowing 
            fan, the dust in the barn door.  A moment – and the thing has vanished, because it was 
            pure effect; but it leaves a relish behind it, a longing that the accident may happen again.            
                                                                                                                                           (R 113)
The weather-vane, windmill and winnowing fan are cumulative metonyms for moving, passing, ephemeral time.  The transfiguration of this mobility into ‘a moment’ is not, therefore, the halting of time.  Its ‘effect’ takes place very much within continuous time which moving on and on leaves it behind in the past in just an instant.  This occurs within the space denoted by the dash: uncapturable.  Pater captures the feeling that we each experience, unexpected, when a sense of the singular beauty of the present moment becomes so intensely felt that it brims inside with the sense that its ‘brief interval’ has expanded.  The phenomenon of the moment presents two main issues: the potentiality of the moment and its significance in retrospect, in the context of continuous time.  

Pater’s presentation of Giorgione’s Fête Champêtre​[98]​ vividly evokes the transgressive potentiality of this transitory moment.  This painting, which Pater would probably have seen on one of his visits to the Louvre, shows two men rapt in ‘the musical intervals of our existence’ (R 96).  It is in that state of heightened aesthetic awareness that the figures in these paintings stand ‘with intent faces […] to detect the smallest sound, the smallest undulation in the air’ (R 96).  The two central figures in the pastoral scene are young men rapt in music and gazing with slight embarrassment and a hint of blush into each other’s eyes.  As they sit amidst park scenery with bodies turned towards each other they make a separate space, intimately their own.  Spatial disjunction comes to stand for the sense of temporal pause.  Pater draws on classical Arcadian ideals with images of ‘rustic buildings, the choice grass, the grouped trees, the undulations deftly economised for graceful effect’ and ‘blent with the music of the pipes’ (R 97).  The traditional pipe music of Arcadia is the catalyst of this harmonious scene and, with this, Pater evokes the central and eternally seductive characteristic of classical Arcadia: sexual freedom.  Autonomy from moral strictures against male-male desire is granted by the autonomous physical location of this place and the alternative mode of consciousness created by its music.​[99]​ They are apparently oblivious to the two naked women who flank them, but the nakedness of these women offers the possibility of sexual freedom to the clothed men.  In all this, the figures of the men are encapsulated in a moment of rapt indeterminacy when no transgression has yet taken place but where the air of the place is electrified by their mutual attraction, forever captured at the interval where action is undetermined.  This is the moment.  It brims with possibilities, perhaps unrealizable possibilities, that for the brief interval of undetermined action are at least imaginable. As with the narrative desire for those idealized Greek statues, here sexual desire is paused into an eternal moment of indeterminacy, liberating them from the reality principle which begs desires to be acted out and bodies to be touched.  It promises that ‘There will be time to murder and create’, before snatching it away in the next moment.  After all Arcadia is ephemeral.  The town rising up in the background of Giorgione’s painting symbolizes the fact that these moments of freedom must give way to the insistent realities of society and the epigraph to ‘Winckelmann’, in the next Renaissance essay, retroactively heightens this sense of brevity: ‘et ego in Arcadia fui.’​[100]​  This brevity is essential to the moment, as we have noted, and in this moment captured by Giorgione and Pater one sees most clearly the links between it and death and love.  Or again, in ‘The Child in the House’ it is a significant stage in Flavian’s development when he realizes ‘the desire of physical beauty mingleth itself early [with] the fear of death – the fear of death intensified by the desire for beauty’ (IP 13).  This sensibility defines the moment, which is conceived in anticipation of its immediate dissolution.  If the rapture of the moment knows nothing else, it knows at least its own finitude.  And so it is to be expected that eros would become identified with the moment as in Fête Champêtre.  Eros exists for Pater as a revelry in the still space between now and the future: ‘Such loves were too fragile and adventurous to last more than for a moment’ (WM 302).  It is not exactly love itself that is fragile; it is the moment that is fragile and, as it breaks to bring forth the next moment and the next, so it breaks the rapture of love that is preserved within it.  In Pater’s scheme of things and for the sake of ‘reserve’ of course, the moment would have to be finite; for if prolonged this state of unreflective revelry would be tantamount to Dionysian frenzy.  

Preserved in memory and set against an ever-changing present, the relics of such moments are subsumed into a continuum of time that belongs to the individual alone.  Yet their existence in the memory is ambivalent.  Like the relic of Dionysus returned to the modern world, the relic of the moment affects the present in both positive and negative ways.  Alluding to Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’ in the Prelude, Pater first suggests that the moment is formative to one’s self-identity:
          a special day or hour even comes to have for him a personal identity, a spirit or angel 
           given to it, by which, for its exceptional insight, or the happy light upon it, it has a 
	presence in one’s history, and acts there, as a separate power or accomplishment […] in these ‘particular spots’ of time.  (A 45-46)
The moment is where ‘spirit’ transforms itself into ‘insight’ and again into a power that brings it into the present like a haunting.  Infused with ‘longing’, but also with the imagination of nostalgia, the moment is crystallized so that as all changes constantly in the world outside, it affirms one’s continuous identity.  

Unlike Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’ which weave themselves into the fabric of one’s unconscious self, Pater’s moments are willed into the present by the subject.  Pater aestheticizes Darwinian selection with his conviction that the individual must be discerning (R 152).  This is expanded when he evokes the aesthete ‘at the centre of the modern world, in what may seem at once the most typical yet aesthetically the least promising scene of its activity in London’.  If man is to lead an aesthetically promising life in the modern milieu, Pater continues, ‘one thing is plain […] he will largely have to apply the faculty of selection’ (AL 14).​[101]​  This process of ‘ignoring or forgetting’ (AL 14) is like an aesthetic selection process that suggests one may exert control over the memory of the past; like Pope’s ‘eternal sunshine of the spotless mind’, where one can rewrite the past and exert one’s power over it as though to countermand its ultimate mastery over us.  ‘ “The artist,” says Schiller, “may be known rather by what he omits”; and in literature too, the true artist may be best recognised by his tact of omission’” (A 18). The way that Pater adapts Darwin’s principle dissipates its threat to the individual.  It wraps Darwinism into Paterianism; if not neatly, then at least enough to cover its implications superficially, putting it into the service of the aesthetic.​[102]​   

In ‘The History of Philosophy’, Pater suggests photography as a darker metaphor for the preservation of the moment in present, continuous time: 
            the kind of poetry represented by Homer found in that age their happiest opportunity in 
            the directness of its vision, its capacity to receive as it were the photographic outline of 
            the object before it, whether of the hero and his great action, or of the bird in the leaves of 
            the tree.  (HP 2-3)
To an extent it is jarring to read Pater figuring literary art through photography.  Quite apart from the fact that photography would come to utterly redefine the neo-Romantic aesthetic he pursues, to the best of my knowledge this is the sole reference to modern technology in Pater’s oeuvre.  Like an intrusion from some other space and time, the photograph serves to stress the artificiality of the relic of a moment, preserved against time in the ever-changing present.  The spatial quality of ‘the photographic outline’ contrasts with the temporality of Homer’s poetry or the hero’s action in the world to define the ‘intense immobility’ (Barthes 49) of the moment as it captures it.  ‘Pater continually associates immobility with death’ (Shuter 1997, 14), and as the passage continues the immobility of the moment in the memory threatens the living individual: 
           [Goethe] hints at the practicability of regaining just that state of unsuspecting receptivity 
            of mind by an artificial act of reflection in which, by a sort of suicide, an all-accomplished 
            philosophy, completing the circle, is to put one back into the state it had already   
            superseded.  (HP 3)                                                                                                                                        
The relic here becomes a curse. Although the statement is slightly unsure of itself, it is uncharacteristically blunt amidst the ‘blitheness and repose’.  Time-present would have to sever its own life-force of continuous development to return to that which is past, as though ‘the return of the dead’ in photography is here inverted and we, the living, choose death.  This is significant because it indicates that we as individuals must cast ourselves into moving time, not dwelling in the past and wishing for an eternity that cannot be.  This metaphor puts one in mind of the mention of suicide in Plato and Platonism cited in chapter II: ‘that union with God which can only be attained by the literal negation of self, by a kind of moral suicide’ (25).​[103]​  As in Plato and Platonism Pater identifies the location of value beyond the individual in the present moment as self-negating.  And just as his idea of individuality is based on the relocation of spirit and self-worth from God to the individual, so it is based on centring one’s identity in the now.  

Pater’s moment recentres time around the individual by looking back from the age of evolutionary science to a Romantic vision of time.  In intense contrast to the impersonal spectacle of evolutionary history or the pernicious marginalization of the individual in evolutionary history, the experience of the moment empowers the individual.  Yet this is an ambivalent empowerment.  It asserts the significance of the individual in the moment and their potentiality to transcend the ordinary conditions of existence, only to declare that this moment is fleeting and that one must constantly move forward into the future.  The only answer to ever-shifting modernity is to constantly create one’s self anew, for with each new moment the individual must recreate himself to affirm his identity.   Pater must find a means to fuse continuous time with the reaffirmation.  He looks for this, of course, in aesthetic contemplation. 




iv. The aesthetic moment

In a poem written in the summer of 1858, just before he went up to Oxford, Pater asks with fearful innocence, ‘Where are the dead?’ (Wright I, 136)​[104]​.  In his mature works it is his inability to answer this question which leads him to consider how it is possible to live under the sentence of death-eternal, through the qualitatively different sense of eternity offered by aesthetic experience.  The effect is that, like the pantheist spirit in ‘Giordano Bruno’, the individual finds himself in the aesthetic moment ‘at every moment of infinite time, in every atom of matter, at every point of infinite space, ay!’ (235-6).  Pater conceives aesthetic experience as the reconciliation of passing time with the atomized moment; which also reconciles evolution with his Romantic idea of the moment.  This section explores how Pater refigures the shape of time through art from several perspectives: the way that he subjects history to the realm of art in theory, presenting linear history as a quasi-Nietzschean Eternal Return, is illustrated by the ekphrastic evocation of La Gioconda, and with this in mind we will consider how Pater’s own writing embodies this Eternal return by its aspiration to ‘the condition of music’ (R 86). 

Aesthetic contemplation interjects itself into continuous time in a qualitatively different way from the sensual moment discussed in the last section.  It is the simultaneous experience of past, present and future, captured within the ephemeral moment.  Here, ‘at the still point of the turning world’, these ‘exquisite pauses in time’ (R 96) fuse the dimensions of time within the moment.  This aesthetic consciousness is an implicit acceptance of our place in ‘endless history’, conditioned on the creative perceiving individual so as to privilege the subjective moment even as it accepts its inconsequence.  Aesthetic perception spiritualizes the shape of evolutionary history into a finite moment of past, present and future or development, extinction and renewal.  Art offers to expand the interval of each moment as it passes by refiguring the shape of time, so that it is perceived not as a vast continuous flow or as a series of discrete moments. Rather, it is a reflective space created in the imagination where past, present and future inhere simultaneously in now.  Perhaps Pater articulates this most clearly when he ponders that ‘those strange reminiscences and forebodings, which seem to make our lives stretch before and behind us, beyond where we can see or touch anything, trace the lines of connection […] One day, perhaps, we may come to forget the distant horizon [of eternity], with full knowledge of the situation, to be content with “what is here and now”’ (A 54; 104).  In this way, the ‘relic’ is restored to life as the unity between these spheres of time, and is intensely realized through the imagination.  This experience is the sublimated realization of evolutionary time condensed in the imagination.​[105]​ 

This idea is founded on a reconception of the relationship between art and history.  Pater is dissatisfied with conventional history writing as it relates to art, and equally with art as it portrays history.  History writing amongst his contemporaries, he complains, is ‘a literary domain where the imagination may be thought to be always an intruder’ (A 9).  He suggests that the historian should celebrate his creative power to select and interpret facts; he is, in other words, to write history on aesthetic criteria, so that it ‘comes not of the world without but of a vision within’ (A 9).  This ‘vision within’ is, by any other name, the artistic imagination; the power of personal creativity is asserted over objective truths.  For Pater’s aspiration is not objectivity but an ‘imaginative sense of fact’ (A 8).  Thus he continues: 
            Gibbon […] Livy, Tacitus, Michelet, moving full of poignant sensibility amid the 
            records of the past, each after his own sense, modifies – who can tell where and to what 
            degree? – and becomes something else than a transcriber; each as he thus modifies passing 
            into the domain of art proper.  (A 9) 
Likewise, Pater’s pen ‘modifies’ or dissolves the Renaissance into an amorphous spirit to create his Renaissance.  J. B. Bullen goes further by recognizing that ‘historiography […] is an integral act of self-expression,’ with the historical Renaissance ‘intimately linked to a personal renaissance, and a process of self-discovery’ (156; 159). 

With the imagination at the centre of the universe, subjective time-consciousness comes to reshape linear history.  The moment of aesthetic contemplation is the consciousness of oneself as integral in a long history, only this history is reconfigured around the self.  It is aestheticized so that the past, present and future of ‘endless history’ exist now, at once, simultaneously: 
[There are] profoundly significant and animated instants, a mere gesture, a look, a smile, perhaps – some brief and wholly concrete moment -- into which […] all the motives, all the interests and effects of a long history have condensed themselves, and which seem to 
            absorb past and future in an intense consciousness of the present.  (R 95) 
Pater attempts to reconcile temporal movement with the apparent stasis of the ‘concrete moment.’  His evocation of the ephemeral nature of each moment in time, suggested by those ‘animated instants’, is subverted into a quite other conception of how time moves by the end of this passage.  The ‘concrete moment’ at first seems to be a manifestation of the fleeting or instant, but it is transformed in the second part of the sentence; first because it assumes subjectivity, and secondly because, through this, it becomes pregnant with the past and future.  These moments are imbued with a temporal depth which spans beyond the fleeting now, to include within it past and future.  As continuous time slips by, impermanent, the moment that remains seems to create a space or a dimension in which past, present and future coexist.  It instantiates the Leibnizian model of Eternal Return as evoked by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: ‘Still! Still! Did not the world become perfect just now?  Did time perhaps fly away?  Did I not fall? Did I not fall – listen! – into the well of eternity’ (1982, 388-9).  As Pater suggests, this experience is not metaphysical; it is, rather, located in an ‘intense consciousness’ provoked by aesthetic experience.  The refraction of time through the aesthetic moment is an experience catalysed by art, but it is one that occurs in the imagination of the spectator.  The decentring of aesthetic judgement from the objective critic to the subject is redolent in these passages.  Indeed, the paintings become absorbed into the imagination so that their outlines are merged into a single fragmented impression.  Liberated from the relentless forward movement of the ticking of the clock, time seems to stop.  This is the moment of aesthetic consciousness, which really is an ‘exquisite pause[s] in time […] which [is] like some consummate extract of the quintessence of life’ (R 96).  The aesthetic moment loosens objective facts, linearity and values into the realms of the imagination, where it serves the present by quickening our sense of ourselves.  

This view challenges the cowed image of the individual in evolutionary time.  If the Paterian individual is still held captive in continuous time as this writes itself on the body, he is at least ‘aware in that suffering body of such vivid powers of mind and sense’ that captivity no longer matters (M, I, 219).  This dualism sets the imagination free of corporeal constraints, allowing the possibility that it may inhabit a separate sphere of time to the ill-fated body.  So whilst we remain subject to the ravages of time as it passes, defining and ultimately extinguishing us, we each have agency to reshape time with the imagination.

Pater’s climactic assertions leave off before explicit explanation, themselves becoming heightened moments which – when one looks closely – contain within them their own explanation of that which came before and that which is to follow.  His impression of La Gioconda is the most pertinent example.  She is ‘a specifically embodied “figure” of the trans-historical Geist, the over-arching unity-of-development beyond figuration, the point of view from which all specific figures are merely “phrases” in the same expression’ (Williams 116).  The figure of Mona Lisa is symbolic of an alternative, figurative conception of historical time, embodying reconciliation of history with the present.  The painting is framed by remarks on its legends, its creation, its significance in Leonardo’s oeuvre and its history (Williams 117).  Within this familiar frame, the dynamic between history and the present is refigured as Pater re-imagines the painting and his narrative progresses from attention to material details to a dreamy reverie.  It begins as ‘Leonardo’s masterpiece, the revealing instance of his mode of thought and work’ (R 79) and Pater suggests that her beauty emanates from an evolutionary inheritance as he describes ‘the thoughts and experience of the world etched and moulded’ on her body (R 80).  Mona Lisa symbolizes the privileged and troubled position of the modern individual, described in ‘The Aesthetic Life’: ‘She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave…’ (R 80).  The vampiric Lady Lisa embodies the cycles of historic time and biographical time in one moment of aesthetic experience.  She is Pater’s modern temporal spin on the old fancy ‘of a perpetual life, sweeping together ten thousand experiences’ (R 80).  It is in this way that she ‘might stand as the embodiment of the old fancy, the symbol of the modern idea’ (R 80).  In sharp contrast to Pater’s relics she is the living embodiment of humanity’s history and our organic connection with it.  Her form is ‘wrought out from within upon the flesh, the deposit, little cell by cell of strange thoughts and fantastic reveries and exquisite passions’ (R 80).  Wilde understood the dimensions of evolutionary theory in Pater’s Mona Lisa and consciously evokes this as he writes of the effects of heredity: 
           it is not our own life that we live, but the lives of the dead, and the soul that dwells within 
           us is no single spiritual entity, making us personal and individual, created for our service, 
           and entering into us for our joy.  It is something that has dwelt in fearful places, and in 
           ancient sepulchres has made its abode.  It is sick with many maladies, and has memories of 
           curious sins.  (2001; 255)    

Pater’s La Gioconda illustrates that his vision is modernist in its structure but quintessentially Victorian in its scope.  The past encapsulated in the aesthetic moment is not just the past of one’s own memory – as in the relic of the sensual moment – but the history of the world.  His aesthetic moment extends far beyond the personal realm of subjective experience and memory that was to bound the scope of the past for, say, Woolf and Proust, or which defined his own idea of the moment as a relic of personal memory.  Pater’s ‘consummate moments’ of aesthetic experience span the centuries with a Victorian conceit that he will nonetheless play his part in diminishing. This is intimately related to Pater’s view of historical consciousness in his age:
           precisely in the effect of time, of long centuries, since nothing seems to be without its 
           compensation [modern man] has also the aesthetic opportunity of our generation.  He has 
           The son of the age has had the privilege of the elder brother and in becoming a scholar 
           with and possesses the touchstones[,] its sense of periods [,] the authorities[,] the critical 
           instincts of his scholarship[,] its sense of periods and their affinities.  This faculty is has as 
           refined itself by long usage.  (AL 16)
This magisterial view of history distinguishes the modern individual from those of the past.  The analogy between this sensibility and the aesthetic moment is indicated as Pater calls it ‘the aesthetic opportunity of our generation’ – no doubt because such a sensibility expands the horizon of the creative imagination.  ‘That historic sense’ (AL 21), which Pater conceives as a distinctly modern phenomenon, challenges facile attempts to read Paterian aestheticism as the liberation of art from the conditions of the world.  

With this context we may return to Pater’s comments at the end The Renaissance: 
            we are all under sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve […] Some 
            spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least 
            among ‘the children of this world,’ in art and song.  For our one chance lies in 
            expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given 
            time.  (R 153)  
The ‘interval’ and the ‘quickened, multiplied consciousness’ are the eternal moment created by art.  As continuous time slips by, impermanent, its brief intervals seem to be expanded for us because each contains within it our ‘intense consciousness’ of past, present and future.  The aesthetic moment may be understood as a point where time expands vertically through each of the spheres of past, present and future so that it is made whole.  It is a panacea for Pater’s fear that when an experience has passed it exists only as a relic or, going further, that it is forever extinguished.  For this suggests that a moment is not extinguished with its passing, but that it lingers on in the imagination or perhaps even as a spirit in the world, resonating through the next moment and the next, enriching and expanding each with its echoes.  Quantitative life-eternal is replaced with a qualitative eternity. And so, as time moves on, each moment is saturated with all that has gone before and all that might be.  Time past is not ‘history’ but a constant present. 

Like Pater’s individual, his prose is bound in continuous time but aspires beyond this to create an imaginative dimension of time.  Certainly, ‘historical time as well as clock time, runs through [Pater’s] form, making it, as in so many previous formulations, an idea on the move’ (Leighton 2007, 78).  The sinuous musicality of his sentences echo the temporal consciousness of modernity, which is why he believed the essay to be the ‘characteristic literary type of our time’ (PP 120).  ‘His own style,’ Leighton argues, ‘flows like the stream he describes, taking the subject away from itself, on a journey of shifting, wandering clauses, which end up, not saving but losing the thing in question’ (2007, 90).  Like Heraclitus’ stream, Pater’s prose constantly shifts in linear time, without concrete presence, and ultimately leaves us with nothing but the impression of its form.  This appraisal of Paterian style maps onto the image of continuous time proposed by evolution, definitive of modernity and implicit in the fleeting moment.  

An ambiguity in the epigraph to the Conclusion to The Renaissance can expand these concerns.  Jowett embodies the critical consensus in translating this as ‘All things are in motion and nothing at rest,’ which in the context of the Conclusion reiterates the now familiar analogy between movement and the passing of time.  But as Adam Phillips notes, in Plato and Platonism Pater renders this as ‘All things give way: nothing remaineth’ (Phillips 174, n150).  In the space between these interpretations motion becomes entropic with the relentless linear movement of time realizing in the end that dust and ashes are all there is.  When the subject is positioned at the centre of moving time, the excitement that defined transition is tempered by a sense of loss.  The last words of Epicurus in Pater’s translation resonate in the final words of the Conclusion: ‘For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake’ (R 153).  Like the nothingness left by Epicurean flux and history’s ‘ceaseless movement whither’, the assertion of art for art’s sake wraps art into ‘nothing’: ‘That “nothing” is both significant, and significant of nothing […] Signifying nothing, like significant form, keeps signification in view while also emptying it of matter, and of mattering too much’ (Leighton 2007, 20).  The nothingness left by passing time and the nothingness of art frame the Conclusion, and in the movement between them this void is transfigured into ‘the sentiment of the grandeur of “nothingness”’ (R 111).  Of course, this grandeur resides in the understanding that it is not really nothing.  If, at the end, the reader is left with no moral truths, no definitive ‘renaissance’, no God, no stability, still one is not left with a sense of nothingness.  Pater’s wandering prose contains within it a sense of eternity.  

One solution to time might be music.  George Moore suggests that if Pater ‘had lived to hear L’après-midi d’un Faune, he could not have done else but to think that he was listening to his own prose’ (187).  As his prose itself ‘aspires to the condition of music’ (R 86), like Debussy’s impressionistic poem for orchestra it alters the experience of continuous time.  Pater writes history like an impressionist composer, choosing notes and intervals ‘according to his own peculiar sense of fact.’  In writing The Renaissance his pen dissolves this period into an amorphous spirit which diffuses through the centuries from twelfth century France to eighteenth century Germany. For Pater, on the one hand ‘a musical composition possesses a certain concentration of all its parts, a simple continuity’ whilst at the same time its perfection comes from its ‘unity of impression’ (A 202; 203).  This conception, articulated in the early 1870s, anticipates ‘Impressionism’ in music.  It was in Pater’s twilight years that Debussy’s first pieces of this kind were written, with their short repeated melodies dissipating the classic symphony’s structure of progression into a single impression.  But his is the same idea: even as seconds, minutes and hours progress, we as creative individuals may unify time into an intense experience of the present, aesthetic moment.  Each aesthetic moment contains within it the echoes of the past and anticipations of the future.  It is a continuous, yet unified series of impressions, revisions and reiterations, like the sonata heard by Swann in In Search of Lost Time, as it ‘opened and expanded his soul,’ reappearing ‘to remain poised in the air, and to sport there for a moment, only, as though immobile, and shortly to expire’ (Proust I, 250; 251).  This is distinct from the ephemeral moment discussed above, because it is an organic part of the past and future.  

Pater is uncharacteristically vehement in his criticism of Coleridge.  In his eponymous essay, he argues that Coleridge’s poetry suffers because ‘he hungered for eternity’ (A 104).  Yet Pater cannot give up eternity either; he just defines it differently.  Instead of thinking of eternity in terms of continuous time, so that it is the continuation of linear time without end, eternity is located in the perception of each ephemeral moment.  Whilst Pater’s prose art flows on and on, as an analogue to continuous time it creates eternal vistas within itself.  This parallels Pater’s spiritual pantheism. As chapter ii noted, having disposed of God at that point, Pater looks for infinite spirit in finite matter; and similarly, having lost faith in eternal life, he seeks to imbue eternal time into the finite moment.  The intensely personal and private moment of aesthetic contemplation yields a universal understanding as the mind traverses the centuries

In this way, Pater finds his own solution to the quintessentially late-Victorian concern to reconcile synchronic and diachronic time.  James Mussell suggests this tendency in the periodical press: ‘While each number is directed towards its own moment, however conceived, serial articles look both forwards and backwards beyond its own confines’ (1).  And the particularly Victorian concern with ekphrasis bridges from the spatial, atemporal art of painting to the temporal art of prose.  


v. Conclusions

Pater’s conception of evolutionary time is defined by engagement, resistance and reinterpretation.  Evolution is not a sudden terror for him because he can see its precedents in Heraclitus.  It is felt, rather, as a dull reality nagging at the inward-facing individual and taunting him with the unthinkable truth that he is just one of a species, made insignificant by those ‘innumerable stages of descent.’   PaterPater does not reject the veracity of evolutionary theory but it does not speak to his condition; he clearly accepts its terms but it is never properly confronted in his prose on its own objective, material terms.  Rather  In part evolution is not a sudden terror for Pater, because he can see its precedents in Heraclitus.  It is felt, rather, as a dull reality nagging at the inward-facing individual and taunting him with the unthinkable truth that he is just one of a species, made insignificant by the ‘innumerable stages of descent.’  it is aestheticized, where -- as a 'relic' and as the as an aesthetic moment -- it fusion of past, present and future places sthe individual at the centre of the universe once more.  Though subject to external forces and threatened by evolutionary history, the individual confirms his own significance because he can reconceive time passing and find within it eternity.

As for space, Pater’s version of Augenblick at least offers one way to read his private position on space.  In contrast to the common depictions of space in late aestheticism, epitomized by Aubrey Beardsley, which congeals domestic space into intense ?overblown clutter, the presence of Pater’s space is defined by emptiness.  Just as the moment ias a sudden fracture in the banal flow of time, against which it stands out, Pater’s arrangement of his domestic space suggests the conscious employment of this principle. As Mrs. Humphrey Ward recalleds:, ‘The drawing-room which runs the whole breadth of the house from the road to the garden behind was “Paterian” in every line and ornament, with few selected ornaments: a vase, a painting by Rossetti’ (123). Not quite sure why this comes now?

The subjective, time-ridden body that emerges here is far from may be juxtaposed with the objective, ideal body that was discussed in chapter IV and the contrast serves to emphasizerub initalicize  our own position: ephemeral, imperfect beings set against these eternal Forms.  Yet, this is made bearable because beauty endowgives life with its own own justification, 'simply for those moments' sake' (R 153).  In aesthetic contemplation, the aesthetic imagination gives a sense of intervention in, or liberation from, continuous time.  The feeling of eternity hungered after by metaphysics is ours in this moment, e.  Except that it is no longer a futile yearning for the unknowable or impossible.  As aesthetic time expands, the imagination, set free, flits between the units of time,;  our experience of each moment is enhanced and intensified.  Eternity is in each moment if only we can perceive it.  The dimension of subjective time- consciousness evoked by art exaults and exults in the imagination,  and positionings it forever at the centre of time.  Thus doesIn this way, art saves the individual from the apparent meaninglessness of athe single life under the conditions of modernity.  For even, if all is nothing in the end, it is at least made meaningful by the beauty of its passing.  Proust – who read and admired Pater​[106]​ – exquisitely captures this as he describes the experience of hearing Vinteul’s sonata: ‘We shall perish, but we shall have as hostages these divine captives (the musical notes) who will share our fate.  And death in their company is somehow less bitter, less inglorious, perhaps even less probable’ (I, 422). 

Finally, tThe terms of such athis consciousness expresses the schism between Victorianism and emergent modernism that Pater embodies. His vision is at once in which this vision is wrought: it is both a vision steeped in the Victorians’ engagement with their history, while prefiguring and an anticipation of the modernists’ subjection of objective reality to the subjective imagination.  We see It is this schism we see reflected in the critical positions that diverge around the moment and history.  In contrast to those who came after who followed by him – Proust, Woolf, Joyce – whose subjective moments admit only of personal experience and memory, the scope of Pater’s aesthetic moments expands from personal memory to the broad scope of shared human history.​[107]​  Rather than evading the issue by simply taking one side, Pater makes a serious and fascinating is attempting to reconcile these quite different conceptions of time; he triestrying, that is, to understand how individual experience could encompass the external world and its history, and by gaining a sort of mastery over it in the imagination enhance his one bgrief moment.  I do not think, not even for a moment that this is tantamount to solipsism.  Always a philosopher no less than a stylist, In this way, Pater makes a singular contribution toin renegotiating the dynamics between the imagination, art and time. In a word, he argues for that envisages art as the saviour of the individual in modern timesity.   





VI.  Pater’s ‘New “Ethick”’ and the Limitations of Schilleresque Self-Culture
















The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life.​[108]​


Ce grand malheur, de ne pouvoir être seul.​[109]​




And then the lighting of the lamps.  The small dinner party is washed now in honeyed light.  It touches the white embroidered table cloth and the orange runner, strewn with the carefully handwritten place cards, which hours before had been positioned in symmetry, amongst the other debris of dinner.  It gleams on the blue dragon vases and on the yellow rose-buds making them golden.  It casts shadows, perhaps, on Richard Jackson, Hester Pater, Lionel Johnson, and Walter Harte, discussing the second murder in Whitechapel that dominated the newspapers.  With moist evasive eyes the host sits back.  His silken bow-tie, vermillion polka-dotted with lemon yellow, had been destined for a more gregarious fate than this.  But those watery blue eyes wander blankly about the room.  On the sideboard lie still the day’s proofs for Gaston de Latour, beneath lemon kid-gloves.  There his eyes drop. 

Between 1885 and 1893 Walter Pater lived much of the time at 12 Earl’s Terrace, just off Kensington High Street, where he served dinner that evening.  It was September 1888 and the proofs were to be the last instalment of Pater’s ill-fated novel.  In 1886 Pater had intended to write a trilogy; with Marius followed by others ‘dealing with similar problems, under different conditions: in France at the end of the sixteenth century; and in England, at the end of the eighteenth’ (L 66).  Gaston de Latour remained unfinished and the third novel unbegun in spite of various attempts that lasted until Pater’s death.  One reason for this is that it crystallizes a significant problem in Pater’s aesthetics: that of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics.  Having attempted in the unpublished ‘Aesthetic Life’ to ground morality in aesthetic contemplation and having reached some consensus in Marius the Epicurean, the sadomasochistic violence of Gaston’s later fragmantary chapters – which remained unpublished in his lifetime​[110]​ – were not only a nasty echo of the Whitechapel murders a few miles east of Pater’s home, but undermined his own belief that ‘descriptions of violent incidents and abnormal states of mind do not serve the purpose of art’ (George Moore qtd. L 74).

The centrality of the self-ostracized individual is at the crux of the ‘confusion between aesthetics and ethics’ that characterizes Pater’s writings (Tucker 108).  For John Ruskin, individuals and society revolve around ethics; while for Henry Sidgwick, individuals and ethics revolve around society.  For Pater, society and ethics revolve around the individual and art.  He does not believe in society and he is sceptical, to say the least, about its ethical terms.  Moral values can only be understood in terms of individuals and personal friendships between them.  The problems arising from this view are thrown into relief by Pater’s appropriation of Friedrich Schiller’s vision of Bildung or self-culture. 

This chapter focuses on the tense dynamics between these four elements: the individual, aesthetic experience, ethics and society.  It illustrates this by considering the scope and limitations of Pater’s engagement with Friedrich Schiller, arguing that Pater’s ‘new "Ethick”' is constructed on a nexus of unresolved issues which centre on his inability to accept Schiller’s turn from personal aesthetic experience and personal morality to a social ethics.  We see here that Pater offers something quite different to ‘an elegant but over-simplified version’ of Schiller’s theory (Wilkinson clix-clx).  Rather, he is very much the would-be Romantic visionary coming to terms with the confident high ideals of Schiller’s aesthetics in the shrunken scope of late Victorian modernity.  Ultimately, the scope of art becomes determined by the limitations of Pater’s individualism.   

In intellectual history, Schiller stands astride the divergent paths of the Romantic autonomous individual and the Hegelian social self which were to define Continental thought in the nineteenth century.  Pater looks back to Schiller as he stands himself at a later schism in the modern history of ideas.  He is writing at precisely the moment when normative views of ethics as a socially cohesive realm of determined value were being placed under threat (Schneewind 6).  Pater attempts to redefine the bases of moral judgement in response to the intellectual shifts that threatened social and ethical norms.  His is an attempt which interweaves constant fluctuation into its own fabric, and its success is mixed.  Emblematically, the ‘new “Ethick”’ is a quotation from Pater’s unfinished essay, ‘The Aesthetic Life’, an essay which descends into the illegible – scribbled out sentences and paragraphs – as Pater reaches a dead end with his own vision of aesthetics and morality. 

In Schiller Pater finds a kindred spirit.  Schiller’s concept of self-culture establishes in lucid detail that in which Pater most wanted to believe: that art is the supreme panacea for modernity’s affronts against the spirit.  To some extent it reinstantiates – on an individual level – the grand teleological model that abounds in Hegelian and Victorian thought and which was undermined by organic evolution.  Schiller’s philosophy of self-culture is a process of self-education through art.  Reflecting this, Pater’s recurring images of the self-perfecting spirit are defined by his implicit conviction that ‘art is a means to self-education’ (R 90).  This refines the Paterian self of ceaseless flux and nebulous spirit to create some order in the midst of the individual’s ‘uncertain condition’.  It suggests that this may be harnessed into a spiritual teleology to perfection, in wilful defiance of bodily decay, and in which the individual ‘achieve[s] this perfect life’; ‘come[s] nearer and nearer to perfection’, ‘[is] on its way to perfection,’ when ‘the elements of our moral nature refine themselves to the burning point’ (D 155; D 155; A 65; D 154).  Pater neither references Schiller nor abides by his systemic exposition, but then he could trust his contemporary readers to understand his subtle invocations of the Aesthetic Education because it was widely known amongst educated mid-Victorians.​[111]​  Pater looks to Schiller’s Romantic conception of ‘self-culture’ in ‘Diaphaneitè’ and The Renaissance to define his own conception of the relationship between art and the individual.​[112]​  In these works, Schiller’s model of self-culture is nebulously present, woven in with fiction, biography and art history. Pater accepts Schiller’s vision of the relationship between the individual and art, right up to the climactic turn from private meditation to society.  But he individualizes Schilleresque self-culture so that its main benefit is to the individual’s sense of himself, not for some greater social end: ‘the proper instinct of self-culture’ is the individual’s endeavour ‘to find [in art] its own strength’ (R 147). 

In his Aesthetic Education (1794), Schiller presents the endeavour of self-culture in three stages.  The apprehension of art, first, creates feelings of unity or completeness, then these feelings create a sense of freedom and autonomy, and finally this allows the individual to perfect himself to an ethical ideal.  The sections of the present chapter trace how far Pater appropriates Schiller’s aesthetic of self-culture, and the problematic relationship between art and morality that he defines in its wake.  Section i explores how Pater characterizes the first stage of Schiller’s self-culture as a means to ‘unity with our selves’ (R 146) and section ii looks at how Pater takes up the second stage of Schiller’s self-culture: personal freedom.  In section iii we turn to consider how Pater marginalizes the importance of society in Schiller’s third stage, threatening the ethics of self-culture. Finally section iv addresses how Pater premises morality on aesthetics in ‘The Aesthetic Life’, reopening the problems posed by sensual experience in chapter III. 


i. Overcoming ‘the problem of unity with our selves’

Self-culture begins in the boundless moment of aesthetic contemplation.  It begins when aesthetic contemplation involves all of the faculties to create a sense of unity within one’s self as a panacea for the fragmentary nature of modernity.  Unity is one of Pater’s most consistent concerns, from his early hesitancy to his mature assertion of ‘the unity of the thing with itself’ (Higgins 1991, 83; MS 51).  This was apparent in his gestures toward pantheism, and we see it again as he addresses ‘the problem of unity with ourselves’ in The Renaissance (146).  Here he appropriates Schiller’s critique of how modernity undermines the unity of reason and imagination, and the possibilities of restoring this through aesthetic self-culture. 

Schiller argues in his discussion On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry that ‘we [are] at variance with ourselves and unhappy in our experiences of humanity’ in modern society with its conflicting claims and expectations (2005).  Schiller’s aesthetic is set against his belief that the modern individual is fragmented by the experience ‘of living not just as a human being naturally lives, but within one or another specific social role, against a wide background of possibilities, where it is not always clear why that role exists, what its value is, or how to fulfil it well’ (Eldridge 235).   Like Schiller, Pater locates ‘the problem of unity with ourselves’ specifically in ‘the modern world’ (R 146):   
           for us of the modern world, with its conflicting claims, its entangled interests distracted by 
           so many sorrows, with many preoccupations, so bewildering an experience, the problem of 
           unity with ourselves, in blitheness and repose, is far harder than it was for the Greek within 
           the simple terms of the antique life.  (R 146; my italics)
In this passage, ‘the conflicting claims’ of modernity victimize the individual in a way that recalls the relationship between the individual and ‘mechanical space and time’ or even the individual beset by his senses, torturing him ‘ “like a band of madmen”’ (AL 3; PP 94).  His autonomy is under threat. Here, too, the individual is pulled this way and that, left ‘a somewhat hopeless being’ (AL 3), assailed on every front by a world defamiliarized by the very science and technologies that were to make Man lord of all.  Pater gestures toward the proliferation of information, the decentring of values and the pace which all distinguish modernity from ‘antique life’ and undermine ‘unity with ourselves’.  He poses the critical question of how one might regain this state if now, as ever, the intellect really does demand ‘completeness, centrality’ (R 146).  The answer is, as the answer always is for Pater, to be found in art.   

Schiller argues that the restorative qualities of art are premised on its singular capacity to engage our dual drives of sensation (Sofftrieb) and abstract reason (Formtrieb).  In modernity these drives are divided, with its constant stream of phenomena demanding the Sofftrieb whilst its philosophy wants only Formtrieb.  Yet, as the individual pauses in aesthetic contemplation, sensation and reason are brought into a state of disinterested play in the imagination (Spieltrieb).  This sublime middle state is inspired by Kant’s concept of the ‘free play’ of the imagination (1987, 47ff), but the effect is unique to Schiller: ‘[o]nly the aesthetic mode of perception makes [the individual] a whole, because both of his natures [sense and intellect] must be in harmony if he is going to achieve it’ (1982, 27.10, 215).  In the finite moment of aesthetic contemplation these drives blend and enhance each other, soaring beyond the demands that bind them in ordinary perception and rising above physical, psychological and circumstantial limitations.  We experience ‘the infinite being realised in the finite, hence the possibility of sublimest humanity is thereby actually proven’ (1982, 25.6, 189).

In ‘The School of Giorgione’ and ‘Winckelmann’ Pater assumes Schiller’s dichotomy between sense and reason and their resolution in the ‘free play’ of aesthetic experience (R 2; 5).  For, as he explains, ‘art addresses not pure sense still less the pure intellect, but the imaginative reason’ (R 83).​[113]​  The ‘imaginative reason’ is ‘that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-born’ (R 88): twin-born because it comprises sense and intellect in an holistic apprehension, which is the immediate pleasure of art.  The slippage between sense and intellect in the final paragraph of The Renaissance further suggests this ideal: ‘Only be sure it is passion – that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness.  Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most’ (R 153).  The emotions and sensations evoked in the first sentence here are, in the second sentence, re-conceived as – not replaced by − ‘wisdom,’ infusing a reflective, cognitive dimension into the essence of these qualities.  This signifies reunification between the feelings within and the modern world without.  

Pater extends the dualism of sense and reason so that it defines not only the aesthetic experience but also the art-object and artistic genius.  Thus artistic genius is defined by ‘imaginative intellect’ (R 136; 137), which can unite ‘with absolute justice, the word and the idea: each in the imaginative flame, becoming inseparably one with the other, by that fusion of matter and form’ (A 58).  This is embodied in ‘the highest poetical expression’ of art (A 58).  He writes that William Wordsworth’s ‘words are themselves thoughts and feeling; not eloquent, or musical words merely, but that sort of creative language which carries the reality of what it depicts’ (A 58).  The fusion of sense and intellect is mirrored in the resolution of Wordsworth’s private ‘creative language’ and ‘reality’.  It reminds us of J.P. Ward’s argument that Pater is ‘the first to make writing a truly composed artifice rather than directly trusting the language of the heart’ (63), suggesting that in his ideal the schism between the heart’s truth and its expression would be healed.  In this ideal, ‘that sincerity, that perfect fidelity to one’s own inward presentations’ becomes the necessity ‘without which any profound poetry is impossible’ (A 51).  By insisting that literary art is impossible without this, Pater makes the imagination the centre of unity.  Moreover, Pater is setting up a very personal function for art.  For he presents art as a panacea for society, consolidating and restoring one’s sense of one’s separate self in abstraction from it. 

In contrast to Oscar Wilde, who would explore the ‘myriad of lives, myriad sensations’ of the individual conceived now as ‘a complex multiform creature’ (1999, 139) in the knowledge that there is no simple, permanent essence of self, Pater hankers still after that unified essence and the means to make one’s self whole.  As noted in chapter II, Pater is not particularly interested in personalities anyway.  He delves beneath to the more fundamental aspects of self, without the Romantic confidence that there is a core element to be found, but at least with the hope that there might be.  


ii. Freedom

Unity with one’s self in aesthetic contemplation creates the second stage of self-culture: a sense of freedom.  Schiller stresses that ‘it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to freedom’ and, again, ‘Beauty […] is the only way that freedom has of making itself manifest in appearance’ (1982, 2.5, 9; 23.7, n.167).​[114]​  When considering Linda Dowling’s suggestion that The Renaissance may claim to be ‘a document of Victorian liberalism’ (1996, 78), in chapter III, we noted how touch forms the basis of personal autonomy in ‘Poems by William Morris’.  Such conceptions are ever-shifting in Pater’s mind and when he returns to the issue of freedom in ‘Winckelmann’ and others of The Renaissance essays, his vision of it has developed and diversified.  Schiller presents three kinds of freedom (Wilkinson 311-312), each of which is apparent in the aesthetic of Pater’s Renaissance. There is  ‘physical freedom’, which is liberty from restraint; and ‘moral freedom’ which is the ability to rise above the ordinary conditions of one’s reality to envisage what ought to be.  The highest form of freedom, ‘anthropological freedom’, is created when the unity of Sofftrieb and Formtrieb expands to create a feeling of freedom because we are liberated from one-sided slavery to either reason or sensation alone.

Schiller argues that the sense of freedom created by art is implicit in the pleasure we take in its contemplation.   Though aesthetic experience itself is only ephemeral, ‘[a]rt has for its object not merely to afford a transient pleasure, to excite a momentary dream of liberty; its aim is to make us absolutely free’ (2007, 141).  Therefore aesthetic freedom is never an end in itself.  This is a striking revision of Kant’s conception of freedom.  Echoing Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Schiller asserts that art ‘gives rise to freedom’ (1982, 26.1, 191).  He formulates the significance of this statement through Kant’s early reason-centred philosophy,​[115]​ accepting his argument that freedom is the power of the will to act ‘entirely from itself’, autonomous of factors external to it (Peerboom 6-7).​[116]​  Schiller’s twist and his major contribution to aesthetic philosophy is that he relocates the capacity for freedom from the faculty of reason to the imagination, implicitly placing the imagination at the very centre of our being. 

‘Physical freedom’, which is simply the freedom to do what one wants, is Schiller’s response to his view that in society, ‘[w]e subject our free judgement to its fantastic customs, our will to its seductions [and] the fetters of the physical tighten ever more alarmingly […], and the maxim of passive obedience passes for the supreme wisdom of life’ (1982, 5.5, 27).  In this first, negative, sense, freedom is defiant escapism through art.  Schiller’s early critics over-emphasized this element of his theory, tending − in arguments which foreshadow the critique of aestheticism − to suggest that he conceives art purely as escapism, and a destructive form of escapism at that.  

Pater’s most pervasive image of aesthetic freedom maps Schiller’s concept of physical freedom.  Surprising though it is given Pater’s association with high art and his somewhat dour reputation in later years, ‘he delighted in very simple and farcical spectacles and in the broadest humour’, particularly enjoying Pinero’s The Magistrate (Gosse 266).  Such escapism is what Pater suggests when he says that ‘[t]he proper function of fictitious literature [is] in affording us a refuge into a world slightly better’ (A 219).  The world from which he wishes to take refuge echoes Schiller’s polemic on the fetters of society: ‘[o]ur collective life, pressing equally on every part of every one of us, reduces nearly all of us to the level of a colourless uninteresting existence’ (D 157).  It is a striking image.  The physical touches that may express love and companionship are here corrupted into the oppressive presses of a crowd bearing down on the individual.  Baudelaire’s vision of the autonomous flaneur watching all forms of human life is subverted as the crowd engulfs him.  The colour that symbolizes Pater’s ideal of fine art in ‘The School of Giorgione’ – ‘those spaces of more cunningly blent colour’ (R 90) – is drained, like the creative spirit evaporating.  This suggests a certain fragility about the individual, as if he is ever on the brink of his own dissolution, and standing back from the crowd lest it crush him into mediocrity. It is society, not realizing what it does, which breaks a butterfly upon a wheel.  ‘The world,’ as Pater tells us, ‘has no sense fine enough for those evanescent shades’ of the diaphanous individual (D 154).  The Paterian individual is defined by his ability to soar in beauty regardless.

To some extent Pater’s dynamics between the individual and society may be thought of in terms of ‘his campaign for the “liberty” of the homoerotic heart and intellect’ (Dowling 1994, 80), in which ‘society’ represents a ‘machinery of power’ that normalizes sexuality through the ‘incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals’ (Foucault 322). Pater does imply that temporal and spatial disjunction offer a liberation which may allow deviant sexualities, as in the ‘free play’ illustrated by Giorgione’s Fête Champêtre in the aesthetic moment.  But as to whether this amounts to a ‘campaign’ we should be sceptical.  Pater’s hesitancy, his increasing inclination to avoid conflict, and his conservatism suggest that his comments are not any kind of political manifesto.  Pater was no freedom fighter: he jumped into his own closet, locked the door and swallowed the key.  His aesthetic moment represents a weak form of freedom, like a daydream that cannot be realized once aesthetic experience has ended.  Moreover, as we argued above, contra the narrow and reductionist obsession with sex in much recent Pater criticism, the scope of his interest in the issue of personal freedom ranges far beyond sexual freedom alone.  ‘Art may seem to be our least important part of time,’ he writes, but in fact it is uniquely vital as it releases us from ‘the stress of our servile everyday attentiveness’ (R 96).  So this is a liberation not only from sexual censure but also from the banality of workaday life, where the imagination is stifled by ‘a stereotyped world' (R 152).  

Pater struggles between Schiller’s forms of freedom, attempting to move beyond physical freedom – that is, beyond the mere sense of being free from oppression  – but unsure how far this is possible.  Schiller’s second form of freedom – of the imagination, to see how things ought to be – is exemplified in The Renaissance by the cultural renewal heralded by Venus: a renewal premised precisely on reclaiming autonomy and personal liberty.  At the outset, Pater asserts that ‘[t]he desire for a more liberal and comely way of conceiving life’ in Renaissance sensibility is what precipitates ‘the divination of fresh sources thereof – new experiences, new subjects of poetry, new forms of art’ (R 1).  Art becomes the site where one may see into the possible, and the means to reconceive the order of things.  This is a pervasive idea in The Renaissance; Pater describes how art creates ‘a liberty of heart,’ in which ‘the happier powers in things without are permitted free passage’.  When experiencing art, ‘[o]n a sudden the imagination feels itself free’ (R 2; 96; 118).  Pater cites the romances of Goethe and Victor Hugo as exemplars of what ‘modern art has to do in the service of culture’, which is ‘to rearrange the details of modern life, so to reflect it that it may satisfy the spirit [with] the sense of freedom’ (R 148).  

Schiller’s third form of freedom is anthropological freedom: the power of the will to act ‘entirely from itself'.  The value of art is that it may bring this quality to the ordinary life of the individual: ‘to remove to an objective distance the sensible world; […] to transform it into the free working of our spirit, and thus acquire a dominion over the material by means of ideas’ (Schiller 2007, 141).  Schiller’s identification of freedom as autonomy is crucial.  Nikolas Kompridis suggests that Kant and his followers offer an unprecedented conception of freedom, seen as synonymous with autonomy and necessary in order to bring forth ‘a new self-determining beginning’ (35).  Freedom and autonomy are essential to the teleologies on which the philosophies of Kant, Schiller and later Hegel and Marx are based, because only in these states can we bring change into being.

Like Schiller, Pater conceives freedom as the capacity to initiate ‘a new self-determining beginning’ as an autonomous agent.  Art makes the individual ‘actually’ free because it raises him above the conditions of ordinary experience so that he experiences himself as an autonomous being who may transcend the material world:
           the proper instinct of self-culture cares not so much to reap all that those various forms of 
           genius can give, as to find in them its own strength.  The demand of the intellect is to feel 
           itself alive.  It must see into the laws, the operation, the intellectual reward of every 
           divided form of culture; but only that it may measure the relation between itself and them.  
                                                                                                                                 (R 147)
Self-culture is defined here as the endeavour to ‘see into’ the world and ‘its own strength’ with self-conscious enthusiasm.  In wilful opposition to Matthew Arnold’s ‘perfect freedom’ conceived as the renunciation of one’s self, Pater affirms the self through freedom.  For him, insight into the world and enlivened intellect are necessary for the individual to find his own strength; the possessive pronouns suggest this is an innate power, distinct from the world’s phenomena.  The individual is to ‘live upon himself’, outside ‘collective life’.  It is precisely his autonomy from ideology and society which makes him insightful and original and which gives the perfected self its strength. 

In ‘Diaphaneitè’ this kind of anthropological freedom is made prerequisite to the artist.  As Pater explains, ‘[i]t is not in the guise of Luther or Spinoza’ – representative of renunciation and intellect respectively – but ‘rather it is that of Raphael, who in the midst of the Reformation and the Renaissance, himself lighted up by them, yielded himself to neither, but stood still to live upon himself, even in outward form a youth, almost an infant, yet surprising all the world’ (D 157).  Raphael’s genius is founded on his ability to remain autonomous whilst contemplating political and religious currents as they shape the world, transforming them into art.  For Pater, artistic expression is proof-positive of this autonomy.  With this, art is made the salvation of the spirit.  Its raison d’être is not understood as a practical function but as the harmonious embodiment of autonomous creation: to have ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ as Kant would say (1929, 73).  

Whilst Schiller also locates freedom in the imagination, he sees this as only coming to fruition in the world.  In Schiller’s theory, as in the modes of ‘freedom’ proposed by Hegel, or Fichte, or Matthew Arnold – various as these are – the idea of freedom starts from the belief that this comes into being and is exercised in a social context.  In other words, the individual is inherently embedded in the external world of action.  As Schiller writes, whilst freedom begins in the imagination, ‘man is Nought, if we are thinking of any particular result rather than the totality of his powers, and considering the absence in him of any specific determination’ (1982, 21.4, 145).  For Pater, it is quite otherwise: he cannot envisage how the ‘sense of freedom’ made possible by aesthetic contemplation could be brought into the practical sphere.  The very phrase ‘sense of freedom’ locates it as a private, imaginative quality; an illusion defined by its unreality.  Without Schiller’s metaphysical conceit and without Schiller’s ultimate belief in society, it is difficult for Pater to envisage how the mere sense of freedom can be universalized to all.  Here is the crux of the matter for Pater, and the beginning of his departure from Schiller.  
            

iii. Society 

The Paterian individual is premised on a strong sense of his singularity; a singularity that takes its poignancy from Pater’s own position.  He was ever an outsider: part of Oxford but not of Oxford, engaging with the issues of his day but never really belonging to it; in his imagination he traversed centuries.  Perhaps this is why he and Gerard Manley Hopkins took to each other despite their theological differences: they understood one another because each knew what it means to be alone.  Pater began at Oxford on a scholarship and without the financial means of many of his contemporaries.  His second-class degree suggested he was less able than others, and made it hard for him to find an academic position.  The fellowship he gained at Brasenose College from 1864 was a world away from the opulence of Christ Church or the academic prowess of Balliol or Corpus Christi; Brasenose, ‘a college for the average man’ (Higgins 1991, 80), placed him outside the intellectual circles that dominated Oxford.  His sexuality too marked him as an outsider because at Oxford, unlike Cambridge, ‘the cult of homoeroticism was not encouraged by the dons’ (Annan 196); it was in the main, like aestheticism, an undergraduate cult.  Furthermore, he was a non-clerical don who denounced Christianity at a time when, in spite of recent reforms, Churchmen still ran the university.  Even in the Old Mortality Society, he was one of the only members from outside Balliol and his anti-religious views made him enemies in the group.​[117]​  At times Pater seemed to delight in his difference: ‘he had been the first man in Oxford to decorate college rooms’​[118]​ and, in an oft-narrated episode, ‘he flashed forth at the Private View of the Royal Academy in a new top hat and a silk tie of brilliant apple-green’ (Wright I. 215; Gosse 254; 253).  The Paterian individual is an outsider above society, and this is essential to his genius.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the third stage of self-culture marks a rupture between Pater and Schiller, as Schillerean aesthetic contemplation opens out into an ethical sensibility realized in society.  Pater accepts Schiller’s view that unity and freedom create a sense of personal value which is fundamental to morality.  However, he flounders at Schiller’s turn from the solitude of aesthetic contemplation to society; unable or unwilling, it would seem, to reconcile the individual with any social role.

Schiller bridges the gap between art and morality left by Kant’s Critique of Judgement by confidently making the move from self-realization in aesthetic experience to ethical sensibility.  He situates moral sensibility in the imagination, brought into being by the feelings of freedom, unity and autonomy evoked in aesthetic experience and educated by the individual’s contemplation of art.  Thus moral feelings are determined by passionate impulses: ‘Morality […] consists not in the formal obedience to moral law based on rational assent to principle, but rather in the heartfelt, unpremeditated inclination to do good’ (2006, 128).​[119]​  Here Schiller suggests that passionate feelings are autonomous of law and convention, which indeed they may transgress. He declares his faith rather in the individual, whom he places at the centre of moral judgement.   

In this Pater concurs.  He shares Schiller’s view that personal morality emanates from ‘a direct sense of personal worth’ (D 157) cultivated within one’s self and not determined by any abstract system: 
          The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this 
           experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract 
           morality we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional has no real 
           claim on us.  (R 153)
Pater’s words hark back to ancient Greek ethics which ask ‘What am I to do if I am to do well?’ in contrasts to modern ethics which ask ‘what ought I to do if I am to do right?’ (J.P. Ward 114).  He empowers the individual by defining morality within one’s self against ‘some abstract morality’.  The individual is made arbiter of the good, which itself is defined simply by the individual’s heartfelt inclination toward it. 

Pater takes up Schiller’s belief that moral sense resides in the imagination with a rather nebulous assertion.  As he puts it, the diaphanous character ‘does not take the eye by breadth of colour; rather it is that fine edge of light, where the elements of our moral nature refine themselves to burning point’ (D 154).  Once again, light evokes the creative spirit and it does so here to effectively identify the imagination with the moral faculties.  But just what is signified by our moral nature and what would it mean to refine this to the burning point is not quite clear.  Perhaps Pater is relying on his audience – in this case the Old Mortality Society, so well he might – to identify the gestures to Schiller in this most Schilleresque of essays.  Since ethics are not his central concern here, he may feel this needs no further explanation.  Even so, the grand sweeping nature of the phrase discloses the indistinctness of his notion of what this would mean in precise terms, or how it could possibly be realized in the context of his modernity.  Pater defines morality as a compassionate response located in the senses, the heart and the passions, and not in the intellect.  The intensity of aesthetic perception and the heightened emotions it excites teach one to notice and respond virtuously in life.  Thus he praises Botticelli for his ability to create ‘a sympathy for humanity in its uncertain condition’.  The sympathy is created at least in part by the delicate attention of Pater’s narrative as he describes Botticelli’s Madonnas: ‘they shrink under the pressure of the divine child, and plead unmistakable undertones for a warmer, lower humanity’ (R 39).​[120]​  Here the beauty and scale of the painting defamiliarize the subject from the emotion to show it to us as an archetype.  Art assumes the role of moral educator in a way that engages the individual to make personal judgements.  For this reason the individual is made central, displacing God or any other authority from the role of determining ethical good: he is set free. 

Schiller saw that the concept of a subjective judgement with claim to universality, introduced by Kant in his Critique of Judgement, is absolutely necessary to make the leap of faith from personal morality centred in the imagination to ethical judgement in society.  A priori universality means that moral values are subject to universal agreement and may be the basis of civil society.  Art evokes an ephemeral experience of intense compassion, which it expands to benefit all society because art ennobles the imagination; allowing us to transcend habitual conditions and recognize that which is universally considered to be the moral good.  With art, the individual  ‘in his own hut […] discourses silently with himself and, from the moment he steps out of it, with all the rest of his kind, […] there will the tender blossom of beauty unfold’ (1982, 26.2, 191).  So whilst self-culture is a private endeavour – a solitary dialectic of self in dialogue with itself, mediated through art – the individual is nonetheless yoked to society, and the tender ethical sensibility cultivated in private is only fully realized in society.  The last of Schiller’s letters in the Aesthetic Education asserts that the quickened spirit and sense of freedom evoked in aesthetic experience ‘recalls to us our freedom as moral agents and we return to the everyday world with a disposition ready to face the challenges and a mind emboldened to make certain moral choices’ (Kooy 40).  This integration of art, society and ethics was a significant element in Schiller’s appeal to educated middle-class Victorians, for whom, often, ‘the primary function of art was to socialise individual readers or spectators into the moral values of their culture’ (Guy 314).  Such an integration is foundational to John Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice (325 ff), and to Matthew Arnold’s view, in Culture and Anarchy, that 
           Perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual remains isolated.  
           The individual is required, under pain of being stunted and enfeebled in his own 
           development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march towards 
           perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the 
           human stream sweeping thitherward.  (9) 
Expanded to the grand scale which Schiller imagines, the proliferation of aesthetic education would create the ‘aesthetic State’: a society in which men do good deeds out of a sense of freedom and autonomy (1982, 27.7, 213ff).   The aesthetic State is contrasted with the dynamic State, where one acts out of oppression, and the ethical State in which one acts out of duty (1982, 24.1, 171).  Schiller explains that in those circles where conduct is governed by beauty in the aesthetic State, none may appear to the other except as an object of free play.  To bestow freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of the kingdom (1982, 27.9, 215).  In the aesthetic State the individual is enabled to act in freedom in accord with the impulses of his heart for the good of society.  These subjective impulses will necessarily cohere with the general good because of their a priori universality.  

Whereas Schiller’s ‘aesthetic education’ reaches its zenith when the aesthetic subject returns to society, Pater’s ethics remain wedded to individual experience.  He is unable or unwilling to follow Schiller’s confident turn to society, for two main reasons. First, he was intensely aware of the relative nature of moral judgement, and secondly he did not believe in society.  Writing almost a century later, amidst the debris of philosophical systems and religious faith and with an acute sense of the material world in flux, it is clear to Pater as it never was to Schiller that moral values too are subject to relativity: ‘Modern thought,’ as we have already noted, ‘is distinguished from the ancient by its cultivation of the “relative” spirit in place of the “absolute”’ (A 66).  Moral sensibilities are ever shifting through time and vary between people, as he was well aware from the changed perception of male-male desire as between Ancient Greece and its condemnation in his own society.  In short, he could not subscribe to Schiller’s universality.  Rather, he insists that relativism must be reflected in moral principles: ‘[t]he moral world is ever in contact with the physical, and the relative has invaded moral philosophy from the ground of inductive sciences.  There it has started a new analysis of the relations of mind, good and evil, freedom and necessity’ (A 67).  There is, perhaps, a touch of irony in his use of invasion here: a nod toward those who resented this, like his contemporary F.H. Bradley who harboured pretensions to systematize ethics in apparent defiance of the emergent spirit of relativism.  For Pater, by contrast, relativism has a positive side: it reveals afresh the truth of the human condition, sets the individual free from ‘facile orthodoxy’ (R 152), and in the sphere of ethics grants him the authority to legislate his own values.  With all moral absolutes eradicated, morality is redefined as an unending empirical investigation. Such a spirit of relativism would reach its apotheosis soon after in the figure of Friedrich Nietzsche.​[121]​  With the distinction between good and evil in question, we are left to wonder if Pater’s teleological language is but the relic of a learnt language of ethics, or whether he aspires still to this apparently impossible ideal.​[122]​  Or is he like Nietzsche gesturing beyond good and evil to some other form of perfection? 

In part, Pater also finds society a difficult concept because of the emergent evolutionary view that society has ‘spontaneously evolved’ and its values are irredeemably relative (Spencer 1998, 85).  Sounding a modern note, he faults the Republic as ahistorical: ‘Plato is certainly less aware than those who study these matters in the “historical spirit” of the modern world that for the most part, like other more purely physical things, states “are not made, but grow”’ (PP 162).  But in truth Pater is inherently suspicious of any integral relationship between the individual and society on which the visions of Plato, Hobbes and Hegel are all founded: ‘Plato then assumes rather than demonstrates that so facile parallel between the individual consciousness and the social aggregate’ (PP 162).  Indeed, Pater says precious little about society: anticipating the modernist interiority which he would influence, he mainly turns inward, away from it.  This refusal rests on a further critique.   Society, Pater suggests, ‘reduces us to an almost colourless existence’ (D 157): it stands for a norm of dull mediocrity against which the creative individual is judged, and rebels. 
Thus ‘Diaphaneitè’ is his swansong to society.  Written right at the beginning of his career, it is the justification for his disregard of society thereafter.  Billie Inman has noted that Pater appropriates and reworks Schiller’s tripartite concepts of the dynamic State, ethical State and aesthetic State into the three types of individual in ‘Diaphaneitè’, where they become respectively ‘doctrinaires’, ‘the saint, the artist, even the speculative thinker’ and the diaphanous man in ‘Diaphaneitè’ (Inman 1981a 100; D 154).  The significance of this lies in how Pater shrinks the broad social significance of Schiller’s vision into an optic limited to just one: the solitary self.  In ‘Diaphaneitè’ the individual and society become dichotomies.  The diaphanous type is first defined by the way that he ‘crosses rather than follows the main current of the world’s life’ (D 154).  This singularity is confirmed as Pater evokes the threat of ‘collective life’, discussed above, and he stresses that the diaphanous type, the self-cultured individual could never be expanded to society: ‘Society could not be conformed to their image’ (R 158).  The principle of self-culture could never be expanded to all.  For in a world that is irredeemably banal, the self-cultured individual becomes defined by this exceptionality.   Far now from Schiller, here Pater agrees with Nietzsche, who writes with a certain predictability in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: ‘A high culture is a pyramid, it can stand only on a broad base, its very first prerequisite is a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity’ (1982, 646).  

In ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’, Wilde with typical audacity reasserted a supposedly unproblematic relationship between individual and society: ‘propos[ing] a welfare and industrial State as precondition of a “New Individualism” characterized not by machinery or wealth but by Christlike inwardness’ (Gagnier 2000b, 325).  This ‘Christlike inwardness’ resembles Paterian ‘contemplation’, but Wilde’s vision inverts Pater; taking the more sociological view, dominant in Britain at the time, that individualism is predicated on appropriate political and social conditions (Lukes 41-45). Pater refused any such causality; thus failing to practise the historicism he preached when criticizing Plato, above.   It is a cruel irony that Wilde would himself become a butterfly crushed upon society’s wheel.  

And so, as though Pater is himself that ‘solitary prisoner [in his] own dream of a world’ (R 151), his Schilleresque gestures towards humanity at large are undermined by his inability to envisage how self-culture could expand beyond the individual.  His friend Arthur Symons conjectures that ‘[Pater] was quite content that his mind should keep as a solitary prisoner its own dream of the world; it was that prisoner’s dream of the world that it was his whole business as a writer to remember to perpetuate’ (1974, 98).  I beg to quibble on one point.  Even if Pater ultimately seems like that ‘solitary prisoner’, he was never ‘content’ with this.  The inclusive pronouns of Pater’s essays consciously and consistently reach out to people, just as Pater himself reached out to his students as a kindly friend and teacher.  It is the move from ethical feelings founded on personal friendships to an abstract conception of ethics in society that Pater finds difficult.  His gesture towards this broader vision of self-culture at the end of ‘Diaphaneitè’ is indicative: ‘A majority of [diaphanous people] would be the regeneration of the world’ (D 158).  This hyperbolic flourish does not make up in gusto what it lacks as a tenable idea.  Its irreverent idealism belies ambivalence about society, which remains a blank somewhere in between the particularity of the individual and the ideal of the whole world.  That blank is the space in which the individual is reduced to ‘a dull, colourless existence’, which Pater does not care to discuss.  Hence he cannot envisage the social regeneration implicit in his theory.  Like the end of The Renaissance, ‘Diaphaneitè’ burns itself out with this voracious flame, leaving such dull practicalities unresolved.

Pater’s desire to prioritize the individual allows space for social deviance and relativity.  Yet it also means that he writes against the prevailing tenor of social responsibility.  His dichotomy between the individual and society not only separates him from Schiller, but puts a gulf between him and many others: both eminent contemporaries, and the earlier thinkers he elsewhere identifies with.  He cannot, for example, take up Hobbes’ conception of civil society or Hegel’s Sittlichkeit.  Such concepts ring hollow to Pater.  

Moreover, there is a risk: the possibility that this radical kind of ‘Individualism […] destroys the very idea of obedience and duty, thereby destroying both power and law; and what then remains but a terrifying confusion of interests, passions and diverse opinions?’ (Lukes 6).  Pater’s defiant turning away from society risks the solipsistic, unchecked supremacy of the individual against whom there is no authority.  He stresses this quality when he describes the diaphanous man as ‘a revolutionist’ who is ‘not disquieted for the desire for change’ and whom the world regards with ‘indifferentism’ (D 157; 155; 157).  Such a vision is ultimately unrealizable, but it knows that.  It is a pipe dream of Romantic individualism, curiously out of time, in an age that had long since given up such notions in favour of a different model of individualism. 

Solipsism in aestheticism is a familiar tale.  The relationship between individual and society in the aesthetic movement lends itself to parody, and ‘could all too easily be seen as a self-serving apology for an amoral, selfish, hedonism – for an attitude to life (and a lifestyle) which threatened the very basis of civil society’ (Guy 318).  Such sweeping generalizations, like Mrs. Oliphant’s dismissal of Paterian self-culture, are at fault in ignoring the cultural and intellectual nuances of aestheticism.  In truth, the disjunction between the individual and society has more complex implications for ethics.  Having ostracized the individual from society and relegated God – at best – to the realms of the possible, Pater does not settle into amorality and still less into immorality.  He acutely realizes the need to establish an alternative basis for ethical judgement: a ‘new “Ethick”’.



iv. Ethics as aesthetics

Katherine Bradley, one half of Michael Field, wrote of Pater in her journal on 25th August 1890: ‘He has struck out the Essay on Aesthetic Poetry in Appreciations (for the 2nd ed.) because it gave offence to some pious person – he is getting hopelessly prudish in literature, & defers to the moral weaknesses of everybody. Deplorable!’ (qtd. L 113, n.3).  This is not the enduring image left to us of Pater.  Neither does it exemplify the amoral individual characterized in ‘Diaphaneitè’.  But quite apart from the fact that Pater could never dare to be the diaphanous man he envisaged, he was always more moral than he is remembered.  This section concentrates on his attempts to reconcile the individual with morality through aesthetic experience in his ‘new “Ethick”’.  This is defined in Marius the Epicurean, ‘The Aesthetic Life’ and ultimately challenged by Gaston de Latour. 
  
The genesis of Paterian moral sympathy lies in the expansive, unified aesthetic moment discussed in earlier chapters.  In chapter II we saw how Pater’s pantheism involves the individual in a network of sympathies with other individuals and, in chapter V, the aesthetic moment expands the sympathies of the individual to other historical periods.  In each of these visions, the individual empathizes with others and realizes a sense of common humanity through aesthetic experience. As Regenia Gagnier notes, ‘Pater dramatically extended his meditation on the precise way the solipsistic prison of the self could be opened to the higher life in Marius the Epicurean' (2000b, 328).  This ‘higher life’ is the ethical life and it is Pater’s most successful development of aesthetics into ethics.  In the final days of Marius’ life, as he is dying, his ailing body quickens his senses and noticing the minutiae of the natural world that surrounds him his sympathy with those around him is expanded.  Thus, ‘the scent of the new-mown hay’, ‘the sunlight’ and ‘the sounds of the cattle’ (M, II, 216) open out into a broader sense of common humanity as Pater describes: ‘the faces of those people, casually visible, took a strange hold on his affections; the link of general brotherhood, the feeling of human kinship, asserting itself most strongly when it was about to be severed forever’ (M, II, 217).  Marius’ senses are heightened by their own form of ‘elaborate and lifelong’ aesthetic education (M, II, 219), charted by the novel, and to which this is the climax just prior to his death.  For a moment at least it takes us back to Schiller’s aesthetic education as we see Pater make the easy link from aesthetic contemplation to kinship with those around to sympathy with humanity at large.  

The neat beauty of the vision is such that one hesitates to add a note of cynicism.  And yet, placed in the broader terms of Pater’s writing, one might justly ask whether Marius’ common sense of humanity is sustainable and whether it could ever go beyond a beautiful sense of common humanity to a shared experience or a power of action.  Sure, 'Pater is not a philosophy professor and it would be a mistake to look to him for a rigorous moral theory to serve as the basis of a rigorous aesthetic theory' (Guyer 346-47).  Even so, given the antipathy between the individual and society elsewhere, it is necessary to question whether Pater's apparent reconciliation of the individual, aesthetics and ethics is not in fact an example of that ‘confusion between aesthetics and ethics' noted by Paul Tucker (108).  In Marius the Epicurean the matter is settled by Marius’ immanent death, which preserves it, like the moments discussed in the previous chapter, as a moment of exquisite unsustainable beauty: ‘for a moment he experienced a singular curiosity, almost an ardent desire to enter upon a future, the possibilities of which seemed so large’ (M, II, 221).  Like the moment in evoked by Giorgione’s Fete Champetre it is premised on the impossibiliy of expanding beyond the individual.  It is poised between being and not-being, where it is vanquished by its extinction before it ever could be realized.  After his insight into 'human kinship'  Marius has to die.  He never could cheapen this imaginative experience into an ethical life where it would be tarnished by the ugliness of the world.  As in the intense climatic moment of the Conclusion to The Renaissance and 'Diaphaneitè' Pater ends his works before he has to address such inconveniences.  Being is, after all, higher than doing (A 62) and this is the realm Pater reserves for art.    

The ‘reserved’ quality of art, discussed in chapter III, presents it as an apt link from the sensual self to ethics and if Pater does not realize this in Marius, this novel at leaves some possibility that it could be realized.  The same could not be said of Gaston de Latour.  Indeed, refocusing from the site of Pater’s literary triumphs to his apparent failures -- ‘The Aesthetic Life’, which he never published, ‘A Study of Dionysus’ and ‘The Bacchanals of Euripedes’, which he withdrew from publication, and Gaston de Latour, his abandoned novel -- we see how the ethical solution of Marius is thwarted.  Pater’s loosely woven tapestry of the good, the beautiful and pleasure is most revealingly glimpsed in these pieces, written in the late 1870s and 1880s, when he attempted to theorize the ethics vaguely glimpsed in his earlier writings.  Here he tussles in an attempt to reconcile ethics with aestheticism; and here he must confront the genesis of evil in sensual beauty once we abandon the measured, intellectual realm of idealist metaphysics.  Just as an aesthetic sense of common humanity cannot be equated with the power of ethical action, neither can art be equated with the good.  Whilst Marius illustrates the climax of ethical possibility, Gaston subverts its very basis, suggesting that art is not a safe haven from the ‘descriptions of violent incidents and abnormal states’, which Pater entreated George Moore to avoid.  Gaston de Latour illustrates how ‘flowers of evil’ may bud in art by placing Gaston in Paris in 1572, on what would afterwards be called the St Bartholomew's Day massacre.  In stark contrast to Pater's advice to Moore, his narrative becomes saturated in 'the horror of supernatural darkness' (G 175).  Recalling the language of his earlier essay on Dionysus, he describes 'a confusion of spirit', 'physical madness', 'the strange devils' gaiety [...] all in gaudy evidence', '[d]elirium [...] in the air' (G 175; 175 ;177 ;179).  Pater sums it up when he explains that 'this singularly self-possessed person had to confess that [...] he had lost for a while the exacter view of certain outlines, certain real differences and oppositions of things in that hotly coloured world of Paris' (G 180).  All of which is very well if it is spiritualized into the realm of art, but in Gaston, Pater is unable to bring order to the 'madness' of sadistic violence and homosexuality in which the initially strong narrative thread loses itself.  Art fails.  It is overcome by the madness within.  As if the violence of Paris has infiltrated Pater's literary art, the unpublished manuscripts reveal how his ideas become fragmented; unfinished, sometimes hurried and often elliptical.  In art as in life ‘reserve’ can all too easily break down.  As Gerald Monsman has explained, the standard edition of this 'unfinished romance', edited by Charles Shadwell after Pater's death, smoothes out these issues: 'for Shadwell the unfinished and unpolished must be decorously hidden away [.  A] certain amount of his editorial energy seems to have gone into constructing the equivalent of those fig leaves which so proliferated on nineteenth-century statuary' (1991, 2).  Pater's text becomes so steeped in the centrifugal tendency that it cannot proceed.  He is unable in the end to reconcile the violence and passion of life with art.  Art is therefore an unreliable moral educator.  There might have been other reasons as well Pater’s withdrawal of Gaston de Latour in 1888, but its subversion of his design to bring ethics and aesthetics together may have been decisive. 

It is not without trepidation that Pater turns from art to sensual experience in the world for moral guidance.  Of course, sensuality has attraction to him as a relativist: a direct link between morality and sensuality enables him to approach morality on its own ever-shifting terms.  In ‘the Aesthetic Life’ he writes, ‘[t]he life of sensation suggests its own moral code, has its own conscience, clear and near, and with no problematic assumptions’ (AL 9).  Moral judgement is thus left to reside, unfettered, in the individual and his sensations alone.  The statement itself ironically highlights that nothing so concrete as a code would be possible were one to found morality on sensation.  After all, the particularity, subjectivity and ever-shifting nature of sensations could afford no such thing.  The sensual pleasure evoked by beauty contains its own morality not because it stimulates an a priori, universal realization of the good, but because the good is implicit in it.  The distinction is significant because it eradicates Schiller’s metaphysical idea that ethical values could be a priori universals.  It also decentres ethical judgement from the Church or State.  Rather, as in Epicurean ethics and Hume’s empirical ethics,​[123]​ moral judgements are implicit in sensual experience, where fluctuation and subjectivity are integral.  In this way Pater’s ‘code’ is more like a faith that aesthetic judgements correlate to just ethical judgements; a faith that no longer has the guarantee of God.  This is all very well for Hume, who believes in custom as the basis for social stability and whose idea of sensation is unproblematic.  Pater’s rejection of those ideas, as discussed in I and in chapter III respectively, makes personal pleasure an unreliable moral compass.  The problem is neatly illustrated in an exchange between Pater and a student who asked, ‘But Mr. Pater, why should we be good?’ to which he replied, ‘Because it is beautiful’ (qtd Conlon 453).  It is an apocryphal tale but its veracity is not as important as the truth it captures: that Pater’s ethics are conditional on beauty.  Quite simply, the individual is to act according to his aesthetic sense of beauty and ugliness, which correlate to right and wrong.  But is it possible to found ethical values on a subjective judgement of beauty?  And even if it is, does he mean that we should be good because the good is always beautiful or that we should be good only when the good is beautiful?  

There is evidence for both interpretations in ‘The Aesthetic Life.’  In the first case, it seems that we should only be good when the good is beautiful because the sensual pleasure of the individual is the highest criterion to determine action.  For example, in a passage also noted in the previous chapter, Pater discusses London: ‘aesthetically the least promising scene’ (AL 14) and a city in which he never really felt comfortable: 
           one thing is plain if he is to prosecute the life of aesthetic culture he will have to apply 
           largely the faculty of selection.  Well! does not all right conduct of artistic matters always 
           involve selection?  Does not the aim of all art lie in the establishment of an ideal 
           depending partly on negative qualifications culture in its most general sense being largely 
           in large measure negative or renunciant[:] a fine taste habit of ignoring or forgetting.  
                                                                                                                                            (AL 14)  
It is difficult to reconcile ‘ignoring and forgetting’ with ethical being; one is reminded that by contrast the literary ethics of, say, Dickens and Gaskell were premised on noticing the ‘ugly’ or degraded areas of society.  The reality is that virtuous acts are often most needed amid the ugliness, but this is somehow at odds with Pater’s aesthetic imperative.  He disdains what he refers to as ‘real life and its sordid aspects’, or at least affects to disdain it (2003, 87).  When Pater’s friend, the painter Simeon Solomon, was imprisoned and financially ruined because of homosexual offences and cast into London’s seedy underworld, Pater’s response is contested.  Laurel Brake has argued that Pater helped him financially (1994, 14) whilst Richard Dellamora claims that he turned his back on him (117).  There is scant evidence either way.  Of course Pater memorialized Solomon in his ‘Study of Dionysus’, but the truth and depth of his moral response actually depends on whether he really believed in ‘ignoring or forgetting’ that which offends the delicate eye.   

The question of whether the beautiful is always good raises inherent problems in Pater’s aesthetic.  He suggests that beauty informs moral sensibility: ‘[the individual’s] apprehension of moral fact will identify itself with his nature and acquired appreciation of a sensible charm in things’ (AL 10).  Gesturing toward a notion that individualism may be reconciled with universal values – ‘moral fact’ − in the subjective imagination, Pater seems unable to follow through the implications. The problem is that he locates ethical sensibility in sensual pleasure of the beautiful.  His comparison elsewhere of sensual desire to being in ‘service to a band of madmen’ (PP 94) overshadows his idea of morality with the possibility that sensual ‘ecstasy’ may become uncontrollable, obscuring all distinctions between good and evil as the individual, intoxicated by his desire for greater and greater sensations, becomes aware only of his own pleasure.  The vision of uncontrollable Dionysian sensuality which emerged in chapter III shows that there are ‘flowers of evil’ amongst beauty (G 71).  Certainly Pater realizes the intrinsic capacity for ‘evil’ in the beautiful: Dionysian frenzy shows that desire may come between beauty and ethics, subverting both with the primal urge for ever greater sensations.  The beautiful becomes ugly; the good becomes evil, and all is obscured because the individual is alone in his revelry, with only his distorted judgement for a guide. 

Pater revisited the ethical dilemmas of Gaston de Latour when he reviewed The Picture of Dorian Gray in Bookworm three years after Gaston had ceased to be published in Macmillan's Magazine.  The critical scorn heaped on his admirer's work could equally have been directed at him had he continued to publish his novel.  But by 1891 Pater had all but given up his novelistic ambitions.  Until his death he would tinker with Gaston, but his move back to Oxford in 1893 was in many ways a retreat from the ambition to fully realize his vision of literary art in his own novels; a realization of sorts that he would not fulfil his own artistic vision.  In the past he had solicited favourable reviews from his protégé Oscar Wilde but he felt unable to return the compliment.  His criticisms centre on Wilde’s presentation of ‘a dainty Epicurean theory’ (2003, 87), thus offering an insight into Pater’s own conception of Epicurean morality: 
           A true Epicureanism aims at a complete though harmonious development of man’s entire 
           organism.  To lose the moral sense therefore, for instance, the sense of sin and
           righteousness, as Wilde’s heroes are bent on doing so speedily […is] to pass from a higher 
           to a lower form of development.  (2003, 87-88) 
This may be Pater's most convincing word on ethics.  In terms of his own broad vision of the individual and art, it is difficult for him to make ethics necessary in way other way than to suggest that 'moral sense' is essential to the 'harmonious development of man's entire organism.'  Morality is justified because it is of value to the holistic cultivation of one's individuated self.  It is difficult to accept for a moment that Pater himself pursued this self-involved, self-important way of living, but it is evidence of the intellectual difficulty of reconciling a pursuit of beauty with the supremacy of the individual and relativity.  The problem defeats him because it outrages art.  Pater's ultimate refuge in the individual is not a solution; it is a statement that he cannot move beyond the individual on any other basis.

While Pater the man may have ‘beg[u]n as an aesthete and ended as a moralist’, as his friend Vernon Lee put it (1980, 295), Pater the writer never found a way to fully reconcile his vision of the individual with ethics.  Given that glaring gap, and though his position was misinterpreted by over-zealous followers who gave it a hedonistic and decadent twist, T.S. Eliot’s famously snooty admonishment cannot be quite gainsaid: 
 His view of art, as expressed in The Renaissance, impressed itself upon a number of writers in the 'nineties, and propagated some confusion between life and art which is not wholly irresponsible for some untidy lives.  (1951, 441)


v. Conclusions

Pater’s appropriation of Schiller’s aesthetic self-culture and his departure from it, ultimately illustrates his difficulty in going beyond the individual.  His elucidation of unity, freedom and autonomy through Schiller's Aesthetic Education shows his engagement in the history of ideas and begins to draw out the nuances in these ideas that may be lost in the density of his prose.  He wanted to believe that art and beauty could fulfil the spiritual needs of the individual and liberate him from the world.  In this way, his turn to beauty is a self-consciously aesthetic response to modernity; it is the hope that man may embrace the liberation offered by relativity and, instead of learning the rules of society, to cultivate a personal response through art.  Yet what Dowling calls ‘Pater’s task to complete the “aesthetic education of man” that Schiller had begun’ is doomed to fail (1996, 86); ​[124]​ it is difficult to imagine Pater completing anything, least of all Schiller’s extensive philosophical system.  Incompleteness – exquisite incompleteness – is part of his philosophical aesthetic.  By editing society out of ‘aesthetic education’ Pater presents a form of self-culture that is always and forever incomplete.  Only, without it, he finds it hard to muster the moral authority to legislate for humanity.  Art may educate hearts and imaginations but it cannot alter the world without.

It is his retreat from the final stage of Schiller’s vision that tells us most about the nature of the Paterian individual.  Held in abstract from society, the Paterian individual -- the diaphanous glass man -- appears as a fragile form who risks breaking if put in contact with others.   However, the resistance that defines the individual against and in contrast to the external forces that threaten him, is the same resistance that ultimately prevents the expansion of moral feelings to moral actions.  Pater's imagination sets him against the fragmentary and oppressive nature of modernity and society, promising him the possibility of transcending all of this, but by asserting the autonomy of the individual through aesthetic experience alone, Pater has created for himself a tautology and a trap: society is not required, ethics are unleashed into the relative space of an isolated personal judgement.  

For these reasons, a study of Walter Pater’s ethics is a study of creative failure.  His ‘confusion between aesthetics and ethics’ (Tucker 108) exemplifies the self-contradictory, stuttering position from which he wrote.  Like Friedrich Nietzsche’s übermensch, Pater’s aesthetic subject, rapt in sensual experience, goes beyond good and evil.  Beauty becomes a fickle teacher, subject to the desires of the individual. But Pater, more so than Nietzsche, is possessed by these categories still; whilst attempting to cast off the shackles of religious ethics, his own sensibility is still enmeshed in Christian values of good and evil.  In consequence, his individualism is left as an exquisite disposition without the power of action, except for resistance.  It is difficult to see how such an individual could ever be 'the regeneration of the world' (D 158).













Pater’s ‘Elusive Inscrutable Mistakable Self’: 
Some Conclusions










In such of us as not merely, live, but think and feel what life is and might be, there is erected an inner drama full of conflicting emotions, long drawn out through the years, and, in many cases, never brought to a conclusion.​[125]​         

                      

Vernon Lee might have had Walter Pater in mind as she wrote these lines.  His meandering aesthetic philosophy, itself ‘never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy’ (R 152), was on no account ever brought to a conclusion.  And so, to write a conclusion about Pater is already to engage in an exercise quite foreign to the man himself.  

The extent to which one may make conclusions about Pater’s thought is limited to a notional sense of an ending, never to be confused with resolution.  A feather on the breath of time is Pater’s ever-shifting thought.  His ‘visions and revisions’ understand themselves to be – like his individual – subject to ever-fluctuating time, even as he strives to overcome this limitation.  It is with these qualifications that Pater has emerged in this study as a Romantic  ‘aesthetic philosopher’, who engages in contemporary philosophical issues to define an ‘illusive inscrutable mistakable self’ that is continually justified only by art.  These closing comments draw together the considerations of the preceding chapters to notionally define the significance of the Paterian individual and his philosophical aesthetics in these terms: in section i we consider how Pater conceives of a Romantic individualism, woven through art to answer modernity and, in section ii, we suggest that Pater reconfigures the history of ideas into an art. 



i.  The individual, modernity and art

Oppression, resistance and creativity characterize the relationships between the individual, modernity and art.  The individual emerges in Pater’s works assailed on every side by society, the vast history of evolution, his own inevitable decay and even by the secret passions and desires within his own heart.  Stood ever on the brink of his own destruction, the individual of ‘uniqueness, originality, self-realization’ (Lukes 17) confirms his identity and autonomy with each creative act, with each imaginative flight into the infinite, and the creation of art commits his individuality to eternity.  Whilst all that is solid melts into air, the imagination, which can appreciate beauty and create that which is beautiful becomes the ultimate justification of being.  This is exemplified by the artist’s work, and in subjective aesthetic experience, in Kantian ‘initiatory power’ that makes experience possible, and in the self-creating endeavour of physical cultivation that is doomed by time.  

We have seen Pater illustrate and undermine Steven Lukes’ conception of Romantic individualism in various ways.  And whilst it is true that ‘the importance of Walter Pater’s thought lies in its subjectivity [and the view that] we create ourselves and that we are the measure of our own value’ (Pittock 15-16), this must come with qualifications.  Pater realizes that autonomy is hard-won and it is always but a moment away from dissolution.  Even as Pater positions the individual at the creative centre of the universe he points out his ephemeral nature, and as he suggests the potential of self-cultivation he vividly evokes the individual's self-destructive potential and physical frailties.  So Pater believes in the individual almost in spite of himself.  The ‘illusive inscrutable mistakable self’ is a secular faith.  This is why he is at the centre of each and every one of Pater's published writings​[126]​ as they ask again and again how ‘I’ am formed and what I mean when I refer to my self.  

Of course others have discussed Pater’s Romanticism, most notably Graham Hough in The Last Romantics and more recently Kenneth Daley in The Rescue of Romanticism.  Unlike in those works, however, Pater’s Romanticism emerges in the present study as far more than a mere ‘relic’ of the past, excavated out of time like Dionysus in Auxerre. After all, we have seen that dwelling with relics severs the very life-force of the individual.  Rather, I contend that Pater's Romanticism is a dynamic force through which one may understand modernity.  This is what Nikolas Kompridis would define as ‘philosophical romanticism’ (2): Romanticism not founded on a period or a specific set of influences but as an ever-emerging philosophy based on common principles.  Pater’s Romanticism, like his aesthetic moment, spans past, present and future.  It engages with thinkers of the past but its real stimulus comes from the issues of his day.  The obliqueness of his views on contemporary thought and literature were explained to some extent in the Introduction when we noted that Pater did not read his contemporaries, but it would be a mistake to deduce that he did not engage with contemporary thought.  We can no more believe this than believe that art really is entirely for its own sake.  This study has aimed to show that Pater engages most significantly with contemporary issues on philosophical terms, addressing emerging contemporary concerns – with God, evolution, society, sensuality – and seeking to define how the individual may cease to be ‘a somewhat hopeless being’ in their wake (AL 3).

Pater saw the encroaching threats to Romantic individualism but, then, ‘[f]orms of intellectual and spiritual culture sometimes exercise their subtlest and most artful charm when life is already passing from them’ (A 65).  In Culture and Society Raymond Williams suggests that what we understand by Victorian sensibility had all but ceased to be by 1880. The Paterian individual is defined across this fault line.  Conceived on this transition, Pater’s Romantic individualism is defined by creativity, quickened by a sense of possibility and contradictoriness.  His Romantic individual of ‘uniqueness, originality, self-realization’ incorporates both elements that seem Victorian and others startlingly modern.  As such it is a picture of the individual in his ‘uncertain condition’, characterized by a very modern notion of flux and subjectivity. Pater’s skepticism of objectivity and society too is distinctly modern, or even post-modern.  Yet quite unlike the modernist vision this spawned, Pater suggests that the individuated mind could span the centuries; he is subject to Victorian Doubt, but ultimately rooted in Protestant Christian sensibility; and his values are defined by 'strange' metaphysics.  He might most usefully be conceived as neither Victorian nor modernist; but as one who writes on the cusp, capturing this moment of transition in his thoughts and echoing his own presentation of the Renaissance as a creative transition.   

If ultimately Pater is unable to meet modernity on its own terms; if in the end he retreats to art to shut out reality, this does not undermine the significance of his endeavour.  Like the book of self-portraiture that captivates Marius, Pater’s writings on the individual are ‘a creature of efforts rather than of achievements, in the matter of apprehending truth, but at least conscious of lights by the way, which he must needs record, acknowledge’ (M, II, 47).  Part of his significance lies in his sincere attempt to conceive the inconceivable: an individual without God but with metaphysical spirit, without society but with ethical values, without historical eternity but with a sense of eternity.  


ii. Philosophy as art
 
In the first of his Imaginary Portraits, Pater writes of Watteau that ‘He was always a seeker after something in the world, that is there in no satisfying measure, or not at all’ (43).​[127]​  The same may be said of Pater himself, and the way he seeks this something characterizes his terribly unphilosophical philosophical aesthetics.  

Pater’s fusion of philosophy and aesthetics also exemplifies Nikolas Kompridis’ definition of ‘philosophical romanticism’: ‘In so far as it understands itself as responding to the conditions of modernity, philosophical romanticism takes the question of what philosophy is or what it should be as a question defined and shaped by those very conditions’ (3).  As a thinker Pater engages with the history of ideas on his own terms.  So whilst he is well-read in philosophy, exhibiting an implicit understanding of the debates surrounding the issues he discusses, he is in no way entrenched in it.  As he turns to Hume, to Kant, to the ancients as well as to Romantic thought, intellectual ideas indeed become ‘painted ideas, painted and visible philosophy’ in his prose (MS 43).  Like history, philosophy is subsumed into the realm of art where reason and imagination are brought together.  

From this perspective Pater suggests that philosophical discourse is wanting in several ways.  First, we have seen that, as a discourse centred in the rational mind, conventional philosophy is too narrow to address the full scope of human experience.  With regards to sensuality, discussed in chapter III, Pater finds its inherently irrational possibilities to burst the bounds of its philosophical treatment by Kant, Epicurus and Hume.  Secondly, Pater recognized that a philosophy of neat systems does not befit fluctuating time, which we saw most vividly in chapter V but which really defines all of Pater’s thought.  Pater’s attack on Coleridge and his idea of the ‘relic’ illustrate that, like the individual, thought must ride the wave of ever-moving time.  To concretize truth is to kill it.  Thirdly, Pater demurs from the metaphysical conceits of Idealist and Platonic philosophy.  We saw in chapters I and II that he trusts the faculty of reason too little to believe its metaphysical extrapolations, leaving his view of 'spirit' in ambivalence.  And finally, he shies from the ‘pretensions to pass beyond the limits of individual experience’ on which philosophical universalism is founded (MS 1).  The radical subjectivity which he sets out in his Preface to The Renaissance makes each individual the measure of all things, with no claim to legislate for the experience of another.  Yet this rejection of philosophical universalism is more problematic than it could have seemed at first.  Surrounded by ‘that thick wall of personality’, the individual ends up ‘imprisoned now in the narrow cell of its own subjective experience’ (R 151; MS 2): not exactly freed from the world and objectivity, so much as alienated. 

Having thus rejected philosophical discourse as it was being defined contemporaneously by the British Idealists, the question to which Pater always returns is what philosophy would have to be to account for the nature of the irrational, fluctuating and mysterious modern world.  He finds the answer in literary art.  Time and time again we see that art is his terribly Romantic answer to the questions of modernity.  The apt memorial to Pater on the west wall of Brasenose College chapel includes the Greek motto: ‘Philosophy being the grandest of music’.  Ultimately Pater goes beyond philosophy to art – which always aspires to the condition of music (R 66) – in order to explore the human condition.  It is an inverse move to that of Hegel, who believed that art and religion would be subsumed into philosophy in the realm of Absolute Spirit.  Pater's fusion of art and philosophy or – more accurately – the encapsulation of philosophy in art is founded on the intellectual assertion that imagination can reach into the corners of experience which range beyond the rational mind.  Whereof he cannot speak he does not remain silent, but instead looks to the imagination to at least gesture to the inexpressible.  The philosophical theories Pater read are diffused through the imagination, which vanquishes the false dichotomy between philosophy and literary art.  The claim is that, properly understood, philosophy is not an abstract theory about the world, much less a systematizing endeavour. Rather, it infuses how we think and is subject to the unsystematic and inconsistent mind of the individual.  As philosophy merges into art and art is the expression of personality, it follows that Pater’s aesthetics would be an expression of his unique self.  He engages with opposing thinkers from across the vast scope of history without commitment to any; sporting their ideas to measure them against his own, take from them what he wishes and make it into art. 

 The terms on which this philosophical literary art is successful are debatable.  Certainly Pater personifies his declamation of ‘facile orthodoxy’ using his own principle of 'selection' to work through these theories, finding in them enough ‘to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation’ (R 152).  However, as a result of vanquishing systems and absolute truths, Pater has difficulties in defining a constructive aesthetic vision.  His unpublished manuscripts are his clearest attempts at this; but they peter out into pages increasing in crossings out and large blank spaces, eventually ending still in medias res.  His failure to conclude his enquiry is a very modern failure: the failure of each one of us to fully conceive the nature of our reality.  It is an inevitable failure as soon as he admits the fluctuating character of existence.  The only ‘sense’ of unity he perceives is in those brief moments, when all is condensed in an intense experience of the present.  The suggestion that this could be reflected in prose and exemplified in his own work has no claim to rational, intellectual unity; it claims only an impression of unity.

Moreover, his attempts to forge new modes of thinking in the modern world are inhibited by his inability to fully vanquish metaphysics.  Although he ostensibly returned to religion only at the end of his life, we saw in chapter II that he never really went away.  Elliptical allusions to the ‘strange’, a hankering after ‘the other sort of knowledge’ and a censorious comment that empiricism had ‘narrowed the spiritual, the imaginative horizon’ point to his sense that there is something beyond our understanding (R 69; HP 12; AL 2).  It is true that he is no conventional religious believer: as we have seen, he mocks ‘that mythical personage’ (R 148) at the beginning of his career and even at the end ‘he never returned to Christianity in the in the orthodox, or intellectual sense’ (Mrs Humphrey Ward, 121).  Neither are his flirtations with pantheism or Romantic gestures to some unknowable void ever fully developed in his works.  Even so, that intangible something lurks behind them, where it becomes essential to ‘the initiatory power’, the animating force of genius, and the threatening void invoked by the body.  If Pater seems to ‘privilege the concrete over the abstract’ (Higgins 1991, 86) this is not to say that the material world is all there is.  It is one of many ironies that whilst he declares the primacy of the seen world, he is captivated by that which cannot be understood.  Much as he believes that we must live as though there is no God, the Paterian individual is defined at the interface between the seen and the unseen, the tangible body and the intangible spirit.  Hence it is not so much a desire to know, as a desire to explore the parameters of our not knowing, which engages Pater.  His legacy is not consistency, to be sure; he had far too much imagination to be consistent.  

Yet Pater does have a significance in intellectual history, over and above his singular style.  At the time of Pater’s death there was a sense, summed up by Henry James, that he is ‘not of the little day – but of the longer time’ (293).​[128]​  Ironically for one who embraced the ephemeral, he is indeed of  ‘the longer time.’  For the terrible beauty of Pater’s writing is that it expresses the individual in his uncertain condition.  The poignancy of his writings is that they express above all the uncertain condition of one particular individual, Walter Pater.  Beneath the poses and imaginary portraiture his warm, sometimes faltering voice calls out to us, reassuring us that we are not alone.  He is not an authority but one of us, vulnerable and unsure, as he wanders through the debris of old beliefs: a gentle spirit raging, with 'reserve', against the dying of the light. 
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^1	  Oscar Wilde, 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism,' 142. 
^2	  Walter Pater, Gaston de Latour, 167. 
^3	  Here and in later extensive quotations from Pater’s manuscripts I have taken the liberty of punctuating Pater’s long sentences.  Reading Pater’s manuscripts it seems that he often added commas and colons at a later stage of composition.  There is an apocryphal anecdote that when asked what he had been doing one morning Pater replied, ‘Adding a comma’; when asked what he had done during the afternoon, he replied, ‘taking it out.’  In the interests of clarity the addition of commas is necessary.  
^4	  Whilst writing about the Paterian individual I will use the male pronoun almost exclusively.  Quite simply, Pater writes for and about men.  Whether this excludes women from his vision of the individual, and whether he writes particularly for the select set of men who appreciate homoerotic desire, are matters  we will address in the conclusion.  The role of the female body is discussed in chapter IV.   
^5	  Rothenstein’s sketch is reproduced on the front cover of this study. 
^6	  For example, see Benjamin Taylor, 20. 
^7	   Steven Lukes dicusses this at more length in Individualism, 32-39.  
^8	  T.S. Eliot, ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,’ lines 48-50, 13.
^9	  Published under her pen name, ‘Vernon Lee’.
^10	   Evidence of Pater’s ability to read German comes from several sources.  Billie Inman suggests that in the long vacation of 1860 ‘Pater was probably learning to read German and possibly reading Goethe' (1981a, 9).  Ingram Bywater recalls anyway that Pater knew enough German to read Hegel’s Phenomenology in 1862.  In this formative period particularly Pater’s library borrowings include many philosophical works in German (Inman 1981a, 9ff.).  This surely disproves Gosse’s assertion that ‘He was no linguist, and French was the only language in which he could even make his wants understood.  Although so much in Germany in his youth, he could speak no German’ (256).
^11	  He gestures toward this with his perennial assertions and questions about the nature of philosophy.  For example, see The Renaissance (148; 152; 153), Marius the Epicurean (II, 220) and Plato and Platonism (21).
^12	  Raphael’s painting of Plato and Aristotle is the title illustration of this chapter. 
^13	  In a comparable though unrelated passage, Friedrich Nietzsche writes that ‘our universities, despite themselves, are really greenhouses for this sort of stunting of spiritual instincts’ (1997b, 45).  One can but speculate as to what Pater and Nietzsche would have to say about academia in the twenty-first century.
^14	  I have written on this recent and, to my mind, significant strand of Pater criticism at greater length in ‘Recent Criticism on Walter Pater: “Antithetical Scholar of Understanding’s End”’. 
^15	  Although extensive consideration of style falls beyond the scope of this enquiry, it should be noted that these manuscripts could make a significant contribution to our understanding of Pater’s techniques of composition.  Recently, Leslie Higgins has discussed ‘The Aesthetic Life’ in her article ‘Walter Pater: Painting in the Nineteenth Century,’ and in his revised edition of Gaston de Latour, Gerald Monsman uses Pater’s manuscript notes to piece together this controversial, revised, ultimately unfinished work.  Given that these manuscripts are not currently available in print, slightly longer passages will be quoted with the aim of providing greater context.   
^16	  I have included Pater’s crossings out in the extracts quoted throughout this study.
^17	  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 52.
^18	  Thomas Wright notes that Green and Pater were friends (I. 260), but there is no evidence for this.  Circumstantial evidence must suffice.  Pater and Green are linked first by their friendships with Benjamin Jowett, who tutored both of them at different times.  In turn, in the late 1860s, they both tutored Gerard Manley Hopkins.  Pater and Green were also members of the intimate and exclusive Old Mortality Society, whose members mostly studied at Balliol. Green joined in 1856 and Pater in 1863.  The regulations of the Society stated that members remain members for life but, unfortunately, its records of attendees to its weekly meetings had petered out by the time Pater joined, so we will never really know whether they attended the same meetings or exactly how well they were acquainted.  
^19	  Hume’s theory of causation is explained best in his Treatise (I.I. iii, 76ff).
^20	  Morito Uemura has recently and persuasively traced the title ‘Diaphaneitè’ to its French roots, drawing attention to the appearance of ‘diaphaneité’ (note the acute accent) in Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables (Hugo 27; 118-9) and Les Travailleurs de la Mer.  In these contexts, the rough translation is the same as in the Greek: it refers to transparency, but unlike the Greek it is a noun.  For example: ‘et cette diaphaneité laissait voir l’ange’ (‘a quality of transparency through which her saintly nature could be seen to shine’).  Given his fluency in French and his particular admiration for Victor Hugo (A 37; A 38), it is quite possible that Pater is aware of this usage and even these particular contexts.  There is evidence of Pater’s familiarity with Les Misérables in several works and, in addition, it may be recalled that Pater was familiar enough with Les Travailleurs de la Mer to refer to it in ‘Winckelmann’ (R 143).  Having said this, the imperative of the Ancient Greek word is essential to Pater’s meaning because it emphasizes the element of personal endeavour that is essential to his conception of self-perfection.
^21	  Pater may also have been aware of ‘the glass delusion’: a pathology in which the individual believes himself to be made of glass.  The number of cases reached its peak in the seventeenth century and it is explored in Martin Sorrell’s radio play ‘The Glass Man.’
^22	  This resonates with Friedrich Nietzsche’s later and more developed and assertive remarks on the ‘yes-saying’ individual: the Űbermensch (1997b, 90-91).  
^23	   This passage recalls a rather beautiful passage from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria: ‘In consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand’ (478-9).  Pater would not have missed the irony.  
^24	  Billie Andrew Inman has argued that Hume’s sceptical argument is a ‘less pervasive’ influence on the Conclusion to The Renaissance than Gottlieb Fichte (1981a, 16ff).  As Inman argues, ‘it is easy to conclude that Pater made his first step in the philosophical search toward scepticism, while reading Fichte’ (16) because his library records show that he read The Vocation of Man first and because of  certain resemblances between its account of scepticism and the second and third paragraphs of the Conclusion (16-17).  Pater did read and was influenced by Fichte: as noted in the Introduction, he presented a paper on Fichte’s conception of the Ideal Scholar to the Old Mortality Society in 1864 and, having read The Vocation, perhaps it contributed to his thoughts.  In everything Pater writes there are threads from a multiplicity of sources woven into a fabric that is uniquely his.  However, it is my view that Hume, not Fichte, was the main influence on Pater’s scepticism.  Just to reiterate, Pater cites Hume’s philosophy as ‘the characteristic modern scepticism’ (HP 7) and it is with this in mind and the similarities between Pater’s Conclusion and elements of Hume’s Treatise that we begin to see Hume as the crucial sceptical element in what Pater calls ‘the tendency of modern thought. Resemblances between Pater’s scepticism and that of Fichte are better explained by the fact that Fichte, like Kant, was himself strongly influenced by Hume: ‘Fichte accepted Hume’s argument that we find it impossible to locate the self as an object of knowledge but he claims that we can nevertheless have experience of ourselves, not in our capacity as knowing subjects but in our capacity as moral agents’ (Magee 155).  
^25	  The latter point is fundamental to Locke’s philosophy but it is ignored by Pater.  For example, see Locke on the ethical formation of the individual (II. xxvii §§7-15, 317-23).  This is a tendency we will see again when we discuss Pater’s reading of Friedrich Schiller: there he narrows Schiller’s social aesthetic vision to a purely personal, solipsistic endeavour.  See chapter iv, section iii.  
^26	  Neither of these most explicit statements was ever published, which in itself is an interesting example of Pater’s timidity by the late 1870s when they were written.  Having raised his head above the parapet with The Renaissance, to be shot down in flames by John Wordsworth and others was bad enough, but, then, the parody of him as Mr. Rose in The New Republic (June –December 1876; Belgravia ) was probably as much public humiliation as he could bear.  We can but speculate; and for further speculation see Wright II. 10-18 and Gosse, 257-258.  Actually, Vernon Lee wrote on meeting him: ‘What strikes me is how wholly unlike Pater is to the Mr Rose of Mallock’ (1980, 294).  I tend to think that having been attacked on the grounds of his aesthetics he felt not confident to publish on philosophy, especially given that his own thoughts were inconclusive and, thus, difficult to expand and defend.  
^27	  Inman notes that this comment is itself a (mis)interpretation of Novalis: ‘Novalis did not mean that philosophy should vivify by sharpening the eye.  Fichtean in orientation, he meant that it should vivify by creating an awareness of the unifying principle of consciousness in oneself and in all living things’ (1981b, 21).
^28	  This is the most significant distinction between the Romantics and the Idealists.  Whilst Kant confidently set out to explain the workings of the mind, the Romantics modestly refrained, believing the mind to be unfathomable through reason.  Kant would identify with a model of transparency for it endorses his conviction that the philosopher can see through man into the mechanics of the mind.  
^29	  Walter Pater. ‘Oxford Life.’ Quoted by Thomas Wright, I. 194.  This is an early unpublished poem.  I have been unable to trace it. 
^30	  Walter Pater. The Renaissance, 27. 
^31	  Matthew Kaylor discusses the possibility that their mutual sympathy centres on homoeroticism (207 ff).  He is quite right to be cautious in introducing this idea because, though it should be noted in passing, this speculation rests on shaky foundations. 
^32	  Just how well Pater and Swinburne knew each other is contested.  Edmund Gosse writes that ‘the poet [Swinburne] was not an unfrequent visitor in those years [c.1870] to Pater’s college rooms.  To all young Oxford, then, the name of Mr. Swinburne was an enchantment…’ (254).  However, Swinburne himself told Thomas Wright years later that ‘he never met Pater, to speak to him, more than twice – once in London and once at Oxford, and that even then only a few words passed (Wright I. xv).
^33	  The various turns in the relationship between Oxford University and the Church in the mid-nineteenth century are detailed by V.H.H. Green in A Short History of Oxford University (143ff).   
^34	  This is perhaps an indication that Pater read Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea.  Schopenhauer characterizes a world of post-Kantian noumena and phenomena, in which the former – the Will -- is a constantly striving pickle, at odds with itself.  Within this vision, the ‘Will’ (capitalized) manifests itself into the ‘will’ of the individual. Since Schopenhauer was the first philosopher to take music seriously, as well as being a very literary writer, and given Pater’s extensive reading of other German transcendental idealists, it would be surprising if he did not read Schopenhauer – but there is no concrete evidence.
^35	  Pater’s ambivalence regarding these terms is also apparent in ‘The Aesthetic Life,’ where he notes that ‘the higher life of mind and or spirit will involve preference’ (AE 15), as discussed below. 
^36	  The absence of crossing out suggests that it is not a first draft but it has not yet been adorned with commas, suggesting that it is not a final draft either. 
^37	  Arnold speaks more of sweetness than of light in the chapter that introduces this phrase.  He later suggests light as a symbol of Hellenism (1949, 89-90). 
^38	  Jesus brings Truth and Faith to alleviate darkness in the hearts of His people in the Gospel of John (8. 12, 113) and, again, in Rossetti’s Light of the World.
^39	  ‘“To see the object as in itself it really is,” has justly been said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism to first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s impression as it really is…’ (R xxix; Arnold 2000, 1514).  Pater quotes Arnold for the express purpose of highlighting the space between the disinterestedness of Arnold’s view and his own subjective, relative aesthetic.  In ‘The Critic as Artist’ Wilde is more explicit but essentially still Paterian: ‘Criticism really is, the record of one’s own soul…the primary aim of the critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not’ (237; 240).     
^40	  Pater glosses this: ‘One morning [Arcangeli] entered Winckelmann’s rooms, under pretence of taking leave […] a cord was thrown round his neck’ (R 126).  As Alex Potts has explained, Winckelmann’s homoerotic relationships were by this time well known and recent studies of Pater have discussed at length his aesthetic minoritizing discourse in ‘Winckelmann.’  For further reference, see Dellamora’s chapter on ‘Arnold, Winckelmann, and Pater’, especially page 114.  Pater’s quotation later in the essay of Samuel 14:43 may allude back to Winckelmann’s death to intimate the unutterable: ‘I did but taste a little honey with the end of the rod that was in mine hand, and lo! I must die’ (R 142).  This phallic allusion certainly has the arch humour of a man who would have joined the Church without belief.  Oscar Wilde, of course, alludes to this, making the homoerotic metaphor more obvious in ‘Hélas!’: …                         lo! with a little rod
I did but touch the honey of romance — 
And must I lose a soul's inheritance?    (449)
^41	  The Latin is translated as ‘some divine quality in the depths’ (Phillips 162n).
^42	  For further reference, see In Our Time on ‘Music of the Spheres.’
^43	  This metaphor is touched on again when Pater discusses Pythagoras’ vision of cosmos through numbers in Plato and Platonism (35).
^44	  It was originally written as two lectures given at the Birmingham and Midlands Institute in 1875, and was published in the Fortnightly Review in January and February 1876.  Intended for publication in the ill-fated Dionysus and Other Studies, in fact it lay uncollected until the posthumous Greek Studies. 
^45	  In full, the passage from ‘Wordsworth’ is strikingly similar to Denis Donoghue’s comments on Pater in his biography: ‘There are weeks or even months in which he seems to have taken literally his favourite motif of evanescence and drifted away.  We assume that he is still alive, but the evidence for his breathing is meagre […] he has been teaching, tutoring a few students, or spending the Long Vacation in France or Italy […] By comparison to his contemporaries he seems hardly to have lived’ (23-4).  
^46	  Pater’s desire to invigorate the status of prose is closely related to a more general sense that poetry was unable to express the modern condition and frustration at the apparent limitations of poetic form.  Pater felt that prose was the art form of emerging modernity.  He advised the student Oscar Wilde to give up poetry for prose, and with less success he later wrote to Arthur Symons: ‘You know I give a high place to the literature of prose as a fine art, and therefore hope you won’t think me brutal in saying that the admirable qualities of your verse are those also of imaginative prose […] I should say, make prose your principal metier [sic]’ (L 80).  
^47	  Michael Levy gives a full account of this episode in The Case of Walter Pater (91).
^48	  The intellectual relationship between Pater and Dante deserves more attention and from a scholar better versed in Dante than I.  Suffice to say here that the spirit of Dante hovers in the background of Pater’s early writings – ‘Diaphaneitè’ and The Renaissance – but acquires a new significance in this very frank, personal Introduction to Charles Shadwell’s translation of Purgatorio.  Like Shadwell, Pater was a member of the Oxford Dante Society.  He was elected in December 1890.  
^49	  Michael Field, ‘Walter Pater: A Poetic Tribute.’ 280.
^50	  See Monsman’s essay, ‘Gaston de Latour and Pater’s Art of Autobiography’ for a fuller account (1979, 417).
^51	  The union between Dionysus and Venus is described by Pausanias, Tibullus and Diodorus Siculus.  These sources state that Priapus is the son of Dionysus and Venus.  The scholarly website, the Encyclopedia of Classical Mythology give a good overview of these myths (http://www.theoi.com/Georgikos/Priapos.html). 
^52	  In this chapter only I am including references to both the original essay, which appeared in the Westminster Review in October 1868, and (where appropriate) the Conclusion to The Renaissance, , which is taken from the final pages of this earlier essay.  
^53	  This is the cover illustration of chapter II.
^54	  Matthew Arnold writes in ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’: ‘ “the main effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort; the endeavour, in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is”’ (2000, 1514).  (In this passage he is actually quoting himself in ‘On Translating Homer’, but the later context is the best known and most relevant to the current discussion.)
^55	  There are more extensive comments on Pater’s vision of freedom and its limitation in chapter VI, which considers what freedom means to Pater for the individual and society.  Paraphrasing an argument in that chapter, which has relevance here too, I would say that I do not necessarily agree with this expansive reading of Paterian freedom.  Certainly, the autonomy exercised in the act of this aesthetic judgement is an expression of personal freedom, but for Pater this does not necessarily open out to freedom understood in the social context of democracy. 
^56	  Physical sensation and emotion brush close to each other here.  This issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter IV.
^57	  This passage is echoed later in a section that is reproduced within the Conclusion to The Renaissance: ‘Not to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us […] is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening’ (R 152).  
^58	  Lyons’ other comments on time perception in the Paterian moment are very helpful and I will return to these in chapter VI.  
^59	  One question here is how far we may read Pater’s imagery in misogynistic terms, though this would be quite another and much larger discussion (see also chapter IV, below).  The pernicious power of Venus considered in terms of the earlier appearance of Medusa may make such a case.  For in addition to the recurring trope of the femme fatale, including also Charlotte Corday (D 158), Pater’s averted gaze as he describes Botticelli’s Venus recalls the Medusa myth in which all who look on her are turned to stone.  There is certainly something in this, but the threatening undercurrents of sensual pleasure here are not female-specific.  Far from it.  Pater’s conception of women is a rich critical seam as yet almost entirely unmined.  
^60	  As mentioned earlier, Pater’s manuscripts illustrate this.  Gaps in his sentences suggest that his primary concern was to make the rhythm of the sentence right; Angela Leighton discusses this in ‘Pater’s Music.’  In other cases alternative words are jotted above the original, suggesting Pater’s eternal indecision about which word would capture the exact sense he wishes to create – or even an attempt to pin down in words, which have their own sensuosity, that which he cannot fully grasp by mental thought alone.
^61	  This barrage of criticism is well documented. Much of it is reproduced by R.M. Seiler in Walter Pater: The Critical Heritage (1980, 47-108).  The deeply hostile letter of John Wordsworth to Pater (mentioned abov in chapter II) is particularly worthy of note (61-3) as is George Eliot’s tart summary: ‘Mr. Pater’s book […] seems to me quite poisonous in its false principles of criticism and false conceptions of life’ (92). 
^62	  ‘The Myth of Dionysus’ was published as ‘A Study of Dionysus’ in the Fortnightly Review (December 1876); ‘The Myth of Demeter and Persephone’ was given as first as two lectures at the Birmingham and Midland Institute  (1875) and published in the Fortnightly Review (January and February 1876).  Charles Shadwell believes that ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ was written at about the same, though it was not published till May 1889 in Macmillan’s Magazine (iv).  Of the less inflammatory essays, ‘The School of Giorgione’ was included, of course, in the second edition of The Renaissance.  Several other essays had been published previously in the Fortnightly Review and appeared later in Appreciations. Greek Studies, which included these essays and others written in the late’80s and early ‘90s, was published in 1895 under the guidance of Charles Shadwell.
^63	  In early October 1878 Pater intended to title the collection The School of Giorgione, and it was to open with the eponymous article (BB 84).  It is not clear why he had changed the title to focus on Dionysus by 18th November, when he confirms, ‘I should like the lettering on the back to be precisely as before [in The Renaissance], in type and arrangement, with, at the top, Dionysus and other Studies’ (BB 87).  Nor do we know if it was at this point that Pater decided to move ‘Giorgione’ to the second edition of The Renaissance – which he was preparing at the same time – or whether this decision was taken only after Dionysus had been aborted.  
^64	  Dionysus is mentioned twice in Pater’s Renaissance, each in the essay on ‘Michelangelo.’ First, ‘in the Doni Madonna in the Tribune of the Uffizi, Michelangelo actually brings the pagan religion, and with it the unveiled human form, the sleepy-looking fauns of the Dionysiac revel, into the presence of the Madonna’ (R 31).  Later in the essay, Pater describes Michelangelo’s return to Florence: ‘he put forth that unique presentment of Bacchus, which expresses not the mirthfulness of the god of wine, but his sleepy seriousness, his enthusiasm, his capacity for profound dreaming’ (R 51).  
^65	  These passages first appear in ‘The Marbles of Aegina’ and are restated almost word for word in Plato and Platonism (70-1).  For continuity here I quote from the former.  There is just one significant addition in Plato and Platonism: ‘The Greek spirit! - it might have become a hydra, to use Plato’s own figure, a monster; the hand developing hideously into a hundred hands, or heads’ (71).   
^66	  In Marius the Epicurean, the charismatic Dionysian Lucius Verus -- ‘[he] might well have reminded people of the delicate Greek god of flowers and wine’ (M, I 193) -- is ‘struck with sudden and mysterious disease, and die[d] as he hastened back to Rome’ (M, II, 30).  The actual cause of Lucius’ death is not as important as its symbolism.  His reckless sensuality condemns him to death.  
^67	  See Billie Inman’s essay ‘Estrangement and Connection.’  We will return to this though in section i of the next chapter. 
^68	  Wright glosses this as ‘an ecclesiastical term meaning “restraint” – the restraint imposed upon himself by a monk’ (II, 65).
^69	  The poems were published in 1878 in Tales of Ancient Greece, No 1, Eudiades and the Cretan Idyll, but they had been written c.1868 and were circulated in select Oxford circles years in the interim years.
^70	  Chapter VI, section ii discusses Pater’s evocation of Giorgione’s Fête Champêtre in this regard. 
^71	  As mentioned earlier, Pater’s manuscripts illustrate this.  Gaps in his sentences suggest that his primary concern was to make the rhythm of the sentence right and Angela Leighton discusses this in ‘Pater’s Music.’  In other cases, alternative words are jotted above the original, suggesting Pater’s eternal indecision about which word would capture the exact sense he wishes to create and, often, indicating his attempt to capture in words that which he cannot grasp with his mind.    
^72	  This critical discourse is well-documented and it is reproduced in by R.M. Seiler in Walter Pater: The Critical Heritage (1980, 47-108).  The letter of John Wordsworth to Pater is particularly worthy of note (61-3), as is the pithy summary of George Eliot: ‘Mr. Pater’s book […] seems to me quite poisonous in its false principles of criticism and false conceptions of life’ (92). 
^73	  ‘The Myth of Dionysus’ was published as ‘A Study of Dionysus’ in the Fortnightly Review (December 1876); ‘The Myth of Demeter and Persephone’ was given as first as two lectures at the Birmingham and Midland Institute  (1875) and published in the Fortnightly Review (January and February 1876).  Charles Shadwell believes that ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ was written at about the same though it was not published till May 1889 in Macmillan’s Magazine (iv).  Of the less inflammatory essays, ‘The School of Giorgione’ was published, of course, in the second edition of The Renaissance.  Several other essays had been published previously in the Fortnightly Review and appeared later in Appreciations. Greek Studies, which included these essays and others written in the late’80s and early ‘90s, was published in 1895 under the guidance of Charles Shadwell.
^74	  In early October 1878 Pater intended to title the collection The School of Giorgione, and it was to open with ‘The School of Giorgione’ (BB 84).  It is not clear why he had changed the title to focus on Dionysus by 18th November, when he confirms, ‘I should like the lettering on the back to be precisely as before [in The Renaissance], in type and arrangement, with, at the top, Dionysus and other Studies’ (BB 87).  Nor is it clear whether Pater decided then to relocate ‘Giorgione’ to the second edition of The Renaissance – which he was preparing at the same time – or whether this decision was taken only after Dionysus had been aborted.  
^75	  Dionysus is mentioned twice in Pater’s Renaissance, each in the essay on ‘Michelangelo.’ First, ‘in the Doni Madonna in the Tribune of the Uffizii, Michelangelo actually brings the pagan religion, and with it the unveiled human form, the sleepy-looking fauns of the Dionysiac revel, into the presence of the Madonna’ (R 31).  Later in the essay, Pater describes Michelangelo’s return to Florence: ‘he put forth that unique presentment of Bacchus, which expresses not the mirthfulness of the god of wine, but his sleepy seriousness, his enthusiasm, his capacity for profound dreaming’ (R 51).  
^76	  These passages first appeared in ‘The Bacchanals of Euripides’ and are restated almost word for word in Plato and Platonism (70-1).  For continuity here I quote from the former.  There is just one significant addition in Plato and Platonism: ‘it might have been a hydra, to use Plato’s own figure, a monster; the hand developing hideously into a hundred hands or heads’ (71).   
^77	  Asia and Europe may also figure the dynamic between Dionysus and Apollo.  The extent to which Pater’s Dionysus is antithetical to Apollo is subject to debate.  Robert Keefe argues that The Renaissance encapsulates his ‘anti-Apollo campaign’ to effectively undercut the Victorian cult and to signal a cultural rebirth with ‘a more sensuous, alluring art than that of his fathers’ (1987, 161), whilst Billie Inman argues that a more subtle appreciation of Pater’s conception admonishes so emphatic a statement.  Inman is quite right to demand a nuanced consideration of Pater’s thought.  Pater seldom presumed to wage ‘anti’ campaigns in print.  Neither, she points out, was there a homogenous exultation of Apollo in society (1989, 541).  And so, to suggest that Pater is self-consciously defining himself against Apollo would be to over-simplify Pater’s characteristically complex response.  This said, Keefe’s comments draw attention to an implicit contrast between the sensual primacy of Pater’s Venus and Dionysus and the rational, ordered side of Apollo.  It is not, perhaps antipathy but a re-centring – a troubled re-centring – onto these tendencies.  Apollo gains significance later as Pater attempts to reconcile his conception of self-identity with society and Christianity.  
^78	  The poems were published in 1878 in Tales of Ancient Greece, No 1, Eudiades and the Cretan Idyll, but they had been written c.1868 were circulated in select Oxford circles years in the interim years.
^79	  Chapter VI, section ii discusses Pater’s evocation of Giorgione’s Fête Champêtre in this regard. 
^80	  Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal, 62.  
^81	  Pictured on this chapter’s title page.
^82	  ‘[T]he Brasenose undergraduates […] toiled at games and played at books’ (Humphrey Ward qtd Higgins 1990, 80). 
^83	  For further reading on the genealogy of thought in Muscular Christianity see, there is some discussion in Nick Watson’s ‘The Development of Muscular Christianity in Victorian Britain and Beyond.’
^84	  Billie Inman gives a full account of this in 'Estrangement and Connection: Walter Pater, Benjamin Jowett and William M. Hardinge' (1ff.).
^85	  Morgan’s work responds to this view, seeking to nuance it by contending that homosexual code is plural and unstable, with different writers constructing their own idiosyncratic codes.  In a phrase surely far too ugly for Pater, she terms this ‘aesthetic minoritizing discourse’ (142). 
^86	  The disjunction between the real desire and the ideal object of desire indicates a covert relationship between masculinity in the public and private spheres that falls beyond the scope of this enquiry.  Pater is attempting to negotiate the transgressive assertion of homosexual masculinity with the very Victorian quality of gentlemanliness.  Not for Pater the defiant, flamboyant cavorting of Swinburne or the assertive argument in favour of ‘Greek Love’ given later by John Symonds.  His expression of homosexual masculinity is encoded within an aesthetic discourse that addresses itself to the educated middle-class gentleman.  This ‘aesthetic minoritizing discourse’ implies a discreet masculinity that must be kept from those who would not understand its beauty; speaking only to empathetic readers who might pick up on its homoerotic evocations. 
^87	  Although most famously published in Studies in the History of the Renaissance, like most of the Renaissance essays ‘Winckelmann’ first appeared as an article in the Westminster Review, in 1867. 
^88	  Pater was afflicted with gout: ‘I am confined to my room with gout, but have been consoling myself with “The Happy Prince,”’ he wrote to Wilde in 1888 (L 85).  He suffered all the symptoms of a body unwilling to cooperate with the effort of spirit required to write Marius: ‘the intolerable languor and fatigue, the fevers and the cold fits, the grey hours of lassitude and insomnia’ (Gosse 262).  We also know that he came down with bronchitis in 1893 (L 146), before his protracted final illness in the summer of 1894.
^89	  Pater does not attribute the Classical source, perhaps because the phrase had long since passed into common parlance.  Attributed to Herodotus and Menander, it was rendered by Plautus: ‘quem di diligunt, adolescens moritur.’  Among several subsequent versions, the best known may be Byron in Don Juan: ‘Whom the gods love, die young’ was said of yore,/ And many deaths do they escape by this’ (IV.12, 192). 
^90	  Alfred Lord Tennyson. Locksley Hall Sixty Years After <http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poem/2162.html> (line 246).
^91	  T.S. Eliot. ‘Burnt Norton.’ Four Quartets, 9.
^92	  See Wright II, 89.
^93	  The philosophy of time consciousness does not really begin, of course, until Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution and Time and Free Will, both published in 1910. 
^94	  For example, Peter Allan Dale suggests some parting of the ways as he asserts the greater significance of history to Pater:            [t]hat Pater both as a critic and as an imaginative writer is, in the end, a good deal more concerned             with tracing the historical development of speculative culture than he is with burning with a hard             gemlike [sic] flame is a point that needs more recognition than it has generally received from             modern writers.  (188)
^95	  It was published in 1894. There were also, though, posthumous collections: Essays from the Guardian, Greek Studies and Miscellaneous Studies.  
^96	  Andre Gide, Fruits of the Earth, 25. 
^97	  Meaning, literally, in the blink of an eye.
^98	  Since the twentieth century it has been reattributed to Titian, Giorgione’s contemporary, and fellow student of Giotto.  The image is reproduced as the frontispiece of this chapter.
^99	  The real life correlative is Andre Gide’s first unashamed homosexual desire for Mohammed the Algerian flautist, whose music Gide describes as so entrancing that ‘you forgot the time and place and who you were’ (Gide 1935, 251).  
^100	  ‘I too have been in Arcadia’ 
^101	  As for the importance of space that Pater maligns, his conception of the moment offers one way to read his private position.  In contrast to the common depictions of space in late aestheticism, epitomized by Aubrey Beardsley, which congeal domestic space into overblown clutter, the presence of Pater’s space is defined by emptiness.  Just as the moment is a sudden fracture in the banal flow of time, against which it stands out, Pater’s arrangement of his domestic space suggests the conscious employment of this principle. As Mrs. Humphrey Ward recalled: ‘The drawing-room which runs the whole breadth of the house from the road to the garden behind was “Paterian” in every line and ornament, with few selected ornaments: a vase, a painting by Rossetti’ (123).       
^102	  The assumed definitions of ugliness and beauty bear some consideration.  As we have seen, ‘the dust in the barn door’ occasions an aesthetic moment and elsewhere the scenes of death that surround Marius do not detract from his own moment of insight.  Perhaps then it is modernity itself that Pater finds ugly, in spite of the modernity of his thought.  He is pinned still to a notion of universal judgements not dissimilar to those of Kant.  This gives rise to his belief that the urban is ugly, a view quite out of place in his modern aesthetic.  By placing aesthetic judgement in the subjective mind and dissolving the metaphysical claim to universality central to Kantian aesthetics, Pater is enabled to be less conservative with his conception of beauty. But it  would be left to Arthur Symons, influenced by Pater and the Impressionists, to explore the implications of this.  
^103	  As I have mentioned in chapter I, the characteristics of the diaphanous man suggest that he may be conceived as a camera: with his light and translucency and his ability to capture the moment.  However this is left in the realm of allusion.  In view of Pater’s concern to reconcile continuous and atomistic conceptions of time, one wonders why he did not take a more active interest in photography.  Perhaps he harboured concerns regarding its challenge to artistry, or, looking forward, one may consider how Pater would have responded to moving pictures had he lived long enough to see them.  Carolyn Williams’ recent paper, ‘Walter Pater Film Theorist’ begins to explore his gestures in this regard.
^104	  The poem is ‘Watchman, What of the Night?’ 
^105	  Such ideas are better known through the voice of Nietzsche, especially in his early essay ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.’  This notion of past, present and future implicit in each other, more than any other idea makes me wonder whether there is a direct influence from him to Pater.  Take for example Nietzsche’s comment that ‘in opposition to all historical modes of regarding the past […] the past and present are one’ (1997, 66).  Most of Nietzsche’s works were not published until the 1890s and were unavailable in Britain until 1897, after Pater’s death.  However, ‘On the Use and Abuse of History for Life’ was published in a German journal in 1874: a year when Pater – who knew German well – spent the summer in Germany studying in Heidelberg, and three years before the second edition of The Renaissance in which he added ‘The School of Giorgione’.
^106	   Proust read The Renaissance and possibly other works in his formative years (Painter 257; 275).  Although on the subject of time he had a more rigorous interlocutor close at hand in the form of his cousin by marriage, the philosopher Henri Bergson, Proust’s aesthetic moment is the greatest illustration of and literary homage to Pater’s aesthetic moment.
^107	  Pater’s influence on these writers is widely acknowledged, in a general sense, The main discussions are  in Meisal’s Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and Walter Pater and Higgins’ The Modernist Cult of Ugliness: Aesthetic and Gender Politics. However, there is not nearly enough written on how Pateri’s concept ion of time, in particular, helped to precipitate literary modernism. 
^108	  Georg Simmel, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life,’ 409. 
^109	  Edgar Allan Poe’s epigram to ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (101).  It is quoted from The Characters of Man by Jean de la Bruyère.  The meaning is: ‘Such a great misfortune, not to be able to be alone.’
^110	  Chapters 6 and 7 were edited and published by Charles Shadwell in 1896.  Gerald Monsman has pieced together a further six chapters from the fragments of Pater's notes in his critical edition of the novel (Pater 1995, 84-308).
^111	  This together with Pater’s studies in the Heidelberg library and the British Museum (although there are no records of what he read) questions Inman’s argument that ‘the ideas in ‘Diaphaneitè’ parallel to Schiller’s could not have been derived form Schiller’ (1981a, 101) because his library records show that he borrowed none of Schiller’s work in Oxford.  
^112	  Schiller’s influence on Pater is oft-mooted but little expanded.  Billie Inman tentatively suggests that the idea of the diaphanous man as ‘a revolutionary type who, if multiplied, could profoundly affect the body politic [is] reflective of Schiller’ (75).  Intrigued by the possibilities of this influence, in The Sensible Spirit F.C. McGrath identifies an ‘impressively long list’ of issues and viewpoints that Pater shares with and is likely to have borrowed from Schiller (98ff).  As far as we know, Pater first read Schiller’s magnum opus On the Aesthetic Education of Man in 1865. But it is highly likely that he was already aware of Schiller through Goethe, and he may have read his work in Germany before the composition of ‘Diaphaneitè’ in May 1864.  The great friendship of Schiller and Goethe gave rise to an almost daily essayistic correspondence between 1794 and 1805 in which they worked out their aesthetics.  Because of this they were often mentioned in the same breath by writers including Thomas Carlyle and Oscar Browning.  Schiller had come to prominence in England in the early nineteenth century through his friend and correspondent Goethe and, whilst academia’s interest in German philosophy was regenerated only in the 1870s and 1880s by the British Idealists, works such as Carlyle’s ‘Life of Schiller’ (1825) and George Henry Lewes’ Life of Goethe (1855) meant that the educated public maintained a love-affair with German culture and thought (Wilson 348). 
^113	  Of course, ‘the imaginative reason’ is a phrase coined by Matthew Arnold in ‘Pagan and Mediaeval Religious Sentiment’ (161) and superficially it makes a similar claim that sense and intellect are fused in aesthetic experience.  However, Arnold deploys his concept rather differently. 
^114	  Like Kant, Schiller assumes synonymy between art and beauty.  Only, when he speaks of beauty he is invariably speaking of art and not natural beauty.
^115	  Kant’s own view of these matters also evolved. Whereas the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Critique of Practical Reason offer highly rationalistic conceptions, by 1790 in his Critique of Judgement Kant has reconsidered the significance and centrality of aesthetic experience, and also of ethics.  .
^116	  Kant’s transcendental freedom is distinct from that of Schiller by the fact that it proceeds from the faculty of the reason, whereas Schiller’s proceeds from the imagination.  Pater of course follows the latter, true to his belief that reason is subject to the imagination where it plays with the senses.
^117	  The notion of Old Mortality as a liberal brotherhood in which radical ideas could be voiced is sometimes overdone.  Lesley Higgins notes that Samuel Brooke, a co-member in the 1860s, warned Gerard Manley Hopkins against Pater after hearing the latter speak at one of the Society’s meeting (1991, 79).  
^118	  ‘The sitting-room whose panelling, which extends from floor to ceiling, Pater coloured primrose, has two windows, and the one which projects, became, when furnished with cushioned seats, his favourite reading place’ (Wright I. 215).   
^119	  Schiller’s views may have been influenced by both Catholicism and Hume’s concept of ‘natural virtues’ (1964, I.ii, 271ff.) but they are made distinct by their secular basis and the central role of aesthetics. 
^120	  Botticelli’s Madonna Magnificat is the cover illustration for this chapter. 
^121	  Of course, Pater was rather more reserved than Nietzsche; no doubt the lengths to which Nietzsche takes his often very Pateresque ideas would have shocked Pater beyond measure. The comparison between them has been made several times. Though I am not aware of any extensive comparison of their views on ethics, Patrick Bridgwater touches on some of the issues involved in Nietzsche in Anglosaxony (1972). One can read Nietzsche’s comments on ethics in Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.
^122	  Even as he expresses this teleology, Pater criticises teleological conceptions of humankind (A 60-1). In matters of ethics he argues that teleologies neglect ‘the intangible perfection of those whose ideal is rather in being than in doing’ (A 61). To some extent this may be addressed through his conception of time, which attempts to reconcile synchronic with diachronic in the ‘consummate moments’ of aesthetic contemplation (R 88).
^123	  In accordance with his sceptical empiricism, Hume bases moral principles entirely on sensual impressions, arguing that            vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, [so] it            must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark            the difference betwixt them’ […]  An action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or           vicious; why? Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind.                                                                                                                               (1964 II.iii.i, 179)
^124	  More broadly, Linda Dowling’s downplaying of Schiller’s significance may be questioned.  The idea that his philosophy survived, as she goes on to assert, ‘only [as] a ghostly idealized vestige […] to puzzle readers’ (87) does a great disservice to him.  In fact Schiller’s aesthetic philosophy exerted great influence on Coleridge and Schelling in the late eighteenth century, Nietzsche, Carlyle and Pater in the nineteenth century, and Walter Benjamin in the twentieth century, to name but a few.  In the twenty-first century so far, Germany has celebrated Schiller Year (2005) and academics such as George Steiner continue to engage with his aesthetic, declaring ‘Say it Loud – It’s Schiller and It’s Proud’!
^125	  Vernon Lee, Gospels of Anarchy and Other Contemporary Studies, 9.
^126	  This is not true of the two unpublished essays I have quoted from: ‘The History of Philosophy’ and ‘The Aesthetic Life’.  In these works Pater attempts more speculative enquiries, dealing directly with ideas rather than focusing these through individuals.  One wonders whether this conceptual distinction is not part of the reason why Pater could not make these essays work and ultimately abandoned them.  Pater writes best when he focuses his ideas through the stories of individuals: they concentrate and unify his ideas.
^127	  Watteau’s Gilles in the cover illustration of this conclusion.
^128	  This is a response to Gosse’s biographical article, which expresses a similar closing sentiment (271). 
